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“None of our men are ‘experts’. We have most 
unfortunately found it necessary to get rid of a man as 
soon as he thinks himself an expert because no one 
ever considers himself expert if he really knows his job. 
A man who knows a job sees so much more to be done 
than he has done, that he is always pressing forward 
and never gives up an instant of thought to how good 
and how efficient he is. Thinking always ahead, thinking 
always of trying to do more, brings a state of mind in 
which nothing is impossible. The moment  one gets into 
the ‘expert’ state of mind a great number of things 
become impossible.” 
– Henry Ford – 
 
- 6 - 
Table of Contents 
I.  FACE PROCESSING AND SOCIAL ANXIETY 7 
 
II.  INHIBITION OF RETURN IS UNIMPRESSED BY EMOTIONAL CUES 29 
 
III.  DISTURBING EMOTIONS: DO ANGRY WOMEN OR ANGRY MEN                               
DISTURB TARGET CATEGORIZATION ? 57 
 
IV.  MORPHED EMOTIONS:  EMOTION DETECTION                                                                     
AND MISINTERPRETATION IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 77 
 
V.  HERE'S LOOKING AT YOU, FOLKS: EYE MOVEMENT                                                          
AND THE EVALUATION OF FACIAL CROWDS 105 
 
VI.  SOCIAL ANXIETY AND THE EVALUATION OF SOCIAL CROWDS:                            
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT MEASURES 131 
 
VII.  INDUCED INTERPRETATION BIAS INFLUENCES                                                    
AUTOMATIC AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOR 161 
 
VIII.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 179 
 
IX.  SUMMARY 211 
 
X.  SAMENVATTING 219 
 
XI.  REFERENCES 229 
 
XII.  DANKWOORD 245 
 
XIII.  CURRICULUM VITAE 247 
 
XIV. PUBLICATIONS 247 
 
XV.    CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 248 
- 7 - 
Chapter 1 
Face Processing and Social Anxiety 
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“Your face is a book, where men may read strange matters” 
 
– William Shakespeare – 
 
 
… Imagine that there were pills that left you without anxiety for whatever circumstance. An individual 
deprived of all anxiety would very likely be doomed to short life: He would step too close to a cliff, 
cross a busy street when the gap between cars is too small, get stuck in a narrow passage between 
caves, drive too fast, be bitten/killed by dogs, snakes or, as in former times predators, behave 
unsocial, rude, engage in fighting, become outcast, and so on. Thus, it seems as if a certain degree of 
anxiety has been quite useful in order to ascertain survival in ancient, and is still useful in modern 
times …  
 
Anxiety can be seen as a threefold set of responses to a threatening situation: 
Information processing (cognition), physiological activation, and behavior 
initiation/inhibition (Lang, 1985). Relevant information of context and environment 
must be analyzed and filtered, the body must be prepared to take action and 
appropriate behavior must be launched – all within a fraction of time. In terms of 
survival of a species (Darwin, 1859), the evolution of an efficient threat detection 
system makes sense. It has been argued that automatic, quick evaluation of a 
situation and activation of an organism to fight or flee increases its survival and 
consequently the likelihood of reproduction (compare: LeDoux, 1996; Öhman, 1993; 
Öhman & Soares, 1993). Geary (2007; Geary & Huffman, 2002) suggested that 
selective pressure must have led to the evolution of a certain “motivation to control”. 
He sees such a “motivation” reflected in a kind of biased processing for survival 
related cues and a desire to modify environmental circumstances in order to 
enhance chances of survival. Specifically, it has been suggested (Öhman, Dimberg, 
& Öst, 1985; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971) that some biological threats 
have evolved to be processed quicker than others, because they once were life-
threatening in human ancestry. Here, one could think of e.g., spiders, heights, 
predators, snakes, and interestingly enough, facial expressions. This last one may 
appear striking, but it has been supposed that facial expressions are highly 
communicative (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Öhman (1985) and colleagues suggested 
that an enhanced detection of angry faces is relevant for an individual in a group to 
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show submissive behavior if demanded. By doing so an individual sustains group 
structure and one’s own membership. In the same line, ignorance of an emotional 
appeal might have lead to disrupted social group coherence (and still does) and 
might have led to rejection from the group. Taken even further, survival does also 
imply reproduction (Darwin, 1859). Ignorance of cues for alliances/mating or signals 
of threat can both hamper survival (Gilbert, 2001; Sapolsky, 2004). Thus, automated 
attention for e.g., a smile could be evolutionarily relevant when displayed by a 
member of the opposite sex, while an angry face may imply more danger when 
depicted by a member of the same gender (compare: Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, 
Blackwell, & Smith, 2007).  
 Baron-Cohen (1995; but compare also: Emery, 2000) supposed that the 
interplay of neurological structures allowing eye gaze detection, in combination with 
the automated recognition of emotional expressions have a distinct communicative 
value. Someone looking fearful at me seems to be afraid of me, while he or she 
would be afraid of something behind me if not directly looking at me. In the latter 
case, it might be crucial, in terms of survival, to turn around quickly and find out 
myself. Here, eye gaze or gaze direction have the capacity to communicate the 
direction of threat, but also intentions. The capability to extract intentions and 
direction of attention of someone’s eyes, and the facial expressions of another 
individual enhances, once more, survival. Fridlund (1994) investigated the 
evolutionary relevance of a facial expression as a whole. He assumed that 
displaying for instance, an angry face might have evolved as means to spare an 
individual from “costly” fighting beforehand. At the same time, an attentional bias for 
the quick detection of angry faces in an observer of such a display might keep one 
from dangerous, tedious defense:  
 
“Millions of years ago, if you crossed my turf, I might bite your 
head off [at some risk to me, if you decided to retaliate]. If you 
had advance warning, you might escape death through retreat 
or protective defense, and we’d both survive.  
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But you’d need cues to retreat or protect. I’d have to give 
them, and you’d have to notice them. Here’s the scenario: 
because of a lucky gene, I adventitiously bared one tooth for 
½ second before I pounced. Your lucky gene made you look at 
my head. I bared my tooth, and you looked in the right place, 
not because I wanted to display my feelings, or because you 
wanted to see how I felt. We both acted out of pure dumb 
genetic luck. That we survived our skirmish increases the 
chances that our lucky genes will proliferate, and that my odd 
tooth-baring and your odd vigilance for it will both disseminate 
in our progeny.“ (Fridlund, 1994; p. 76) 
 
There is an evolutionary drawback, however: As an excessive use of “threat 
displays” undermines its trustworthiness and might provoke attacks after all. 
Hypervigilance for such displays, on the other hand, might keep someone from 
valuable, even necessary resources (Fridlund, 1994). Even though, this mechanism 
is much more complex than presented here, it serves as comprehensible analogy: If 
one is hypersensitive to socio-evaluative stress, one might retreat from any form of 
social contact, become isolated, and increasingly experience difficulty in fulfilling 
one’s daily social needs.  
 In sum, in the history of evolution, not only missing the opportunity to find a 
mate, or provoking the contempt of one individual but especially provoking the 
rejection from a group must have been a major threat to survival. This might, even 
today, explain general stress-proneness in human beings when interacting in groups 
(Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005). Thus, sensitivity to certain facial 
expressions that communicate individually relevant emotions of others, and a certain 
degree of social anxiety that steers one’s actions in a social context is adaptive and 
favorable. Hypersensitivity to social threat and exaggerated social anxiety, though, 
are costly in evolutionary terms. 
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Nevertheless, results substantiating evolutionary “preparedness” (compare: 
Seligman, 1971) for particular threat stimuli is not as consistently found as suggested 
(e.g., Mayer, Merckelbach, de Jong, & Leeuw, 1999), though neuro-biological 
research has been successful in locating the core features of the fear system. 
Consistently, the amgygdala, a central sub-cortical brain structure, has been found to 
play a key role in emotion related processes, as anxiety is one. It appears as if two 
neural pathways are involved in the processing of fear: A quick, direct route via 
thalamus and amygdala, and a slower indirect route via thalamus, cortical regions, 
and amygdala (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2007; Vuilleumier, 2005). Along the former route, 
the perceptual information processing is rather rudimentary: Based on several key 
features, analysis of the emotional relevance of a stimulus takes place quickly, and if 
necessary preparatory, reflexive behavior patterns are initiated. Via the latter route, a 
more thorough analysis takes place in the cortex. Here, not only threat cues but also 
environment cues, earlier experiences and knowledge gained over previous 
experiences are taken into consideration. Further action is guided by all available 
information, and continues or inhibits the behavior triggered via the quick route 
(LeDoux, 1996; Whalen et al., 1998). Both routes contribute to alerting and 
protecting an individual from harm when functioning properly.  
 But what, if the threat system is hypersensitive, if it alerts too early and 
overprotects the individual so that he or she consorts in a permanent state of fear 
and tension? What, if he or she overreacts to fairly controllable confrontations with 
supposed fear stimuli, in a way that, social, educational, or professional areas of 
functioning are impaired? Than one might fulfill the criteria of an anxiety disorder. 
Herein fears can have many different facets: they can be triggered by very specific 
cues as in specific phobia (e.g., arachnophobia: fear of spiders), or by a very broad 
variety as in generalized anxiety disorder. 
The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000 [APA]) differentiates seven anxiety disorders, with 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD; or Social Phobia) being the second from most 
prevalent one. In fact SAD is found to be the most prevalent mental disorder after 
major depression, substance dependency, and specific phobias, with lifetime 
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prevalence rates ranging from 7 to 13% (Hofmann & Bitran, 2007; Kessler, Stein, & 
Berglund, 1998; Vriends et al., 2007) . 
 People suffering from SAD are afraid to be evaluated negatively by, or to 
behave embarrassingly in the presence of others. Imagine yourself being constantly 
worried about how you come across when talking to other people. If individuals are 
afraid to be found boring or clumsy, their foremost fear is to be rejected and 
abandoned eventually. As a result, they may undergo, or develop marked and 
persistent fear in social or social performance situations in which scrutiny by others 
might be possible (for details see: APA, 2000). The age of onset reported for SAD, 
ranges between 12.0 and 16.6 years (Fehm, Pelissolo, Furmark, & Wittchen, 2005; 
Vriends et al., 2007). Earlier onset ages are associated with a more generalized and 
severe symptomatology. The disorder is more prevalent among females (Becker, 
Türke, Neumer, Soeder, & Margraf, 2002; Kessler et al., 1998). If untreated, SAD 
becomes increasingly associated with co-morbid mental problems such as 
depression, alcoholism, but also financial, social and occupational difficulties (Fehm 
et al., 2005; Stein, 2006). For obvious reasons, individuals with SAD generally take 
long, about four years, before contacting a health professional: They fear for 
instance to be despised for their complains by the clinician or not taken seriously. 
What makes matters even worse is the low proportion correctly diagnosed and 
treated patients: Only about 9% of the family physicians of social phobic patients 
realized that anxiety (in general) was the basis of the reported complaints by their 
patients (Wagner, Silove, Marnane, & Rouen, 2006).  
 In previous years several models have sought to describe the etiology of 
SAD. More recently research indicates that many factors play a role in the 
development of SAD: e.g., evolution (genetic vulnerability), personality (temperament 
as a child), parent-child interaction (e.g., overprotection), aversive/negative 
(childhood) experiences, deficits in social skills, avoidance behavior, and cognitive 
styles (e.g., negative interpretation of ambiguous social events; for overview see: 
Bitran & Barlow, 2004; Mathew & Ho, 2006; Rapee & Spence, 2004). 
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 SAD is particularly characterized by a marked tendency to interpret 
(ambiguous) social events as negative and seeing negative cues as supporting 
evidence for the scrutiny at hand. Two influential models have attempted to explain 
these phenomena. In 1995, Clark and Wells presumed that individuals suffering from 
social anxiety disorder base their negative evaluations of social situations on a 
number of threatening assumptions (e.g., “If I am not an interesting interlocutor, they 
will not like me.”). Accordingly, social cues are interpreted in a tendentiously negative 
way confirming their fears (Figure 1.1). Their attention moves inwards on bodily 
anxiety symptoms, and on imaginations of themselves “messing up”, instantiating 
anxiety concepts in the present and for future situations. 
 Similarly, Rapee and Heimberg (1997; Figure 1.2) associated a cognitive 
preoccupation with social threat as a maintaining factor in the etiology of social 
anxiety. In contrast to the suppositions of Clark and Wells (1995), they suggested a 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Model reprinted from Clark and Wells (1995). 
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vigilance to and focus on more external cues of threat by the anxious individual. 
Their model additionally implies that selective attention for signals representing 
potentially negative social evaluation might also include (ambiguous) emotional 
facial expressions.  
 Research exploring the validity of these cognitive models, has attempted to 
tackle various aspects of cognitive biases by investigating participants’ reactions to 
socially threatening word fragments, (ambiguous) words, or text vignettes describing 
social scenarios, to-be-rated video fragments of social interactions, confederate 
feedback, or emotional and neutral face stimuli. When participants pay attention to, 
rate, or interpret (outcomes of) written ambiguous social situations, results frequently 
indicate that social anxiety might be associated with increased attention to negative 
or threatening information (Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005), 
 
 
 Figure 1.2 Model reprinted from Rapee and Heimberg (1997). 
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and a negative interpretation style (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998b; Brendle & Wenzel, 
2004; Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Voncken, 
Bögels, & de Vries, 2003). Negative interpretation- and judgment biases of social 
scenarios are believed to be prominent candidates for dysfunctional information 
processes in social phobic patients (Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 2001; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000).  
 There is less coherent evidence of such a bias when participants have to 
react to, evaluate, or identify facial expressions, a main ingredient of social 
interaction (for overview see Table 1.1). This is surprising, when considering that 
facial (emotional) expressions are reputed to be of marked evolutionary value 
(Haxby et al., 2000; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 
2001) especially for social interactions. In fact, processing of emotional faces is 
believed to be “hardwired” to specific brain areas for quick identification/recognition 
(e.g., Haxby et al., 2000; Herrmann, Ehlis, Muehlberger, & Fallgatter, 2005; 
Vuilleumier, 2002, 2005). As stated above, this speeded processing is thought to 
have evolved in order to facilitate, under more, detection of anger in an opponent 
and protect an individual from harm. Specifically, an expression of for example 
sympathy, surprise, or anger, but also a neutral/ambiguous face might be potentially 
threatening for a person suffering from SAD because such expressions might be 
interpreted as reflecting rejection or might simply ask for interaction.  
 
In sum, while evaluation biases in social anxiety are consistently found with word 
related material, compatible results with facial expression are scarce. In this thesis 
distraction by, (automatic) responses to, and recognition and direct evaluations of 
emotional and neutral faces are being assessed and are interpreted in relation to 
degree of social anxiety in non-clinical populations. The employment of socially 
anxious individuals rather than participants suffering from SAD must be seen as an 
analogy. While the first are much easier to recruit in a university environment, 
recruitment of the latter demands much more time and resources. We felt that results 
from socially anxious but not diagnosed participants can contribute largely to the 
understanding of social phobia.  
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 Goal of the present thesis is to shed more light on afore mentioned 
inconsistencies of facial expression research in social anxiety. By doing so we strive 
to contribute to the development of a theoretical outline that helps understand the 
role and the nature of cognitive distortions when socially anxious individuals are 
confronted with emotional expressions, and eventually use our comprehension to 
develop improved treatment modules and help reduce the suffering of patients with 
this debilitating disorder. To achieve this goal, the following line of research will be 
put forward and the following research-questions will be asked: 
 First, we start with a more general investigation attempting to replicate 
findings showing that supposedly evolutionarily relevant threat cues, namely pictures 
of spiders and of angry faces, have the potential to draw and especially hold 
attention in a way that other reflexive attentional processes are undermined. We will 
investigate whether both types of stimuli trigger attentional vigilance and enhanced 
dwelling (disrupted disengagement) in a normal population as would be expected if 
evolutionarily relevant. Subsequently, we will investigate, whether the same 
processes are more pronounced in a population with fear for such stimuli (spider 
fearful and high socially anxious individuals).  
 Second, phenomena imputed to disrupted disengagement can also be 
attributed to a narrowing of attention when one is confronted with threatening 
material in the attentional field. By means of a flanker paradigm we will explore if 
threatening stimuli do indeed narrow the attentional field and thus restrict the 
influence of task irrelevant flanking stimuli. Additionally we are interested if such an 
effect is enhanced with high degrees of social anxiety and as such contribute to the 
maintenance of anxiety symptoms.  
 Third, attentional vigilance for a threatening face cannot only manifest itself in 
quick detection of a “full-blown” facial expression. In fact, it would be plausible to 
assume that socially anxious individuals are also particularly good in detecting a 
threatening emotion very rapidly and identify the developing expression correctly 
before the entire expression has been seen.  
 Fourth, to answer the question if not only covert attentional processes but, 
additionally, overt attention is affected by certain types of facial expression, we will 
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record the eye movement of participants while observing a matrix of faces (facial 
crowd) with different ratios of two intermixed expressions. Additionally, we will 
explore if the eye movements can predict subjective evaluations of the crowds by the 
participants and if social anxiety plays a dominant role in it.  
 Fifth, when social anxiety is characterized by fear for social situations and 
communication, looking for negative ratings of facial crowds may not be sensitive 
enough to tap into and explain the cognitive processes of the disorder. Therefore, we 
will investigate if automatic behavior patterns, such as approach and avoidance 
reactions, differ between socially anxious individuals and non-anxious individuals 
when confronted with emotional facial crowds.  
 Finally, after examining different facets of cognitive biases and automatic 
behavior patterns, the sequence of cause and effect needs to be addressed. We will 
investigate whether in a normal population an induced cognitive bias, as previously 
observed in socially phobic individuals, brings about reflexive approach-avoidance 
tendencies that are similar to those of socially anxious individuals. 
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Inhibition of return (IOR) and emotional cues 
 
In Chapter 2, the influence of emotional stimuli on reflexive attentional processes is 
investigated. Usually, a target is detected more quickly when the location where it is 
about to occur is previously cued (reflexive orienting), then when it is not cued or 
when the cue is wrong. With long cue-target stimulus onset asynchronies, though, 
response latencies become longer when the target is correctly cued (Posner, 1980, 
1990). This phenomenon, called Inhibition of return (IOR), is thought to facilitate the 
processing/scanning of novel over previously scanned visual loci, promoting more 
efficacy of the attentional system (Klein & MacInnes, 1999; Lupianez, Klein, & 
Bartolomeo, 2006). On the other hand, it is supposed that an increased threat 
sensitivity or threat appraisal as observed in anxiety disorders, can bias reflexive 
orienting predominantly towards threatening stimuli (hypervigilance: e.g., Eysenck, 
1992; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). When comparing both theoretical implications, 
IOR with those of hypervigilance for threat, they seem to contradict each other 
(compare: Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006): When the cue is biologically 
relevant and threatening, the IOR effect should be weakened. Cognitive theories of 
anxiety do indeed suppose that threatening, biologically relevant cues catch and 
hold attention and diminish the IOR effect, even if the location is already inspected 
(e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002).  
 In three experiments we tested the hypothesis that the emotional valence of 
cues (animals or facial expressions) influence the strength of the IOR effect in a 
probe detection task. To increase the degree of threat relevance, all materials were 
additionally tested in spider fearfuls, socially anxious, and non-anxious control 
participants.  
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Distraction or facilitation in a flanker task 
 
The assumption that threatening valid cues undermines IOR is based on the idea 
that individuals sensitive to those threats have difficulty disengaging their attention 
from the “threat location”. Hence, the influence of an “attentional bias for novelty” 
diminishes. Disrupted disengagement however, can also be spawned by a narrowing 
of the attentional diameter in response to threatening stimuli. In 2003, Fenske and 
Eastwood employed Eriksen and Eriksen’s flanker paradigm (1974) to investigate 
the role of attentional narrowing. Participants were asked to categorize the 
expression of centrally presented (emotional) target faces, while ignoring the faces 
(flankers) left and/or right of the target. Yet, flankers did influence task performance. 
Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) found that in general flankers similar to targets speeded 
target categorization (flanker-compatibility effect) as compared to differing flankers. 
Since threat is associated with attentional narrowing, Fenske and Eastwood (2003) 
found that attentional narrowing in reaction to a threatening target facilitated its 
categorization: Facilitating similar flankers and distracting dissimilar flankers fall 
beyond the attention boundaries and the flanker-compatibility effect is weakened 
when threatening targets have to be categorized. In an attempt to replicate their 
findings (Chapter 3), we used a comparable experimental setup but employed real 
facial expressions instead of schematic faces.  
 
The recognition of morphed emotions 
 
Social anxiety might be characterized by biased mechanisms beyond extended 
dwelling on the location of threatening stimuli, increased distractibility, or attentional 
narrowing in response to facial expressions. It is possible that socially anxious 
individuals simply recognize threatening stimuli faster or believe to have detected the 
first signs of a negative facial expression (as suggested by Rappee and Heimberg, 
1997). In the study described in Chapter 4, we examined this hypothesis. When 
observing the progressing of a face that gradually changes from neutral to emotional 
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(angry, neutral, happy, disgusted), socially anxious and non-anxious participants 
were instructed to stop the film whenever they recognize the expression. We 
registered the elapsed time and also the emotion participants believed to see 
developing during the film, and whether their guesses are correct. In a second task, 
high and low socially anxious participants watch the same morphed movies but are 
free to fast-forward or rewind the film to find the “onset-point” of the emotional 
expression and to see the full expression at the end of the film. Again the onset-point 
of the emotion, its name, and errors in naming the displayed emotion are recorded. 
 
The movement of eyes when observing a crowd 
 
In Chapter 4 a new dimension has been added to the series of experiments: 
Conscious guessing of the developing emotional expression (restricted viewing) and 
naming of the emotion when finally completely displayed (free viewing). This has 
brought up the question how recognition and evaluation take place and whether 
overt attentional processes such as eye movements can predict them. Further, it is 
possible that single face stimuli are not ambiguous enough to leave much room for 
misinterpretation. It is thinkable that the presentation of a group of faces showing 
different emotional expressions simultaneously creates increased ambiguity to 
provoke negative evaluation. In fact, it is supposed that social interaction in groups is 
even more threatening for socially anxious individuals than one-on-one interaction 
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Presburger, Marom, & Hermesh, 2005). In Chapter 5, we 
therefore explored if social anxiety is related to negative evaluation of emotional 
crowds. Here, “crowds” are constructed, showing individuals with different ratios of 
two different facial expressions (happy-angry, or neutral-angry). The subjective 
ratings of how “friendly” the participants find the groups were compared between 
socially anxious and non-anxious control participants. To shed more light on the 
attentional processes involved, we also recorded the eye movements while 
participants observed the displays. 
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Approach-avoidance tendencies and emotional crowds 
 
Eye movement recording in Chapter 5 have revealed that social anxiety was related 
to shorter gaze durations at angry faces once they were fixated first. Additionally, 
SAs, as compared to NACs, had a tendency of fixating proportionally more angry 
faces than non-angry faces. It appears that negative evaluation of emotional faces 
might not so much be reflected in conscious evaluations, but rather in automatic 
behaviors such as eye movement. In Chapter 6, we specifically investigated if 
(biased) evaluation of facial expression is more clearly reflected in automatic 
behavior than in direct evaluation. If processing of emotional faces is indeed 
facilitated by neurological hardwiring, investigation of distracted covert attention by 
threat, or conscious ratings of facial expressions might not tap into the responsible 
cognitive mechanisms, or might not be sensitive enough to detect possible biases. 
Measurement of observable automatic or reflexive behavior impulses, on the other 
hand, might tap into these processes. To investigate this notion, we compare 
indirectly assessed, automatic evaluations in response to facial crowds, with direct, 
subjective evaluations of these facial crowds. In an adapted version of an Approach-
Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007), participants scoring high and low in 
social anxiety, could by means of a joystick “avoid” neutral-angry, or happy-angry 
face combinations (crowds) presented on a computer screen by quickly pushing 
them away, or “approach” them by pulling them closer. The underlying idea of this 
task is that human beings have a tendency to automatically approach pleasant 
stimuli while avoiding unpleasant or threatening ones (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; 
Solarz, 1960), even when stimulus valence is not task relevant.  
 
Induced bias changes approach-avoidance tendencies  
 
In Chapter 7, we extended the findings from Chapter 6. We have found that socially 
anxious individuals have a tendency to interpret ambiguous social situations as 
negative and impulsively react avoidant towards increasingly angry crowds. 
Therefore, we assume that an induced interpretative bias might be an analogy for 
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social anxiety and transfers to automatic approach-avoidance tendencies. In recent 
years, researchers have started to investigate the cause-effect-chain of biases in 
and symptoms of anxiety in more detail. It is still unclear if people are anxious to start 
with and hence develop a cognitive bias as a symptom. Or is it the other way around 
and have people adopted a cognitive style that eventually results in increased fear 
and symptoms of an anxiety disorder. To investigate the influence of biases on 
healthy human beings, new techniques have been developed, which allow the 
induction of cognitive biases in non-anxious participants (Cognitive Bias Modulation 
[CBM]; e.g., Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006). The question 
remains, whether CBMs transfers/generalizes to measures estimating anxiety or 
anxiety-related behavior. Recently, it has been shown that a benign, four-session 
interpretation training (CBM-I) increased the number of positive interpretations of 
novel ambiguous events in highly trait anxious participants. Additionally, the degree 
of subjectively reported trait anxiety decreased after the training (Mathews, 
Ridgeway, Cook, & Yiend, 2007).  
 We have presented data in Chapter 6 showing that crowds with increasing 
emotional faces provoked automatic avoidance reactions in participants with 
elevated degrees of social anxiety. We wondered whether the same could be true 
when “normally anxious” participants are trained to negatively interpret ambiguous 
social situations. As in Chapter 6, an indirect Approach-Avoidance procedure is used 
to measure responses to emotional multi-facial displays (“crowds”) after the bias 
induction. 
  
In Chapter 8, the findings of the six studies are summarized. Based on the presented 
studies we discuss our comprehension of the processing of (emotional) facial 
expressions in social anxiety disorder, as well as the implications for the research 
field. 
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Chapter 2 
Inhibition of Return is Unimpressed by 
Emotional Cues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as: Lange, W.-G., Heuer, K., Reinecke, A., Becker, 
E.S., & Rinck, M. (2008). Inhibition of return is unimpressed by emotional cues. 
Journal of Cognition and Emotion, 22(8), 1433-1456. 
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Abstract 
 
Inhibition of return (IOR) is a phenomenon observed when a target unexpectedly 
appears in the place of a preceding cue: With long cue-target stimulus onset 
asynchronies, reaction times are longer than for targets that appear in an alternative 
location. Cognitive theories of anxiety suppose that the IOR effect diminishes with 
threatening, biologically relevant cues because these catch and hold attention. To 
test this hypothesis, we conducted three experiments, in which emotional valence of 
cues (animals or facial expressions) had no influence on the strength of the IOR 
effect, neither in an unselected sample of students nor in highly spider fearful or 
socially anxious participants. Inhibition of return appears to be a robust effect, blind 
to cue valence. 
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Introduction 
 
According to theories of information processing, attention is a highly automated 
system striving to optimize quick and accurate perception of objects and changes in 
the visual field (Yantis, 1996). Several authors suppose that two distinguishable 
attentional systems control voluntary and automatic orienting (Norman & Shallice, 
1986; Posner, 1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990). While the endogenous attentional 
system (voluntary orienting) appears to be located in the anterior brain areas, for 
example the anterior cingulated cortex, the exogenous attention system (reflexive 
orienting) is located in the parietal lobe, the pulvinar, and the superior colliculus 
(Roelofs, van Galen, Eling, Keijsers, & Hoogduin, 2003; for details see: Pardo, 
Pardo, Janet & Raichle, 1990; Peterson, Fox, Miezen, & Raichle, 1988). Moreover, it 
has been found that the reflexive attentional system exhibits a certain kind of 
“novelty bias”, in that attention is allocated to specific locations only if it is likely that a 
new stimulus is going to appear in this location. If you are, for example, riding in your 
car and a ball rolls onto the street in front of you, your alertness increases because 
you expect a child running after the ball. The ball is a cue with some predictive value, 
that is, there is a high chance that the ball is followed by a child (a target of 
attention). Therefore, you voluntarily orient your head towards the location of where 
you first spotted the ball. If, after some elapsed time, no child has appeared to get 
the ball, its predictive value declines and so does the alertness to this specific cued 
location. It might even be so that it is more difficult now to redirect your attention to 
the “ball location” because you have already looked there and nothing happened. 
One has to be aware, though, that this simplified example refers to endogenous 
redirection of attention, a voluntary movement. Imagine now having made the 
experience sketched above several hundred times, each time with a child following 
the ball. It is very likely that the redirection of your attention to the ball has become 
automatized – reflexively triggered whenever a cue is detected. Taylor and Therrien 
(2005, p.1414) suppose that the cued position receives a “… hypothetical location-
based inhibitory tag [which] marks the location as visited”, and then inhibits 
subsequent return of attention to the same location. This phenomenon has been 
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termed inhibition of return of attention (compare: Klein & Taylor, 1994; Posner, Rafal, 
Choate, & Vaughan, 1985; Taylor & Klein, 1998, 2000). 
Inhibition of return has been investigated mainly with a task employing two 
possible locations for cues and targets on a computer screen. In this task, a cue 
stimulus appears randomly in one of the two locations, disappears, and is then 
followed by a target, which appears either in the cued location (called a valid trial) or 
in the uncued location (invalid trial). If the target follows the cue quickly, people often 
show a faster reaction to targets on valid trials than on invalid ones, a phenomenon 
called facilitation by cueing. If there is a delay between cue onset and target onset, 
the pattern reverses, and inhibition of return (IOR) occurs. Posner and Cohen (1984) 
suggested that the temporal limit which separates facilitating cueing effects from IOR 
effects lies around an SOA of 300 ms (i.e., if the cue appears 300 ms earlier than the 
target), and Samuel and Kat (2003) found that the IOR effect is surprisingly stable 
between SOAs of 300 ms and 3300 ms. Moreover, inhibition of return of one’s 
attention to a formerly cued location has biological and evolutionary implications. It 
prevents repeated scanning of irrelevant locations that have already been sampled, 
promoting more efficacy of the attentional system (Klein & MacInnes, 1999; Lupianez 
et al., 2006). 
Independently of these findings, several authors have proposed that stimuli 
related to danger may be processed pre-attentively, and therefore particularly 
rapidly. In general, a pre-attentive analysis of stimuli makes evolutionary sense, for 
instance because fast detection of danger in the environment allows for faster 
reactions and hence, a higher chance of survival (Öhman, 1993; Öhman & Soares, 
1993; LeDoux, 1996). Additionally, Mineka and Öhman (2002) assumed that 
mammals possess an evolved fear system, pre-programmed to rapidly detect 
specific, (formerly life-)threatening stimuli such as spiders, snakes, heights, and 
(socially) threatening facial expressions of others. Neurobiological research confirms 
that certain stimuli appear to have a kind of “biological hardwiring” that facilitates the 
identification and categorization of some stimuli above others: e.g., spiders and 
snakes (Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), or emotional facial 
expressions (Haxby et al., 2000; Herrmann et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2002; 
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Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). Therefore, reflexive orienting and the emotional 
relevance of these biologically or evolutionarily encumbered stimuli are of great 
interest in experimental psychopathology. For instance, it is supposed that an 
increased threat sensitivity or threat appraisal of anxiety patients biases their 
reflexive orienting to threatening stimuli, and by doing so initiates or maintains 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). 
Hypervigilance for (biologically) threatening cues, the reflexive allocation of attention 
to threat and the aggravated disengagement of attention from threat in anxiety 
patients have been termed attentional biases. 
If one combines the findings and theoretical explanations of IOR with those of 
attentional biases, it seems that inhibition of return and attentional biases for 
biologically relevant threat stimuli may contradict each other under certain 
circumstances (see also Theeuwes & van der Stigchel, 2006). In particular, the IOR 
effect should be weakened when the cue is biologically relevant and threatening. In 
this case, even if the threatening cue does not predict the location of the following 
target, it should catch and hold attention, such that targets appearing in its location 
will be advantaged rather than disadvantaged compared to targets appearing in 
another location. If this is indeed the case, the enhanced relevance of threatening 
cues in patients with an anxiety disorder may actually lead to a complete dissipation 
of the IOR effect. Indeed, there appears to be some evidence for this suggestion. 
Fox, Russo, & Dutton, (2002) concluded from their results that angry faces employed 
as invalid cues do indeed eliminate the IOR effect in highly trait anxious participants. 
In Experiment 2 of their study, they examined whether relevant emotional stimuli 
(schematic faces) would reduce the IOR effect, and whether the reduction would be 
more pronounced in high trait-anxious participants. Their results suggested a general 
reduction of the IOR effect following angry cues, but not neutral or smiling cues, in 
both high and low trait-anxious participants. In Experiment 3, all participants 
underwent a mood induction and a jumbled face replaced the smiling face in order to 
rule out low-level visual features as an explanation of the results. In this study, 
specific reductions of the IOR effect were found, however, for several reasons the 
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results have to be interpreted cautiously. First, jumbled faces produced the same 
IOR reduction as angry faces. Second, it appeared that the mood induction only 
worked for high trait-anxious individuals and not for the non-anxious controls. 
Consequently, group differences may be inflated by the unsuccessful anxiety 
induction in the non-anxious controls. Third, Fox et al. (2002) directed participants’ 
attention to the fixation point again after cue presentation: “The cue was 
subsequently blanked out and 200 ms later the central cross was darkened for a 
further 300 ms. The initial fixation display was then presented for 160 ms and then 
the target was presented.” (Fox et al., 2002; p. 367). This redirection of the 
participants' attention to the central fixation point between presentation of cue and 
target is not seen often, and its impact on the observed reaction times remains 
unclear. Nevertheless, the results contradict those of Taylor & Therrien (2005), who 
found that the IOR effect was not reduced by facial cues. None of these studies 
employed other biologically relevant cue stimuli, for instance threatening animals, 
and none studied the effects of these stimuli in groups differing in their specific fear 
of these stimuli. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to test the prediction of a 
reduced IOR effect following biologically relevant cues in different populations. To 
this end, we used versions of Posner’s covert orienting paradigm (Posner, 1980). 
Posner distinguishes two types of orienting: overt with movement of head and/or 
eyes, and covert without moving head and eyes (Posner, 1980). In experiments 
employing this paradigm, participants are asked to react to a target presented 
anywhere in their visual field, while keeping their eyes focused on a central fixation 
cross. Before the appearance of the target, a cue appears either in the same location 
as the target (a valid cue) or in a different location (an invalid cue). In the 
experiments reported here, the stimulus onset asynchrony of cue and target was 
varied, as was the valence of the cue. In Experiment 1, drawings of a spider, a 
butterfly, and a cross (Experiment 1A) were used as cues, as well as pictures of 
angry, neutral, and smiling individuals (Experiment 1B). With neutral cues and longer 
SOAs (> 300 ms), cueing is generally thought to cause IOR, that is, facilitated target 
detection on invalid trials compared to valid ones. Therefore, we employed an SOA 
 
IOR and Emotional Cues 
- 35 - 
of 550 ms for all cues. The critical question was whether in an unselected student 
sample, the IOR effect would be reduced for threatening, biologically relevant stimuli 
(spiders and angry faces), or for emotionally valenced stimuli in general (spiders, 
butterflies, angry and smiling faces), as opposed to neutral stimuli (crosses and 
neutral faces). 
To find out whether the biologically relevant cues gain sufficient threat value 
when presented to highly fearful participants, the task containing spider, butterfly, 
and cross cues was repeated with selected samples of highly spider fearful 
participants versus non-fearful ones (Experiment 2). The prediction was that the IOR 
effect would generally be reduced by spider cues, and that spider fearfuls might not 
show any IOR effect at all after spider cues. In Experiment 3, the biologically relevant 
cues were again angry, neutral, and smiling facial expressions. It is supposed that an 
angry expression inflicts threat on human beings in general (Hansen & Hansen, 
1988; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) and especially so for 
socially anxious individuals (Lundh & Öst, 1996a, 1996b; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 
Therefore, the same facial cues as in Experiment 1B were presented to selected 
samples of highly socially anxious versus non-anxious individuals. As in Experiment 
1B, a general reduction of the IOR was predicted after cues showing angry facial 
expressions. Additionally, it was expected that in the highly socially anxious, the IOR 
might disappear altogether. 
 
Experiment 1: Emotional cues in an unselected sample 
 
In Experiment 1, we investigated the influence of evolutionary relevant cues on the 
magnitude of the IOR. Angry emotional faces as well as spiders are supposed to 
have an evolutionary threat value to humans, therefore, both types of cues should 
reduce the IOR effect, such that participants do not react more quickly to invalidly 
cued targets than to validly cued ones. All participants completed the same set of 
questionnaires and the same two computerized experimental tasks (Part 1A: spider 
cues, Part 1B: facial cues). 
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Experiment 1: General Methods 
Participants. An unselected sample of 54 students of the University of Nijmegen 
participated in the experiment (see Table 2.1). An experimental session contained 
two computer tasks and lasted for 40 minutes, for which participants received 
payment of €4 or course credit. Due to registration errors and some missing values, 
not all data sets could be processed. Consequently, the composition of participants 
varied slightly between the two tasks and the questionnaires (see below). 
 Procedure. Before the two computer tasks 1A and 1B, participants filled in a 
general screening questionnaire for eyesight, handedness, education, and 
medication; the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; Mennin, 
Fresco, Heimberg, Schneier, Davies, & Liebowitz, 2002; Oakman, Van-Ameringen, 
Mancini, & Farvolden, 2003), the Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS; Rinck et al, 2002), 
the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Syzmanski & O’Donohue, 1995), the state 
version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (here: STAI-State1; Spielberger, Gorsuch 
& Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The two 
computer tasks were conducted on Apple eMac computers with integrated 17” 
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Table 2.1 Mean scores (M) and standard deviations (SD) of age, gender, Fear of Spiders 
Questionnaire (FSQ), Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS-Spider), approach speed in the 
Behavior Assessment Task (BAT; cm/sec), Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS), trait 
version of the Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait), and Symptom Check 
List 90 (SCL-90) in Experiment 1 (n=54) 
 
Variables M SD 
 
Age (years) 
 
25.4 
 
6.8 
Gender (% female) 79.2  
FSQ 14.1 23.5 
SAS-Spider 6.3 6.3 
BAT Speed 54.5 25.3 
LSAS 27.6 16.5 
STAI-Trait 35.4 7.7 
SCL-90 129.8 28.4 
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monitors, operating at 700 MHz on Mac OS 10.2.8. Stimulus presentation and 
reaction time recording was controlled by the software RSVP 4.0.5 for Macintosh 
(Williams & Tarr, 1998). The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. After the two tasks, participants filled in the STAI-State again (here: 
STAI-State2), the Symptom Check List-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994), the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961), and 
the trait version of the STAI (STAI-Trait). Then they took part in a spider-related 
behavior assessment task (BAT): They had to approach a living tarantula in a 
terrarium as closely and as quickly as possible. The remaining distance to the 
terrarium and the time until participants stopped approaching was recorded. 
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Figure 2.1a Stimuli Task 1A and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1b Stimuli Task 1B and 3. 
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Afterwards, participants were debriefed, thanked for their effort, and were paid or 
given course credit. 
 
Spider Task 1A: Methods 
Materials. Black-and-white drawings of a butterfly, a cross, and a spider were used 
as possible cues, and a black dot as the target. The cue pictures were approx. 
110x100 pixels large, and the target dot was 22x22 pixels large. Two empty frames 
separated by a fixation cross served as possible locations for cues and targets. The 
two frames were 146x146 pixels large, and the distance between the fixation cross in 
the center of the screen and the centers of the frames to the left and right of it was 
197 pixels (Figure 2.1a). 
 
Procedure. Participants were seated about 50 cm from the computer monitor. The 
instructions were as follows: “On the screen, you will always see two empty frames 
with a fixation cross in between. The task will be easiest if you keep focusing on the 
fixation cross in the middle. First, in one of the frames a drawing (spider, butterfly, or 
cross) will be presented. After a while the drawing will disappear by itself. Then, a 
dot will be presented in one of the frames. You have to press the space bar as 
quickly as possible whenever you detect the dot in one of the frames. Following the 
key press, the next trial will start. In a third of the trials, no dot will appear, and you 
must not react. In this case, the program will continue automatically after 2 seconds”. 
Participants were given 54 trials to get acquainted to the procedure. In the main part 
of the task, participants finished 10 sets of 54 trials each. The total of 540 
randomized experimental trials was divided equally into 20 trials for each 
combination of cue type, validness, and SOA. The sequence of each trial is depicted 
in Figure 2.2: A black fixation cross was displayed for 1000 ms in the center of the 
white screen with the two black square, empty frames to its left and to its right. Then, 
one of the cues (cross, spider, or butterfly) was shown for 100 ms in one of the two 
frames. In two thirds of the trials, the target dot appeared centered in one of the two 
frames with an SOA of 150, 250, or 550 ms (i.e., 50, 150, or 450 ms after the cue 
had disappeared). In one third of the trials, no cue appeared. After the participant’s 
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response or after 2 s, the next trial began (see Figure 2.2). The shorter SOAs of 150 
and 250 ms were included to undermine the predictability of the cue-target time lag. 
These SOAs are not relevant here, therefore they will not be discussed any further1. 
 
Design and analyses. A 3 (cue type: spider, butterfly, cross) x 2 (cue validity: valid, 
invalid) factorial design was applied to the participants' median reaction times (RTs) 
 
Figure 2.2 Example of experimental sequence Experiment 1A and 2. 
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in response to dots appearing after an SOA of 550 ms. In addition, IOR effects were 
calculated by subtracting the median RTs of valid trials from the median RTs of the 
corresponding invalid trials: Facilitation of validly cued responses results in negative 
values, whereas positive values denote facilitation of invalidly cued responses, that 
is, inhibition of return. The participants' IOR effects were correlated with their fear of 
spiders, measured by SAS, FSQ, and the BAT. Whenever the assumption of 
sphericity was violated in one of the analyses reported below, more conservative 
tests were employed (Huynh-Feldt). An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests. The same was true for the analyses of the following experiments. The 
following predictions were tested: First, responses to invalid trials should be faster 
than responses to valid trials (the IOR effect). Second, the IOR effect should be 
reduced after the biologically relevant threat cue, the spider. Third, the IOR effect 
after spider cues should be negatively correlated with fear of spiders, such that it 
disappears in participants who are highly spider fearful. 
 
Spider Task 1A: Results and Discussion 
Cue validity yielded the expected significant IOR effect on response latencies, 
F(1,52) = 128.44, MSE = 676.74, p < .001: In general, invalidly cued targets were 
detected more quickly than targets preceded by a valid cue (343 vs. 367 ms, see 
Table 2.2). This IOR effect was also significant for each cue analyzed separately, all 
t(52) > 7.55, p < .001. Stimulus type did not have a main effect, F(2,104) < 1, 
Table 2.2 Mean RTs and standard deviations (in parentheses) in ms for each cue  
 
Experiment 1A (n=53): 
Cue type 
Experiment 1B (n=54): 
Cue type 
 
 
 
Cue validity 
 
Angry 
 
Neutral 
 
Smile 
 
Butterfly 
 
Cross 
 
Spider 
VALID 363 (36) 359 (33) 361 (38) 380 (41) 380 (36) 379 (41) 
INVALID 342 (35) 342 (40) 342 (34) 345 (41) 346 (38) 349 (38) 
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MSE = 219.63; and it did not interact with cue validity, F(2,104) = 1.13, MSE = 
215.74, n.s. The correlational analyses corroborated this result: Level of anxiety was 
not correlated with the IOR effects for any cue. While most measures of spider fear 
(FSQ, SAS, and BAT) correlated with each other, and all IOR effects correlated with 
each other, no significant correlation between a measure of fear and an IOR effect 
was observed (see Table 2.3). 
 The results of this task suggest that the IOR effect was unaffected by the 
biological relevance of the cues preceding the targets. In particular, spider cues did 
not reduce the IOR effect as compared to a neutral cross cue or positive butterfly 
cues. Furthermore, and in contrast to the results reported by (Fox et al., 2002), the 
magnitude of the IOR effect was not correlated with the individuals' level of fear, here 
fear of spiders, as measured by the SAS, the FSQ, or the BAT. 
 
Faces Task 1B: Methods 
Part 1B of Experiment 1 was designed as another test of the hypothesis that 
biologically relevant cues may reduce the IOR effect by attracting and holding 
attention at the location of a threatening cue. To this end, different types of relevant 
stimuli were used in Part 1B, namely, pictures of individuals with angry, neutral, or 
smiling facial expressions. These cues may be better suited for the reduction of the 
IOR effect than the simple animal drawings used in Part 1A. 
Table 2.3 Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between questionnaire scores, BAT speed 
(cm/sec), and IOR effects after spider, cross, and butterfly cues in Experiment 1A (n = 53) 
 
 SAS BAT 
Speed 
Butterfly: 
valid-invalid 
Cross:  
valid-invalid 
Spider:  
valid-invalid 
FSQ .86** -.25 -.07 .20 .11 
SAS  -.33* -.05 .24 .17 
BATSPEED   -.08 -.26 -.16 
Butterfly: valid-invalid    .73** .77** 
Cross: valid-invalid     .77** 
     *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Materials and procedure. Black and white pictures of two individuals (one male, one 
female) were presented as cues. Each individual was shown on three pictures, 
showing an angry, neutral, or smiling facial expression (see Figure 2.1b). The 
pictures were 200x320 pixels large. The two location frames were adjusted to the 
new picture size, yielding 206x324 pixels, and the distance between the fixation 
cross in the center of the screen and the center of the frames to the left and right 
was 142 pixels. The fixation cross and the target dot remained unchanged. The 
procedure was basically the same as in Experiment 1A, except that the spider, 
cross, and butterfly cues were replaced by the facial cues showing an angry, neutral, 
or smiling expression (compare Figure 2.2). 
 
Design and analyses. Again, a 3 (cue type: angry, neutral, smiling) x 2 (cue validity: 
valid, invalid) factorial design was applied to the participants' median RTs in 
response to dots appearing after an SOA of 550 ms. IOR effects were calculated as 
above, and they were correlated with social anxiety, as measured by the LSAS. The 
predictions for Part 1B of Experiment 1 were similar to those of the Part 1A: First, 
responses to invalid trials should be faster than responses to valid trials (the IOR 
effect). Second, the IOR effect should be reduced on trials with angry face cues. 
Third, the IOR effect after angry face cues should disappear with increasing degree 
of social anxiety. 
 
Faces Task 1B: Results and Discussion 
As before, cue validity had a significant IOR effect on response latencies, F(1,53) = 
106.62, MSE = 283.88, p < .001: Invalidly cued targets were again detected more 
quickly than validly cued ones (346 vs. 373 ms, see Table 2.2). The IOR effect was 
significant for each type of facial cue, all t(53) > 5.30, p < .001. As before, stimulus 
type did not have a main effect, nor did it interact with cue validity, both F(2,106) < 1. 
Further, the IOR effects for different cues were not correlated with level of anxiety. 
While the pathology-related questionnaires (LSAS, STAI, SCL-90) showed 
significant intercorrelations, they did not show any significant relationship with the 
IOR effects (see Table 2.4). These results replicate those of Part 1A perfectly, in that 
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the IOR remained robust, regardless of which biologically relevant cue was used. 
Moreover, participants showed IOR effects that were unrelated to their level of social 
anxiety (assessed with the LSAS), trait anxiety (STAI), or general level of pathology 
(SCL-90). These results agree well with those of Taylor and Therrien (2005), but 
they are in contrast to those reported by Fox et al. (2002), who also employed 
emotional facial expressions as cues. 
 
Experiment 2: IOR for spiders in spider fearfuls 
 
The first experiment was conducted following the assumption that some cues are 
biologically relevant, and to some degree threatening, for all humans. This should 
hold for spiders as well as for angry faces (Öhman, 2002; Öhman & Soares, 1993). 
However, the threat value of a cue should also be mediated by the person's 
individual fear of that particular cue. For instance, a spider should be more significant 
and more threatening for someone who is highly afraid of spiders, causing stronger 
Table 2.4 Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between questionnaire scores and IOR effects 
after angry, neutral, and smiling facial cues in Experiment 1B (n = 54) 
 
 STAI-
Trait 
SCL-90 Angry 
face 
Neutral 
face 
Smiling 
face 
LSAS Sum .53** .55** -.02 -.07 .06 
STAI-Trait  .71** -.07 -.01 .06 
SCL-90   .03 .03 .16 
Angry face: 
valid-invalid 
   .05 .29* 
Neutral face: 
valid-invalid 
    .00 
       *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. 
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effects on this individual than on others (compare: Öhman, & Soares, 1993). 
Consequently, we may have been unable to detect a reduction of the IOR effect in 
the unselected sample of Experiment 1 because spiders were relevant, but hardly 
threatening to most participants in this sample. This may also explain the lack of 
correlations between IOR effects and questionnaires observed in the first 
experiment. Therefore, we repeated Part 1A of Experiment 1 in a selected sample of 
highly spider fearful individuals who were compared to a selected group of non-
anxious control participants. In all other aspects, Experiment 2 was a direct 
replication of Experiment 1A. If threatening stimuli only reduce the IOR effect in 
highly fearful individuals, we should observe the reduction in the fearful group, but 
not in the control group. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants. A selected sample of 23 highly spider fearful participants (SFs) and 24 
matched non-anxious controls (NACs) participated in the experiment. All of them 
were first-year students enrolled at Dresden University of Technology, Germany (see 
Table 2.5). An experimental session lasted for 20 minutes, for which participants 
received payment of €2 or course credit. 
 
Materials, apparatus, and procedure. These were identical to those of Experiment 
1A, except for the following aspects of the procedure: During first year lectures, 
students were asked to fill in the SAS. They were invited to participate in the 
experiment if they scored below 6 points (NACs) or above 14 points (SFs) on the 
SAS. Upon arrival at the lab, participants filled in the SAS again and also the FSQ. If 
they scored below 12 or above 30 on the FSQ, they were admitted to further testing, 
and they completed the remaining questionnaires. The "Fragebogen zur 
Depressionsdiagnostik nach DSM-IV" (FDD; Kühner, 1997), which is the German 
version of the Inventory to Diagnose Depression (IDD; Zimmerman, Coryell, 
Corenthal, & Wilson, 1986), was added to the set of questionnaires. The rest of the 
procedure was identical to the one of Experiment 1A. 
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Design and analyses. Full combination of the within-subjects factors cue type 
(spider, butterfly, cross) and cue validity (valid, invalid) with the between-subjects 
factor anxiety group (SFs, NACs) yielded a 3x2x2 factorial design. The participants' 
median RTs in each of the six experimental conditions were used as dependent 
variables. The following predictions were tested: First, there should be an overall 
IOR effect, such that responses to invalid trials should be faster than responses to 
valid trials. Second, the IOR effect after spider cues should be reduced in the highly 
spider fearful participants. 
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1A, a significant IOR effect was observed, F(1,46) = 125.62, MSE 
= 582.20, p < .001. As expected, invalidly cued targets were detected more quickly 
than validly cued ones (383 vs. 415 ms, see Table 2.6a). Again, the IOR effect was 
Table 2.5 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of age, gender, and questionnaire 
scores for spider fearfuls (SFs) and non-anxious controls (NACs) in Experiment 2: Fear of 
Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ), Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS-Spider), trait version of the 
Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait), Fragebogen zur 
Depressionsdiagnostik (FDD), and Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
 
SF (n=23)  NAC (n=24)  
Variables M SD  M SD 
Age (years) 21.0 1.4  21.4 2.0 
Gender (% female) 87.0   87.5  
FSQ** 61.1 17.7  2.0 2.7 
SAS-Spider** 18.4 3.5  1.2 1.7 
STAI-Trait 40.4 6.9  41.6 7.2 
FDD 9.0 5.2  7.6 4.6 
BSI 0.6 0.3  0.6 0.4 
       *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. 
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also significant after each cue type tested separately, all t(46) > 7.11, p < .001. 
Moreover, level of spider fear had no effect whatsoever on RTs, indicated of by a 
lack of significant main effects or interactions of the between-subjects factor, all F < 
1.15, n.s. Most importantly, after spider cues, both SFs and NACs showed significant 
IOR effects, t(22) = 4.68, p < .001 and t(23) = 7.63, p < .001, respectively, which did 
not vary in size, F(1, 45) < 1. 
To summarize, besides the expected IOR effect, no other noteworthy effect 
was found. Thus, even in highly spider fearfuls, the IOR effect was not reduced by a 
spider cue. It seems that the spider did not catch and hold attention strongly enough 
 
Table 2.6 Mean RTs and standard deviations (in parentheses) in ms 
(a) Experiment 2: For butterfly, cross, and spider cues in spider fearfuls (SFs) and non-
anxious controls (NACs) 
 
Group 
SF (n=23) NAC (n=24) 
Cue type 
 
 
 
Cue validity Butterfly  Cross Spider Butterfly Cross Spider 
VALID 417 (43) 422 (49) 411 (36) 413 (47) 415 (46) 410 (43) 
INVALID 380 (43) 386 (50) 384 (40) 382 (34) 387 (37) 377 (35) 
 
 
(b) Experiment 3: For angry, neutral, and smiling facial cues in Socially Anxious (SAs) and 
Non-Anxious Controls (NACs)  
 
Group 
SAs (n=18) NACs (n=22) 
Cue type 
 
 
 
Cue validity Angry Neutral Smile Angry Neutral Smile 
VALID 346 (32) 345 (34) 349 (34) 360 (42) 357 (37) 354 (40) 
INVALID 337 (34) 336 (34) 339 (39) 345 (43) 348 (41) 344 (37) 
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to affect inhibition of return, even when the spider was threatening and highly 
relevant to the participants. This result replicates that of Experiment 1, in which a 
larger, but unselected sample was tested. 
 
Experiment 3: IOR for facial expressions in socially anxious 
individuals 
 
Experiment 3 was designed as a follow-up to Experiment 1B. In Experiment 3, we 
also employed emotional facial expressions as cues, but instead of testing an 
unselected sample, we tested two extreme groups, as in Experiment 2. Similar to the 
reasoning of the second experiment, we predicted that the IOR-reducing effect of an 
angry face cue should be particularly strong in individuals who are highly socially 
anxious. This expectation is based on several findings suggesting that the attentional 
bias for threatening social stimuli is most pronounced in these highly anxious 
individuals (Fox et al., 2001; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Thus, if pictures of 
emotional facial expressions are indeed more relevant stimuli than black-and-white 
drawings of spiders, and if emotional facial expressions are indeed most threatening 
to the socially anxious, a reduction of the IOR effect should be observed in 
Experiment 3. In particular, we predicted that after an angry face cue, individuals 
high in social anxiety should show a marked reduction of the IOR effect. To test this 
prediction, we repeated Part 1B of Experiment 1 in a selected sample of highly 
socially anxious individuals who were compared to a group of non-anxious control 
participants. In all other aspects, Experiment 3 was a direct replication of Experiment 
1B. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants. A selected sample of 18 highly socially anxious participants (SAs) and 
22 matched non-anxious controls (NACs) participated in the experiment. All of them 
were students enrolled at Dresden University of Technology, Germany (see Table 
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Table 2.7 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of age, gender, and questionnaire scores 
for socially anxious (SAs) and non-anxious controls (NACs) in Experiment 3: Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale (LSAS), trait version of the Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait) 
and Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik (FDD) 
 
Group 
SA (n=18)  NAC (n=22) 
 
 
Variables M SD  M SD 
Age (years) 24.2 2.7  25.0 4.4 
Gender (% female) 77.8   68.8  
LSAS** 61.5 16.7  14.3 7.8  
STAI-Trait** 46.1 7.7  31.4 6.7  
FDD** 10.1 5.1  2.9 3.2  
  **p < .001, two-tailed. 
2.7). An experimental session lasted for 20 minutes, for which participants received 
payment of €2 or course credit.  
 
Materials, apparatus, and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1B, 
except for the following aspects: During lectures at Dresden University of 
Technology, students were asked to fill in the LSAS to screen their degree of 
social anxiety. They were invited to participate in the experiment if they scored below 
14 points (NACs) or above 26 points (SAs). Upon arrival at the lab, they filled in the 
LSAS for a second time. If they scored within the same limits as on the screening 
day, they were allowed to continue the experiment. The remaining procedure was 
identical to the one described in Experiment 1B, except for the addition of the FDD 
(Kühner, 1997) to the set of questionnaires. 
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Design and analyses. Full combination of the within-subjects factors cue type (angry, 
neutral, smiling face) and cue validity (valid, invalid) with the between-subjects factor 
anxiety group (SFs, NACs) yielded a 3x2x2 factorial design. The participants' median 
RTs in each of the six experimental conditions were used as dependent variables. 
The following predictions were tested: First, there should be an overall IOR effect, 
such that responses to invalid trials should be faster than responses to valid trials. 
Second, the IOR effect after angry face cues should be significantly reduced in the 
highly socially anxious participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1B, cue validity had a significant main effect on response latencies, 
F(1,38) = 20.26, MSE = 309.32, p < .001. Again, this was due to an IOR effect: 
Invalidly cued targets were detected more quickly than validly cued ones (342 vs. 
352 ms, see Table 2.6b). And again, individual analyses of the IOR effects for the 
three different cue types revealed that it was significant for each cue, all t(39) > 2.55, 
p < .02). As before, neither did cue type yield a main effect, F(2,76) = < 1, MSE = 
209.95, nor did it interact with cue validity, F(2,76) < 1, MSE = 268.50. The same 
was true for the factor anxiety group, which yielded neither a main effect on RTs nor 
any interaction (all F < 1.2, MSE < 210, p > .05). Most importantly, after angry facial 
cues, the IOR effect exhibited by SAs did not differ from the one shown by NACs, 
F(1,38) < 1. 
To summarize, SAs and NACs did not react differently to the emotional face 
cues or the validity of the cues, and the IOR effect after angry face cues was not 
reduced in SAs. As in Experiment 1B, the manipulations resulted in a stable IOR 
effect, observable in both groups and after all cues. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In three experiments, the effect of biologically relevant cues and threatening cues on 
inhibition of return was investigated. Pictures denoting objects of supposedly 
evolutionary relevance served as cues for a neutral target that had to be localized 
 
Chapter 2 
- 50 - 
after a delay of 550 ms from cue onset. In Experiments 1A and 2, the targets were 
cued validly and invalidly by drawings of spiders, butterflies, and crosses. An 
unselected sample of students (Part 1A of Experiment 1) as well as selected 
participants who were either highly spider fearful or not afraid of spiders (Experiment 
2) participated in this visual cueing task. In Experiments 1 and 3, the cues were 
photographs of individuals looking angry, neutral, or smiling. These cues were 
presented to an unselected group of participants (Part 1B of Experiment 1), as well 
as to selected participants who were either highly socially anxious or non-anxious 
(Experiment 3). The experiments were designed to test the prediction that the IOR 
effect (faster responses to invalidly cued targets than to validly cued ones) would be 
reduced for anxiety evoking stimuli such as spiders and angry faces (Experiment 1). 
Furthermore, the reduction should be particularly large in fearful individuals for whom 
these stimuli are highly threatening, that is, spider fearful and socially anxious 
individuals, respectively (Experiments 2 and 3). The results of these three 
experiments were fairly clear-cut, and not in line with the predictions at all: In all 
experimental conditions of all experiments, invalid cueing facilitated responses 
compared to valid cueing, yielding reliable IOR effects. Neither type of cue nor fear 
level of the participants had any impact on the IOR effect whatsoever. 
Previous studies of individual variables that may affect inhibition of return 
have shown that the effect may indeed be reduced by different kinds of 
psychopathology. For instance, Roelofs, et al. (2003) found that patients with 
conversion paresis showed a diminished inhibition of return, and Burdick (2003) 
reported that bipolar depression was related to decreases in inhibition of return. 
Nelson, Early, and Haller (1993) found reduced IOR in patients with obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and speculated that these patients lack inhibitory attentional 
processes. However, Moritz and von Mühlenen (2005) could not confirm these 
findings of reduced IOR: Both patients and control participants consistently 
presented IOR effects, and the magnitude of the effect was not moderated by 
symptom severity, comorbid depression, nor medication use. In all of these studies, 
however, neutral cues and targets were used, in order to investigate the alteration of 
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IOR in general. Thus, the supposedly contradictory influence of threat detection on 
an automatic attentional process could not be assessed. 
To the best of our knowledge, only four published studies addressed the 
question whether the general relevance of a cue or its individual threat value might 
influence the magnitude of IOR. While Fox et al., (2002) concluded from their study 
that angry faces serving as invalid cues do indeed eliminate the IOR effect in highly 
anxious participants, Taylor & Therrien (2005), found that the IOR effect was not 
influenced by neutral faces, neither when employed as cues nor as targets. Similarly, 
Stoyanova, Pratt, and Anderson (2007) found that neither fearful face cues, neutral 
face cues, nor luminance matched cues changed the magnitude of the observed 
IOR. In a slightly different version of the task, Theeuwes and van der Stigchel (2006) 
investigated the occurrence of IOR after simultaneous presentation of (neutral) face 
cues and household objects. The results revealed that only faces seemed to capture 
attention such that an IOR arose. Thus, the occurrence of the IOR effect instead of 
its reduction was taken as evidence for an attentional bias. Since no IOR occurred in 
response to household objects, it was impossible to tell whether the inhibition of 
return was reduced on the location of the formerly presented face. The different 
methodology of especially the latter study renders a comparison rather difficult.  
Our results coincide well with those of Taylor and Therrien (2005) and 
Stoyanova and colleagues (2007) even though they did not employ threatening 
faces. As in their study, we found no influence of the type of facial expression on the 
IOR effect, neither in an unselected sample nor in socially anxious participants. In 
addition to the facial cues, we found that the IOR effect was also resistant against 
threat-related animal cues, namely spider pictures, both in an unselected sample 
and in highly spider fearfuls. Thus, in four tasks, IOR effects have proven to be 
resistant against effects of emotionally valenced, threatening cues. One might object, 
however, that despite the frequent replications, the statistical power of each 
individual experiment might have been insufficient. Therefore, we increased 
statistical power by combining the data of Experiment 1a and Experiment 2. With this 
sample of 100 participants, we again computed correlations of the SAS and FSQ 
scores with the IOR effect for spider cues. Please note that these correlations are 
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artificially inflated because Experiment 2 contained only extreme groups with regard 
to fear of spiders. Nevertheless, they remained low and insignificant (SAS: r = -.02, 
n.s.; FSQ: r = -.06, n.s.). The same result was observed when the data of 
Experiment 1b and Experiment 3 were combined. Even with this sample of 94 
participants, the inflated correlation of the LSAS scores with the IOR effects for angry 
faces remained insignificant (r = -.08, n.s.). Therefore, we are quite confident that our 
findings cannot be explained by a lack of statistical power. Moreover, the fact that 
spiders as well as smiling and angry faces in our study, and fearful faces in the 
Stoyanova et al. study (2007) failed to affect the IOR, suggests that the IOR is 
resistant to a variety of emotional stimuli.  
The finding that threatening stimuli had no effect on IOR stands in contrasts to 
the effects which have been observed many times with other experimental 
paradigms, including the dot probe task (e.g., Mogg et al., 2004), disengagement 
tasks (Fox et al., 2002), and free viewing tasks (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2006). In these 
tasks, attentional biases of highly fearful individuals were observed, suggesting that 
threatening stimuli (e.g., spiders or angry faces) capture and hold attention, such that 
fearful individuals find it difficult to disengage their attention from these stimuli. Thus, 
the question arises why attentional biases have been observed for these tasks and 
processes, but not for tasks addressing IOR. One potential explanation might be that 
the stimulus materials used in the present experiments are not suitable for eliciting 
the expected effects because line drawings and black and white photographs might 
not be ecologically valid enough to represent the desired threat. This is rather 
unlikely, however, because many studies have employed comparable materials, and 
the very same materials have successfully evoked biases in other studies, for 
instance, automatic avoidance tendencies in social phobics (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 
2007) or affective priming in spider fearfuls (Becker, Lange, Reinecke, & Rinck, 
2006), respectively. Nevertheless, we are aware that a more direct, maybe even 
physiological validation of the threat potential of the stimuli would have been more 
elegant.  
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The lack of a theoretical framework in which a hypothetical interference of 
attentional bias and IOR can be placed, puts forward some theoretical and 
methodological questions. E.g., it could be argued that threat related stimuli could 
emphatically stress a location as already processed, rather than undermining the 
inhibition process. This would lead to a more exaggerated IOR.  Evolutionarily, this 
makes no sense, though; since one would rather want to attend to immanent danger 
than avoid scanning its location again. Besides that, in highly anxious participants, 
attentional biases towards threat rather than away from it have been shown quite 
consistently.   
Compared to other studies (e.g., Fox et al., 2002), one might believe  that 
methodological deviations in our design could account for the lack of threat 
influences on IOR. First, we have used a target detection (“now”) task rather than a 
target classification (“what”) or target position (“where”) task. It could be that 
increased cognitive load during a categorization decision makes vigilance processes 
more vulnerable to distraction/attraction by threat, compared to the simpler decision 
about a target’s location, or the even simpler decision that something happened. In 
an extensive review, Schooten (2007; Chapter 1) listed an impressive amount of 
studies using diverging designs which nevertheless reported differential processing 
of threat cues/targets. Mogg and Bradley (1999) directly compared classification and 
position tasks and found that advantages for threat processing were equally strong 
in both designs. Additionally, Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt (2007a) compared 
a categorization and a detection task and concluded that the latter might even be 
superior in detecting preferential processing of threat-related words (compare also: 
Wenzel & Holt, 1999). Therefore, we are confident that the probe detection 
procedure we employed is useful for detecting processes biases for threat-related 
stimuli, given there are any. 
One might also object that our results are due to the fact that the presentation 
time of our cues (100 ms) was shorter than in many other studies. Bradley, Mogg, 
Falla, and Hamilton (1998) justly argue that presenting cues for 500 ms would 
facilitate comparability of findings from different studies. However, numerous studies 
have shown that presentation times of 200, 100 and even 17 ms are sufficient for 
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revealing differential threat processing in these paradigms (Cooper & Langton, 2006; 
Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2002a, 2006). 
Further, unlike Fox and colleagues (2002), and also Taylor and Therrien 
(2005), we did not use an intermediate cue to redirect attention from the cued 
location back to the fixation point and make a subsequent shifting to that locus a 
“real” return. If it were the case that, without such a procedure, attention had never 
moved from the (invalidly) cued location, IOR effects would never have occurred 
(compare: Lupianez et al., 2006). Thus, if the focus of attention would indeed remain 
on the location of the cue, valid trials would always be faster than invalid trials, 
independent of the length of the SOA. However, Stoyanova et al. (2007) have shown 
in two experiments that IOR was not influenced by fearful faces, neither with nor 
without an intermediate redirection of attention (see also Footnote). Additionally, one 
could argue that non-anxious controls have a tendency to avoid attention to 
threatening stimuli (e.g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999) and that 
consequently, IOR should be inflated. But if that were the case, correlations between 
degree of anxiety, or group differences would have been observed. 
A major concern is though, that the observed IOR could also be easily 
attributed to forward masking. Since (visual) attention to a target often seems to be 
corrupted when preceded by another stimulus in the same location, it is possible that 
valid trials are generally disadvantaged over invalid trials. If that was a stable effect, 
consequences of threat stimuli might be overwritten by the effect of forward masking. 
To exclude such an explanation, it would have been necessary to present the target 
on valid trials close to, but not on the location of the cue. Nevertheless, the large IOR 
literature suggests that both procedures lead to effects attributable to IOR (compare 
Footnote). Berlucchi (2006) suggests that both single and bilateral cuing bring forth 
inhibition, with the latter not being explicable by forward masking. More importantly, 
he refers to studies by Possamai (1986), and Tassinari, Biscaldi, Marzi, and 
Berlucchi (1989), who also explored RTs to centrally presented cues and targets. 
They all assumed that the observed inhibition is merely due to sensory “bottom-up” 
influence, meaning that some low level cue property initiates (local) inhibition, not 
forward masking as consequence of stimulus sequence (compare: Berlucchi, 2006). 
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Consequently, this could also explain why the presentation of threatening cues in our 
experiments did not interfere with such an inhibitory process: Stimulus recognition or 
stimulus valance are determined “top-down”, that is, based on individual 
experiences. If energy changes in the visuospatial field are detected and lead to 
subsequent inhibition of a locus, the valence of a cue might not “get the chance to 
make a difference”. 
A last potential explanation might be that compared to other experimental 
paradigms, IOR tasks have rarely been used. Thus, the boundary conditions for 
affective modulations of the IOR effect have not been identified yet, even though 
they might exist (but see Footnote). Until these are identified, however, we have to 
conclude that inhibition of return is a surprisingly stable phenomenon, unimpressed 
by affective valence of the cues. IOR might indeed be an evolved mechanism that 
promotes novelty in one’s visual field (Klein & MacInnes, 1999). This mechanism 
may be so strong that is not easily overruled by other evolutionary relevant functions, 
such as the detection of potentially harmful stimuli in the environment. Future 
research will have to show whether this is indeed the case with different stimuli and 
different individuals. 
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Footnotes 
 
 1Although not of theoretical interest, the SOAs of 150 and 250 ms were also 
analyzed. Unlike some other studies (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Damme, & 
Wiersema, 2006), we did not find any attentional cueing at these SOAs. Instead, we 
found stable IOR effects that were unchallenged by cue valence. A thorough 
analysis of related research reveals that this finding is not as surprising as it might 
seem at first glance. In fact, the occurrence of IOR instead of facilitative cueing is 
highly likely, even at short SOAs, under the circumstances employed in our 
experiments: (a) There is no intermediate cue that would redirect attention to the 
fixation point (unlike e.g., E. Fox et al., 2002). This has been shown to lead to IOR 
effects at SOAs between 200 and 800 ms (Pratt & Fischer, 2002). (b) Cues and 
targets were physically different, but appeared in the same spatial location. This has 
previously produced IOR-like response patterns even for SOAs of 100 and 200 ms, 
while facilitative cueing occurred when cue and target did not overlap spatially 
(McAuliffe & Pratt, (2005). McAuliffe and Pratt (2005) systematically investigated the 
role of target-cue overlap in time and space, and found that spatially overlapping 
cues did not produce any cueing, regardless of the interstimulus interval (ISI). 
Instead, they observed IOR at SOAs of 400 and 800 ms across all ISIs. In summary, 
we have good reason to believe that IOR is a stable process unchallenged by cue 
valence. Since our results observed at SOAs of 150 ms and 250 ms resemble those 
found at 550 ms, they are not reported here, in order to save space. 
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Chapter 3 
Disturbing Emotions: Do Angry Women 
or Angry Men Disturb Target 
Categorization ? 
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Abstract 
 
Cognitive models of anxiety disorders hypothesize that automatic processing of 
emotional faces serves an evolutionarily advantage by preparing prompt reactions in 
critical social situations. Experimental findings with face stimuli are ambivalent, 
however. In the present study, face categorization was assessed by an adapted 
version of Erikson’s classical flanker paradigm. Socially anxious participants had to 
categorize the target face’s emotion (angry, neutral, smiling) while ignoring flanking 
emotional faces. The categorization of angry female and smiling male targets took 
participants longer than that of angry males or smiling females. Flanker emotion by 
itself or degree of social anxiety did not make any difference.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, it has repeatedly been suggested that biases in the information 
processing of patients diagnosed with an anxiety disorder may contribute to the 
initiation or maintenance of their disorder (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). One mechanism which biases anxiety patients’ 
automatic attention towards threat cues is called selective attention (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998). Normally, its purpose is to focus on relevant input while 
irrelevant, distracting information in the vicinity is being filtered out or ignored 
(Gazzaniga, Nangun, & Ivry, 2002; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000). In anxiety 
prone patients, though, it seems that the “relevance evaluation” is out of balance and 
the threat evaluation exaggerated. It has, for example, been found that spider 
fearfuls are hypervigilant to spiders in their environment (Becker & Rinck, 2004; 
Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005), that physiology/panic related 
words distract attention of patients with a panic disorder (e.g., Asmundson, Sandler, 
Wilson, & Walker, 1992; Kampman, Keijsers, Verbraak, Näring, & Hoogduin, 2002), 
and that socially threatening words distract socially anxious participants in an 
emotional Stroop task (Andersson, Westoo, Johansson, & Carlbring, 2006; Lundh & 
Öst, 2001). It has also been suggested that angry facial expressions have 
evolutionary relevance (Haxby et al., 2000; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and may evoke social threat to such an extent that they 
also cause attentional disruption. Facial expressions of negative emotions are 
thought to be particularly relevant to socially anxious people due to their heightened 
sensitivity to social interaction and the fear of being rejected, ridiculed, or scrutinized 
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(APA, 2000). Indeed, it has been shown that in visual search tasks, socially anxious 
and, to a lesser degree, also non-anxious individuals detected angry faces in a 
crowd more quickly than other emotional faces and were more distracted when 
looking for other emotions in an angry crowd (compare: Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & 
Amir, 1999; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Juth et 
al. (2005), on the other hand, found a detection advantage for happy faces. This 
advantage was not mediated by (social) anxiety. Other attention tasks using single 
(threatening) targets revealed conflicting results for angry faces as well. In a recent 
neuroimaging study by Monk, Nelson, McClure, et al. (2006), adolescent participants 
diagnosed with general anxiety disorder showed a higher right ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex activation for angry faces. Reaction time data, however, revealed 
an attentional bias away from those faces and towards neutral faces. In other 
studies, Mogg, Philippot, and Bradley (2004), reported a quick initial orientation 
towards threatening schematic faces in social phobic participants, while Georgiou, 
Bleakley, Hayward et al. (2005) found that anxious participants took longer to move 
their attention away from fearful as opposed to neutral, sad, or happy faces 
(compare: Fox et al., 2001, Exp. 5; Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & 
Vuilleumier, 2006). In this paradigm, participants had to categorize target letters that 
were presented in the periphery of a centrally presented (emotional) face (Georgiou 
et al., 2005). Georgiou and colleagues concluded that attention was not so much 
reflexively captured by threatening faces but that disengagement from these faces 
was disrupted. Christianson (1992) offered another explanation for disruptions in the 
processing of peripheral cues when a centrally presented stimulus is threatening. He 
supposed that threat might evoke physiological arousal, which consequently steers 
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attention to central aspects of a situation ignoring the surroundings (attentional 
narrowing hypotheses; Easterbrook, 1959; Wessel, van der Kooy, & Merckelbach, 
2000). Research on eye-witness reports of crime scenes reports a similar 
phenomenon, here called “weapon focus” (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Fenske & 
Eastwood, 2003): When confronted with threatening situations (e.g., a robbery) 
victims seem to automatically focus on the direct source of threat, for example the 
gun. By doing so, they tend to blind out everything else in the scene, leading to a 
restricted memory of the incident afterwards.  
The aforementioned paradigms share one common feature: Two or more 
stimuli compete for attention ("stimulus competition"; compare: Yiend & Mathews, 
2005) and task completion asks for attentional shifting. In order to investigate the 
role of stimulus competition, while task completion does not require attentional 
shifting, Fenske and Eastwood (2003) employed Eriksen and Eriksen’s flanker 
paradigm, introduced in 1974. In Fenske and Eastwood's study, participants had to 
categorize centrally presented stimuli (e.g., emotional faces), while ignoring flanking 
stimuli (flankers) to the left and/or right of the target. Thus, the flanking distracters 
are not necessary/relevant for task completion, which is identification and 
categorization of the target. Yet, flankers do influence performance on the task under 
certain circumstances. Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) found that targets can be 
categorized quicker if target and flankers are similar (flanker-compatibility effect) and 
when flankers are further away. Fenske and Eastwood (2003) hypothesized that 
attentional narrowing following threatening schematic faces would undermine the 
compatibility effect. They expected that a more restricted diameter of attention would 
facilitate target categorization because facilitating similar flankers and distracting 
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dissimilar flankers lie beyond the diameter. In a series of experiments with 
unselected samples, Fenske and Eastwood (2003) indeed found that the flanker-
compatibility effect was reduced when angry target faces had to be categorized. 
Flankers differing from angry target faces caused less interference than flankers 
differing from neutral or smiling target faces (for alternative interpretation of results 
see: Horstmann, Borgstedt, & Heumann, 2006).  
Surprisingly, almost all the studies reported above have one shortcoming in 
common: stimulus-gender has seldom been taken into account in studies that make 
use of real face stimuli. In evolutionary terms, survival means reproduction, and 
finding a mate among the opposite sex forms the basis for that (Darwin, 1859). 
Insufficient recognition of either invitation for alliances/mating or signals of threat 
might lead to exclusion from a group, which might have been fatal, too (Gilbert, 
2001; Sapolsky, 2004). A frown of a same-sex group member, for example, might 
jeopardize alliances and sympathy in a group, while a smile of an opposite-sex group 
member might reflect interest and willingness to mate. The implication is that an 
angry face might be more pressing if displayed by a same-sex member, while a 
smile might be more important when shown by an opposite-sex member. On the 
other hand, it is thinkable that a more general mechanism facilitates processing of 
angry males, since they are generally more threatening. Following this argument, 
immediate attentional shift towards and speeded processing of angry faces should 
be more pronounced when displayed by men than when displayed by women 
(compare: Becker et al., 2007).  
In sum, research results with emotional facial expressions have not been 
particularly consistent with regard to attentional biases in social anxiety. The use of 
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different paradigms testing different aspects of attentional processes, and the 
ignorance of stimulus- and participant gender makes matters even more 
complicated. 
 In the present study, we therefore explored how target and distracter emotion 
affect emotion categorization by using an adapted version of Eriksen’s classical 
flanker paradigm (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) as applied by Fenske and Eastwood 
(2003). Distraction by task-irrelevant flankers is reflected in increased response 
latencies when categorizing a centrally presented target (Ro, Machado, Kanwisher, 
& Rafal, 2002; Sanders & Lamers, 2002). Instead of letters or schematic faces, we 
used photos of emotional faces of males and females as targets and flankers. Here, 
the emotion of the presented target had to be categorized. Target and flanker 
showed the same male or female individual while the emotional expressions differed 
in 66% of the trials. Additionally, we varied the distance between target and flankers. 
Two groups of participants were tested: a group of highly socially anxious individuals 
(SAs) and a group of non-anxious individuals (NACs). To simplify matters, all 
participants were female. 
 Following Eriksen and Eriksen’s (1974) findings, it was hypothesized that 
close flankers would distract participants more than far flankers. Further, it was 
predicted that flankers showing the same emotion as the target cause less 
interference than flankers differing from the target emotion (flanker-congruency 
effect; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). These are the classical flanker effects. In line with 
prior findings and central to the present study, we hypothesized that categorization of 
angry face targets would, due to attentional narrowing, be less affected by flanker 
dissimilarity or close flanker distance. Based on the assumption that facial 
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expressions have an important communicative value in social interaction, detecting 
rejection, contempt, disapproval, sympathy, or anger in a facial expression might be 
particularly threatening for people suffering from social anxiety (compare: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000 [APA]; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Even though 
Fenske and Eastwood did not test a specific hypothesis concerning flanker emotion, 
it seems plausible that angry flankers would distract target categorization. 
Consequently, as a subordinate hypothesis, we assumed that the distraction by 
flanking angry faces, while categorizing a target with a different expression, might be 
more pronounced in SAs. More importantly, though, when presented with an angry 
target, the flankers’ distracting potential should be significantly reduced in SAs, and 
the flanker-compatibility effect should be smaller than in NACs. Finally, if general 
evolution-based mechanisms are indeed intertwined with gender-specific processes, 
the facilitation of target categorization should be even stronger with male angry 
targets than with angry female targets. Likewise, the classical flanker effects should 
be more reduced. Again, both processes should be mediated by social anxiety.  
Methods 
 
Prescreening & participants 
For prescreening purposes, psychology students of Radboud University Nijmegen 
were asked to complete the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; 
Mennin et al., 2002) during second-year lectures. Those willing to participate were 
selected according to their LSAS scores (≤ 13 or ≥ 27 on the LSAS anxiety-
subscale) and invited for an experimental session. This procedure resulted in a 
selected sample of 27 socially anxious females (SAs) and 34 non-anxious control 
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females (NACs). An experimental session lasted for 25 minutes, for which 
participants received a payment of €3 or course credit. 
 
Measures 
Before the computer task, participants again completed the LSAS. Further, they filled 
in the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Duke, Krishnan, Faith, & Storch, 
2006; Leary, 1983), the state-version of the State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (here: 
STAI-State1; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), and a general screening instrument for eyesight, 
handedness, education, and use of medication. After the computer tasks, 
participants filled in the STAI for the second time (here: STAI-State2), the Symptom 
Check List-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994), a self-report instrument for 
psychopathological symptoms, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), and the trait-version of the STAI (STAI-Trait). 
 
Apparatus & stimuli 
The experiment was conducted on an Apple eMac with integrated 17” monitor, 
operating at 700 MHz on Mac OS X 10.2.8. Stimulus presentation, reaction time and 
error recording was controlled by the software RSVP 4.0.5 for Macintosh (Williams & 
Tarr, 1998).  
A selection of color photos of 4 individuals (2 males and 2 females), each 
presenting three different expressions: angry, neutral, and smiling, was taken from 
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & 
Öhman, 1998). The pictures were resized to 56,0 mm X 78,0 mm, 32-bit color. 
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Procedure 
As stated above, students were pre-selected according to their LSAS scores (≤13 
and ≥27 on the anxiety-subscale). On arrival, they filled in the LSAS for a second 
time. Participants scoring above 13 or below 27 were excluded, thanked for their 
effort, and given a lollipop for their efforts.  
The remaining participants completed the first set of the questionnaires. Then 
the computer program was started. Participants were seated about 50 cm from the 
computer monitor and told that all instructions were shown on the screen and that 
there would be plenty of time to practice. If they had questions, participants were 
asked to pose them before or after the practice-trials. The participants’ task was to 
identify the expression of the target individual shown in the middle of a row of three 
photos. They responded by pressing one of the keys marked with ““- (smile), ““- 
(neutral) and ““- (angry) on the otherwise covered standard computer keyboard. 
The presented pictures within a trial always showed the same person, and the 
emotional expressions of the two flanking pictures (“flankers”) were always identical. 
They could differ from the facial expression of the center picture (“target”) however. 
Participants were told to ignore the flankers and focus on the central picture in order 
to give an accurate judgment. The row was presented for 500 ms, and the trial lasted 
until participants reacted. There were three different locations possible for the 
flankers to appear:  5.75 cm (close), 9.5 cm (intermediate), or 13.0 cm (far) to the left 
and right of the screen center.  
The sequence of a trial was as follows: a yellow fixation cross was displayed 
in the center of a blue screen for 1000 ms. The three photos were then presented for 
500 ms, with the two flanking photos appearing both close, intermediate or far from 
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the centered target picture. After 1500 ms, a buzzer alerted the participants if they 
had not reacted yet.  
Participants were given 54 practice trials to get used to the experimental setup 
and five sets of 108 trials each in the main experiment. The total of 540 trials was 
divided equally into 180 trials per flanker distance (short, intermediate, far). Each 
position was combined with each type of facial expression (angry, neutral, smiling) 
on 60 trials, equally randomized over individual and photo gender (2 females, 2 
males). After finishing the computer tasks, participants were asked to fill in the 
remainder of the questionnaires, were debriefed, paid, and thanked for their effort. 
 
Design 
Neutral facial expressions and intermediate flanker positions were presented for the 
variability of the task, but were not considered in the analyses. Consequently, a 2 
(target gender: female, male) × 2 (target emotion: angry, smiling) × 2 (flanker 
emotion: angry, smiling) × 2 (flanker distance: short, far) × 2 (social anxiety: low, 
high) factorial design resulted for the RT analyses. While target and flanker emotion, 
target gender and flanker distance were within-subjects factors, anxiety was a 
between-subjects factor. Whenever the basic assumption of univariate testing 
(sphericity) was violated in any of the analyses, more conservative tests with 
corrections of degrees of freedom were used (here: Huynh-Feldt).  
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Emotion Categorization Task: Results 
 
Population characteristics. The NACs (M = 19.41 years; SD = 1.42) and the SAs (M 
= 19.44 years; SD = 1.50) did not significantly differ in age, t(59) = -0.09; p = .93, or 
education, χ2(2, N = 61) = 0.6, p = .97. On questionnaires, both groups differed 
significantly on items assessing anxiety-related concepts and comorbidity (for details 
see: Table 3.1). Only state anxiety in NACs had increased somewhat after the 
computer task, such that the difference was marginally significant. The interaction of 
time of measurement and state anxiety was not significant, F(1, 59) = 1.9; MSE = 
26.10; p = .18, though. 
Table 3.1 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of questionnaire scores for socially 
anxious (SAs) and non-anxious control (NACs) participants: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS), Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE), the trait and state versions of the Spielberger 
State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait, STAI-State1, STAI-State2), Beck’s Depression 
Inventory (BDI), and the Symptom Check List-90 (SCL-90) 
 
SA (n = 27)  NAC (n = 34) 
Questionnaire 
M SD  M SD 
LSAS** 37.0 7.4  8.3 2.6 
FNE** 34.8 7.2  13.9 6.6 
STAI-Trait** 41.9 9.7  31.9 6.7 
STAI-State1** 39.5 8.1  32.4 8.2 
STAI-State2 39.1 10.1  34.6 9.2 
BDI* 9.4 5.3  5.0 4.1 
SCL90** 150.0 30.6  117.8 24.2 
          *p < .01, two-tailed. **p < .001, two-tailed. 
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RTs for categorization in general. As would be expected from the flanker literature, 
there was a significant main effect for flanker distance, F(1, 59) = 7.87; MSE = 
3720.36; p < .01. Emotion categorization was quicker when the flanker was “far” than 
when it was “close” to the target. The influence of (dis-)similarity of target and flanker 
was reflected in a significant interaction of target emotion and flanker emotion, F(1, 
59) = 5.37; MSE = 2892.13; p < .05. Identical emotions in target and flankers led to a 
quicker identification than incongruent emotions. Thus, we found the classical flanker 
effects (distance and flanker congruency effect) as observed by Eriksen and Eriksen 
(1974).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Mean reaction times (RT) in milliseconds (ms) per target emotion and target 
gender. 
 
Target 
emotion 
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Target gender interacted with target emotion in a way that categorization was 
facilitated by smiling female and angry male targets, F(1, 59) = 12.34; MSE = 
4472.19; p < .01 (Table 3.2,  Figure 3.1). When analyzed in more detail, it appeared 
that RTs to male angry targets were significantly faster than to female angry targets, 
t(60) = 3.57; p < .01, while responses to male smiling and female smiling faces were 
Table 3.2 Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) of correct trials, for the two types of target/flanker expressions, 
sorted by group, target gender and target distance (SD in parenthesis)   
 
  SA (n = 27) 
Target Gender 
  Female  Male 
 Flanker distance  Flanker distance 
 
 
Far Close  Far Close 
          
 729 (87) 738 (104) 723 (85) 740 (102)  703 (80) 718 (104) 731 (112) 733 (102) 
 
 
 
Target 
 714 (104) 715 (108) 714 (89) 720 (103)  709 (86) 709 (97) 731 (79) 723 (98) 
 
 
  NAC (n = 34) 
Target Gender 
  Female  Male 
 Flanker distance  Flanker distance 
 
 
Far Close  Far Close 
          
 728 (93) 734 (88) 752 (97) 764 (89)  717 (80) 706 (81) 704 (91) 722 (87) 
 
 
 
Target 
 719 (106) 708 (101) 730 (104) 704 (85)  723 (87) 721 (105) 747 (84) 729 (94) 
 
 
Disturbing Emotions 
 
- 71 - 
not different, t(60) = 1.55; p = .13. When the response latencies were compared 
within target gender, it became obvious that female angry targets elicited significantly 
longer RTs than happy females, t(60) = 3.38; p < .01, while reactions to the two male 
emotions did not differ, t(60) = 1.34, p = .18. This means that the observed 
interaction between gender and emotion was mainly determined by the slowed 
categorization of angry female targets. Further, no main effect was observed for 
target emotion or flanker emotion, F(1, 59) = 2.3; MSE = 6269.60; p = .13, and F(1, 
59) < 1, respectively. Neither the main effect of group, F(1, 59) = < 1, MSE = 
88000.04; p = .84, nor any of its relevant interactions reached statistical significance. 
Thus, neither flanker emotion, target emotion, nor the flanker compatibility effect was 
altered by the degree of social anxiety.  
 
Discussion 
 
In the present study, we investigated attention disruption by threatening, task-
irrelevant flanking/distracting faces on the categorization of emotional target faces. 
Second, we examined the change of focus diameter when threatening targets had to 
be categorized, and how that influences the disrupting properties of flanking stimuli. 
Third, it was examined whether those effects were mediated by degree of social 
anxiety. We also assumed that anger depicted by a angry male might be more 
influential than anger displayed by a female, an effect that should be more 
pronounced within the socially anxious females tested here. Generally, as would be 
expected from theory, close flankers slowed latencies down significantly more than 
far flankers. 
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Also, the flanker compatibility effect reached statistical significance: Identity of 
flanker emotion and target emotion facilitated emotion categorization. The claim that 
a particular target or flanker emotion plays a relevant role in facilitating or impeding 
task performance could not be substantiated, however, because none of the related 
main effects nor interactions were significant. Social anxiety did not affect any of the 
classical flanker task effects, either. Instead, categorization of emotional expressions 
in SAs as well as in NACs was significantly faster when either happy female targets 
or angry male targets were presented.  
Despite the fact that the manipulation itself seemed to have worked, none of 
our hypotheses concerning social anxiety or angry faces in general could be 
substantiated. In contrast to Fenske and Eastwood (2003) who had found that the 
classical flanker compatibility effect disappeared when angry target faces were used, 
we employed pictures of real faces and not schematic ones. It has been suggested 
by Öhman, Lundqvist, and Esteves (2001) that choosing ecologically valid stimuli, 
such as real faces instead of schematic ones, might add considerable variance to 
the obtained data and therefore dilute the strength of effects. If that was the case 
here, then a larger sample might have been needed. Considering the equivocal 
findings for facial threat in social anxiety, it is also possible, however, that the flanker 
paradigm grasps aspects of attention which are only mildly disrupted by the 
processing of emotional information. Horstmann et al. (2006) have already argued 
that Fenske and Eastwood's findings might be attributable to perceptual differences 
in the (emotional) stimuli rather than to the processing of depicted emotions. 
Additionally, it is possible that the facilitation of particular gender-emotion 
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combinations overrides influences of a second order such as, for example, degree of 
social anxiety.  
To understand the strong impact gender has on emotion categorization, it could 
be argued that gender recognition, compared to emotion processing, is of similar 
importance or at least similarly automated. Indeed, there are different neurological 
structures that facilitate gender recognition (read: recognition of unchangeable 
features; Haxby et al., 2000). In evolutionary terms, facial expressions of angry 
males and smiling females should be preferentially processed by females because 
the former signals threat by a stronger and more aggressive male group member, 
while the latter indicates potential alliance not linked to mating. Accordingly, Becker 
et al. (2007) provided evidence that socialization or role stereotypes (e.g., smiling 
females and angry males are more common, or role-compliant; LaFrance, Hecht, & 
Paluck, 2003) provide no sufficient explanation for the detected gender-emotion 
interaction. Becker et al. argued that core visual/morphological features of male and 
female faces are associated with anger and happiness, respectively. In Experiment 7 
of their study, they manipulated computer generated androgynous neutral faces by 
changing prominent gender cues: Bony structure of the brow ridge (lowered vs. 
raised), jaw (square vs. round/narrow) and clothing (male vs. female). Participants 
had to rate the faces in terms of masculinity, femininity, anger, and happiness. The 
results indicated that lowering of the brow ridge did indeed lead to increased ratings 
of masculinity and anger (Becker et al., 2007). Interestingly, the clothing 
manipulation initiated judgments incompatible to those suggested by gender 
stereotypes or gender roles (see: Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). Moreover, 
they discovered the aforementioned gender-emotion interaction in male as well as 
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female participants, which opts for more general nature of the mechanism. Females 
are seemingly apt to be more befriending (e.g., Taylor et al., 2000), and facing 
aggression is more dangerous with bigger opponents which are most likely male 
(Daly & Wilson, 1994). Taken together, the presented results imply an 
evolutionarily/morphologically based processing facilitation when (female) 
participants categorize angry male and smiling female faces. 
The presented results raise the question why target (or distracter) gender has 
seldom been taken into account as a potentially relevant factor in facial threat 
research. In fact, many experiments intermix female and male stimulus materials 
without controlling for stimulus gender (e.g., Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005; Gilboa- 
Schechtman, Presburger, Marom, & Hermesh, 2005). This should, in the light of the 
results presented above, be reconsidered. If, for instance, in the present study, 
means per condition and emotion had been calculated disregarding stimulus gender, 
the relative slowing of angry female faces would have leveled out the speeding in 
angry male faces. Consequently, no difference for angry faces would have been 
detected with regard to the other emotions.  
Methodologically, this causes a problem, too, since several studies used 
gender categorization as implicit means of measuring responses to varied emotional 
valence (e.g., Arcuri, Castelli, Boca, Lorenzi Cioldi, & Dafflon, 2001; Rotteveel & 
Phaf, 2004). Assuming that neurological hardwiring facilitates emotion and gender 
categorization in general, but also specifically angry males and happy females, it is 
likely that both factors add considerable variance to response latencies, thereby 
making interpretations of the results more difficult. Additionally, females appear to be 
better/quicker at emotion processing than males are (Hall, 1978; Hampson, van 
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Anders, & Mullin, 2006). This indicates that controlling for participant gender might 
explain additional variance. In the study presented here, this problem was avoided 
by testing only females. In future studies, though, both genders should be tested. 
Taking these arguments into account, it is obvious that controlling for stimulus 
gender as well as participant gender should be standard procedure when emotional 
face materials are used. By doing so, the understanding of emotion processing, the 
evaluation of observed effects, and the statistical power of studies could be improved 
in future research.  
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Chapter 4 
Morphed Emotions:  
Emotion Detection and Misinterpretation 
in Social Anxiety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A slightly adapted version of this chapter is to be submitted as: Lange, W.-G., 
Heuer, K., Keijsers, G.P.J, Rinck, M., &  Becker, E.S. (2007). Morphed emotions: 
Emotion detection and misinterpretation in social anxiety. 
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Abstract 
 
The present study was designed to examine processing biases for emotional facial 
expressions in 27 High Socially Anxious individuals and 30 Non Anxious Controls. 
Participants were presented with morphed movies showing a neutral face gradually 
changing into an emotional facial expression (anger, disgust, happiness). Decoding 
accuracy, and response time to recognize the developing emotion was assessed 
under two conditions: A restricted viewing task with time limitation and a free viewing 
task (FVT) with no time constrains and possibilities to re-view the film. Both groups 
did not differ in the accuracy or speed of recognizing expressions, but in the kind of 
errors they made: results of the RVT indicate a tendency of high socially anxious 
participants to interpret first signs of disgust as contempt. No processing biases were 
evident for angry faces. The FVT did not reveal any group differences at all.  
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Introduction 
 
Social Phobia (Social Anxiety Disorder, SAD) is a common and debilitating disorder, 
characterized by marked and persistent fear of one or more social and performance 
situations in which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny 
by others (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and which may eventually lead 
to rejection and social isolation. Cognitive models of social phobia ascribe a 
significant role in the etiology and maintenance of the disorder to distorted cognitive 
processes (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). These models however, focus on different facets of biased 
processing resulting in different predictions: for example, Beck et al. (1985) 
suggested that social cues can trigger  “social threat schemata” in socially anxious 
individuals. These schemata are supposed to attract attention of threat-confirming 
information and neglect disconfirming evidence in one’s environment. According to 
Beck’s content-specificity hypothesis (Beck, 1976), these biases should then only 
refer to disorder specific themes and cues: e.g., social threat for social anxiety 
disorder. Additionally, the individual does not only focus on seemingly threatening 
cues but is also inclined to disregard or even reinterpret positive or ambiguous 
signals. Clark and Wells (1995) elaborated further on that idea. When confronted 
with conjectural social threat, they believe that socially anxious individuals turn their 
focus on themselves, monitoring themselves as social beings and their (observable) 
symptoms of anxiety. It is supposed that self-focused attention increases anxiety, 
keeps the anxious individual from observing relevant (maybe threat disconfirming) 
social cues, and makes them, under more, behave socially inappropriate. Rapee and 
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Heimberg (1997) clearly advocate an attentional bias towards and disrupted 
disengagement from threat cues once such a threat evaluation is made. Taken 
together, these models lead to contradictory suggestions: On the one hand, socially 
anxious individuals are thought to have a tendency to quickly detect or recognize 
cues of social threat or of cues that are readily interpreted as such. Later on, the 
anxious individual is believed to have difficulty disengaging his or her attention from 
that cue. On the other hand, social anxiety is supposed to be associated with an 
inward focus of attention in a social situation and thereby missing socially relevant 
and maybe even disconfirming social cues. Facial expressions are thought to be 
powerful and among the most relevant social cues in (human) interaction (e.g., 
Bradley et al., 1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Öhman, 2002). The fact that distinct 
neurological hardwiring facilitates face processing (Haxby et al., 2000; Herrmann et 
al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2002, 2005) accentuates the evolutionary relevance of facial 
expressions and their decoding (Haxby et al., 2000; Juth et al., 2005; Öhman, 2002; 
Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) for communication and 
interaction. The capability to recognize the meaning of facial expressions helps 
human beings to obviate conflicts, identify intentions and attitudes of others, and 
readjust one’s own behavior accordingly (Hess, Kappas, & Scherer, 1988; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990). Similar to verbal communication, facial expression in an interaction 
can readily express sympathy and interest but also e.g., rejection or contempt, the 
foremost fear in socially anxious individuals. Additionally, facial expressions can be 
quite ambiguous, and leave much room for (mis-)interpretation (compare: Clark, 
2001). Consequently, the skill to distinguish facial expressions of others correctly is 
crucial for smooth social interaction and healthy personal relationships whereas 
 
Morphed Emotions 
 
- 81 - 
disturbances herein can have far-reaching consequences which may eventually lead 
to rejection and isolation (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999). Facial expressions have 
therefore gained a considerable amount of attention in the research especially of 
social phobia (Douilliez & Philippot, 2003; Merckelbach, Van Hout, Van den Hout, & 
Mersch, 1989; Philippot & Douilliez, 2005).  
Arguing along the lines of the cognitive models outlined above, there should be 
considerable evidence that facial expressions relevant to social threat are processed 
differently by socially anxious individuals than other emotional expressions. 
“Differently”, however, indicates that the range of possibilities is manifold. And 
indeed, quite a lot of experimental investigations using visual search or probe tasks 
report for example speeded processing of or attentional vigilance towards angry 
faces (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; 
Maieritsch & Walter, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002a, 2002b; Mogg et al., 2004; 
Pishyar et al., 2004) as would be predicted by the model of Rapee & Heimberg 
(1997). Others, however, report attentional avoidance patterns for social threat cues 
instead (e.g., Mansell et al., 1999; Stirling, Eley, & Clark, 2006), or even both: first 
vigilance, then avoidance (for critical reviews see: Hermans & van Honk, 2006; 
Ledley & Heimberg, 2006). Along this line it could be hypothesized that speeded 
processing of threatening facial expressions would lead to fast recognition of these 
(threatening) faces, while attentional avoidance as well as self-focus in a social 
situation (compare: Clark & Wells, 1995) leads to slowed or erroneous recognition. 
Thus, an investigation of recognition speed and accuracy of (particular) facial 
expressions in a socially anxious population would allow inferences about the 
direction of underlying attentional and interpretational processes.  
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Following this train of thought, researchers have explored the accuracy and 
speed of emotion recognition in socially anxious individuals and non-anxious 
controls. In a prototypical experiment, participants would be asked to identify/label or 
sort (different intensities) of depicted emotional expressions as quickly as possible. 
Mohlman, Carmin and Price (2007) implemented a speeded emotional card-sorting 
task to investigate sorting accuracy and interpretation biases in individuals with 
social anxiety disorder. Participants with a diagnosis of general social phobia were 
more accurate in sorting angry face cards, but had also the tendency to interpret 
neutral cards as angry. Schofield, Coles, and Gibb (2007) did not find any sensitivity 
differences between high and low socially anxious participants when asked to detect 
the degree of negative evaluation in different intensities of happy, disgust and 
neutral expressions. However, socially high anxious individuals estimated the social 
cost of interacting with someone displaying a disgust expression to be significantly 
higher. Philippot and Douilliez (2005) confronted socially phobic individuals, anxious 
controls and non-anxious controls with different intensities (0%, 30%, 70%, 100%) of 
happy, angry, sad, disgusted, and fearful faces. Participants were asked to decide to 
what degree the portrayed emotion would resemble shame, surprise, anger disgust, 
sadness, fear or happiness. Philippot and Douilliez (2005) reported that the tested 
groups showed neither a superiority nor deficit in decoding any of the emotions. 
Accordingly, Winton, Clark, and Edelmann (1995) found that social anxiety was not 
related to an enhanced ability to discriminate between different facial expressions. 
Instead, social anxiety was associated with interpreting others’ facial expressions as 
more negative (see also: Douilliez & Philippot, 2003; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 
2005). Mullins and Duke (2004), who investigated the decoding of emotional facial 
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expressions (happy, sad, angry, fearful) in social anxiety failed to find accuracy 
superiority/deficits, but interestingly could show that social anxiety scores were 
correlated with longer response latencies to identify emotions. The same was 
reported by Melfsen and Florin (2002), who investigated deficits in classifying facial 
expressions by socially anxious children. Abrams (1999), however, found limited 
support for a deficit of socially anxious participants when decoding low-intensity 
facial cues of emotion. Unequivocal support for a decoding deficit was only reported 
by one study: Simonian, Beidel, Turner, Berkes, and Long (2001) found a strong 
deficit in socially phobic children and adolescents to decode especially expressions 
of happiness, sadness and disgust (see also: McClure & Nowicki, 2001). Taken 
together, there is only equivocal evidence that individuals with high degrees of social 
anxiety have a predominant attentional bias towards e.g., angry faces, nor is there 
any convincing proof of speeded recognition or higher recognition accuracy of 
threatening faces measured with the employed paradigms and stimuli.  
One reason for these inconsistent results, may lay in the selection of stimuli. 
Beck’s content-specificity hypothesis implies that for social anxiety social threat 
stimuli should readily evoke a cognitive bias. In the reviewed studies however, there 
is no mutual agreement about which facial expressions fulfill these conditions. Anger 
is frequently seen as most distinct signal of disagreement or rejection and commonly 
utilized in experimental paradigms. Fear might as well fit the cognitive schema as it 
mirrors the socially anxious individual’s own emotional state. Contempt would 
probably be the most logical choice as it reflects rejection right away. However, the 
facial expression of contempt is not as well-defined as would be desirable for 
research as contempt can readily be seen as disgust (Amir et al., 2005; Darwin, 
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1872; Philippot & Douilliez, 2005; Rossignol, Anselme, Vermeulen, Philippot, & 
Campanella, 2007). Surprisingly, even a positive expression such as happiness is 
not as straightforwardly positive as one would expect. There is incidental evidence 
that socially anxious avoid happy stimuli because they may interpret them either as 
being laughed at or as communicational appeal (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007; 
Lange, Keijsers, Becker, & Rinck, 2008). In fact, all emotional expressions have a 
communication aspect and could therefore evoke fear in socially anxious individuals. 
Another reason for equivocal results in the field could derive from the employment of 
static facial expressions, as used in the expression decoding studies reviewed so far. 
They might provide only a limited understanding of biased processing of social cues 
in social anxiety disorder as they lack a certain degree of ecological validity: faces in 
real live are not static. In real life nonverbal signals usually are also far less intense 
than depicted in standardized prototypical facial expressions. Additionally, emotional 
expressions do change permanently during everyday social interaction and may 
often transmit ambiguous signals. Herein, speeded or delayed (false) recognition of 
(certain) emotional expressions can have its greatest impact on evaluations and 
subsequent behavior. With an elegant set-up Joormann and Gotlib (2006) strove to 
tackle some of the above mentioned shortcomings at once: they presented 
expressions slowly developing from neutral to emotional, and chose a variety of 
emotions to test content specificity in different participant groups (Major Depressive 
Disorder, Social Phobia, healthy controls). Joormann and Gotlib (2006) employed a 
morphed faces task comparable to that of Niedenthal, Bauer, Halberstadt, and 
Innes-Ker (2001; Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002) to assess in how far 
individual differences could account for discrepancies in (early) recognition and 
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labeling of emotional faces. They asked participants to watch a series of black and 
white “film clips” (individual photos in fast succession) showing facial expressions 
gradually changing from neutral to emotional (happiness, anger, fear, sadness), and 
stop its progression as soon as they believed that they could identify the emerging 
emotion. At that point emotional intensity as well as the supposed label of the 
emotion were recorded.   
In the present study, we sought to replicate and expand the findings from 
Joormann and Gotlib (2006) in a non-clinical socially anxious sample and contrast 
those results with non-anxious controls. In order to improve ecological validity even 
further, we adopted the morphed-faces approach but generated movies that did not 
consist of distinguishable (500ms) steps of intensities, and no intensity repetitions, 
either. Instead, the films (and the depicted change of emotional expression) 
progressed fluently, changing in 1%-steps from a neutral expression to a full 
emotional expression (happiness, anger, or disgust) of the same actor each. Our 
selection of facial expression was based on the fact that Joormann and Gotlib (2006) 
had found no proof that neither sadness nor fear was particularly related to social 
anxiety disorder. Instead they presented evidence that angry faces might be 
threatening for socially anxious individuals. Even though Joorman and Gotlib did not 
find any significant correlations between social anxiety and quick and correct 
identification of happy faces, we implemented “happy” nevertheless. It has recently 
been found that socially anxious individuals seemingly interpreted happy 
expressions as aversive and consequently avoided them (see also: Heuer et al., 
2007; Lange et al., 2008; Roelofs et al., 2008). Additionally, we added disgust to the 
set of emotions. As stated earlier, disgust can readily be interpreted as depicting 
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contempt (Darwin, 1872; Philippot & Douilliez, 2005), and there is also preliminary 
evidence that especially socially anxious individuals tend to do so (Heuer, Rinck, and 
Becker, in preparation). Finally, we added a second task where socially anxious 
participants (SAs) and non-anxious controls (NACs) had the opportunity to scroll 
through the movies by sliding the progress bar of the presentation software back and 
forth without any time constrains. Again, they were asked to determine the turning 
point of the emotional expression as well as naming the emotion (depicted at the end 
of the movie). With this task we aimed at exploring if SAs do objectively determine 
the turning-point towards (certain) emotional faces earlier than NACs instead of 
jumping to a preliminary (biased) conclusion based on information confined by time 
constrains. Additionally, we were able to explore if participants recognize the 
depicted full-blown emotions at all.  
First, based of the results of Joormann & Gotlib (2006), we hypothesized that, 
under time restrictions (restricted viewing task; RVT), a higher degree of social 
anxiety would be related to a correct and early identification of angry facial 
expressions. As social anxiety has been found to be associated with interpreting 
disgust as contempt, we also expect a correct early detection of disgust features. 
Additionally, we assume that, compared to NACs, SAs will label early traces of 
disgust faces more frequently as “contempt”. We expect no differences between the 
groups with regard to happy faces. For the free viewing task (FVT) we assume, that 
SAs determine the turning-point between neutral and angry but also disgust 
expression to be earlier visible than NACs. If any accuracy difficulties occur at all, we 
belief SAs to mistake the full-blown expressions of disgust as contempt. 
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Method 
 
Participants. Twenty-seven highly socially anxious participants (SA) and 30 non-
anxious controls (NAC) were tested, all of them students at Radboud University 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Participants were selected on the basis of their anxiety 
subscale scores on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (here LSAS-A; Liebowitz, 
1987; Mennin et al., 2002; Oakman, Van-Ameringen, Mancini, & Farvolden, 2003). 
The LSAS was found to be a reliable, valid measure of social anxiety (Heimberg et 
al., 1999). Cut-off scores were chosen such that participants belonged to the highest 
or lowest 10% of the distribution (LSAS-A > 27 for SAs and LSAS-A < 13 for NACs). 
All participants were female.  
Prior to the experiments, participants gave informed consent. Then they 
completed the LSAS a second time.  In addition, participants answered the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Duke et al., 2006; Leary, 1983), the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961), and the STAI-Trait questionnaire 
(STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI-State (Spielberger et al., 1983) was 
filled in both before and after the experiments. After the experiments they received 
course credit or a modest fee for participating. 
Table 4.1 shows the groups’ mean questionnaire scores. SAs scored 
significantly higher than NACs not only on all LSAS-values, but also on the STAI-
Trait and on the pre- and post-experimental measures of the STAI-State, indicating 
social anxiety and a higher level of state and trait anxiety in the socially anxious 
participants. The difference in BDI was also statistically significant, but of little 
practical relevance: for both groups, mean scores were in the low-to-normal range. 
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Apparatus. The tasks were conducted on a computer with Intel Pentium III 
processor, operating at 451 MHz on Windows XP Professional (2000) with 256 MB 
working memory. The connected monitor-type was “Vision Master Pro 410” from 
Iiama Electric Cooperation. While the restricted viewing task was run with the 
experimental software Presentation® (Neuralbehavioral Systems - NBS, 2003), the 
individual clips for the free viewing task were presented with Microsoft’s Windows 
Media Player (Version 64.09.1130).  
Table 4.1 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and t-tests of questionnaire scores 
for Socially Anxious (SA) and Non-Anxious Control (NAC) participants: Age, 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-Sum) and Anxiety-subscale scores (LSAS-A); 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE); state versions of the Spielberger State/Trait 
Anxiety Inventory before (STAI-Spre) and after (STAI-Spost) the computer tasks; trait 
version of the Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T); Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) 
 
 Group 
 SA (n=27)  NAC (n=30) 
Questionnaires M SD  M SD 
Age 20.00 2.50  20.03 2.04 
LSAS-Sum* 65.37 14.93  16.77 8.15 
LSAS-A* 35.52 6.66  8.87 3.95 
FNE* 22.37 4.90  5.67 5.62 
STAI-Spre* 44.00 9.38  28.70 5.37 
STAI-Spost* 45.15 9.57  33.23 8.23 
STAI-T* 47.96 8.60  30.67 5.93 
BDI * 10.63 6.61  3.67 3.61 
   *p < 0.001, two-tailed. 
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Stimuli. Color pictures of 16 individuals (8 female), each one presenting four 
different expressions (angry, neutral, happy, and disgust) were taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF; Lundqvist et al., 1998). The 
size of the photos was 72,0 mm  98,8 mm, 32-bit color. The computer software 
MorphX (Wenneberg, 2004) was used to produce movies (“morphing”) depicting the 
transformation from the neutral photos to one of their expressional counterparts. 
Forty-eight 100-second movies resulted, which always started with a neutral 
expression of an individual actor and gradually (1%-steps) changed into one of the 
three other expressions. Thus, each individual appeared three times, changing in 
expression from neutral into either angry, smiling or disgust. 
Procedure. Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from the computer 
monitor and completed the Restricted Viewing Task (RVT) first. They were informed 
that a total of 48 short movies would be presented to them on the computer screen in 
random order, each starting with a neutral expression, gradually changing into an 
emotional expression. The participants’ task was to detect the developing emotion as 
soon as possible. Whenever they had the impression to have recognized the 
developing emotion they had to stop the movie by pressing the space bar. 
Subsequently, they had to decide which emotion they thought would be coming up at 
the end of the movie by pressing a marked number of the keyboard (1 = angry, 2 = 
contempt, 3 = disgust, 4 = happy). By key-press the next trial/movie started.  
Due to program restrictions the order of the trials had to be pre-randomized and 
was manually corrected when the same emotions would have been shown more 
than three times in a row. The order was the same for all participants. The sequence 
of a trial was as follows: a blank, black screen appeared for 50 ms until the movie 
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started. Whenever the spacebar was pressed reaction times were recorded and a 
screen appeared recapitulating which key represented which emotion. When an 
appropriate button (1-4) was pressed, the response was recorded and the next trial 
started 
For the FVT participants were informed that they would see the same 48 
movies that they had seen before. This time they were encouraged to use the 
progress-bar of the media player to advance/scroll through the whole movie at their 
own speed, and by doing so determine the point when they thought the first sign of 
expression change was detectable. The elapsed time of the chosen frame was 
recorded. Afterwards, participants were asked to have another look at the end 
expression of the movie and guess which emotion it represents. As participants were 
encouraged to explore the films at their own speed without restrictions, we felt that 
the time they needed to complete a whole trial would not bear any extra information. 
Therefore, it was not recorded. The next movie-file was opened according to a pre-
randomized list, until all movies were processed.  
Design.  For both tasks, first mean decoding accuracy scores across emotions 
for every participant were analyzed (with an ANOVA) by a 2 (group: SA, NAC) × 3 
(emotion: angry, disgust, smiling) design. To explore error rates in more detail, 
emotions were analyzed separately yielding three 2 (group: SA, NAC) × 3 (incorrect 
response: angry - disgust, contempt, smiling; disgust – angry, contempt, smiling; 
smiling - angry, disgust, contempt) designs. Please note that contempt is an artificial 
response category, which indeed was not shown in the movies but offered as 
response option. Further, two 2 (group: SA, NAC) × 3 (morphed emotions: angry, 
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disgust, smiling) analyses of mean turning points were conducted for both tasks. 
While group was a between-subjects factor, morphed emotion and incorrect 
response were within-subjects factors.  
Results 
 
Restricted Viewing Task (RVT) 
Decoding Accuracy. First, mean response accuracy scores across morphed 
emotions (angry, disgust, smiling) were computed for every participant. The analysis 
revealed a highly significant main effect of morphed emotion, F(2, 110) = 181; p = 
.00; eta2 = .77. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, this effect results from participants 
identifying first signs of smiling faces more accurate (86%) than of angry faces (45%) 
and of disgust faces (25%), with all p's < .01. Neither the main effect of group, F(1, 
54) = 0.00; p = .99; eta2 = .00, nor the interaction of group and morphed emotion, 
Figure 4.1 Restricted Viewing Task (RVT) and Free Viewing Task (FVT), mean percentage 
of correct responses per morphed emotion. 
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F(2, 110) = 0.93; p = .39; eta2 = .02, approached statistical significance. 
To explore the high error rates for disgust movies in more detail, they were 
analyzed separately. Here, the analysis yielded a highly reliable main effect of 
incorrect response, F(2, 110) = 112,84; p < .01; eta2 = .67, with contempt (50%) 
being the most frequent misinterpretation followed by angry (18%) and smiling (7%). 
Most interestingly, the interaction group and incorrect response was significant, F(2, 
110) = 3.47; p < .05; eta2 = .06. Subsequent t-tests evidence that compared to 
NACs, SAs show a statistical tendency to misinterpreted first signs of disgust as 
contempt (NAC = 45%, HAS = 56%; p = .06), whereas NAC showed a positive 
interpretation bias for first signs of disgust towards smiling (NAC = 9%, HAS = 4%; p 
< .05; Figure 4.2a). Similar analyses of error types in response to angry and smiling 
faces did not yield any significant interaction. 
Turning points. When mean turning points of responses across emotions 
(angry, disgust, smiling) and participants were analyzed, the main effect of group 
was marginally significant, F(1, 55) = 3.28; p = .08; eta2 = .06: SAs decided generally 
later (37 sec) than NACs (30 sec) when the emotion changed (Figure 4.2b). The 
interaction of group and morphed emotion was not statistically significant, F(2, 110) 
= .33; p = .72; eta2 = .01. The main effect of morphed emotion, however was clearly 
significant, F(2, 110) = 39.16; p < .01; eta2 = .42. Participants defined the turning 
point for smiling (29 sec) earlier than for disgust (32 sec) and for angry (39 sec), all 
p's < .01. 
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In sum, groups did not differ in the relatively high error rates of 75% when 
seeing first signs of disgust, but interestingly differed in the type of misinterpretation 
Figure 4.2a Restricted Viewing Task (RVT), mean percentage of misinterpretations of disgust 
movies per group. 
 
 
Figure 4.2b Restricted Viewing Task (RVT), mean of turning points in seconds per morphed 
emotions per group. 
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they made. SAs tended to interpretation the first signs as depicting contempt 
whereas NACs interpreted them as smiling. This was true although response 
latencies for decisions on disgust movies were equally long in both groups. 
 
Free Viewing Task (FVT) 
Decoding Accuracy. First, mean response accuracy scores for the full-blown 
emotions expressed at the end of the film (angry, disgust, smiling) were computed 
for every participant. The analysis revealed a highly significant main effect of 
emotion, F(2, 108) = 77.81; p < .01; eta2 = .59. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, this effect 
results from participants identifying smiling faces more accurate (100%) than disgust 
faces (86%) and angry faces (72%), with all p's < .01. Neither the main effect of 
group, F(1, 54) = 0.00; p = .99; eta2 = .00, nor the interaction of group and emotion, 
F(2, 108) = 1.62; p = .2; eta2 = .03, approached statistical significance. 
To explore the high error rates for the stimulus with most errors in detail, 
responses to anger movies were analyzed separately. The analysis yielded a highly 
reliable main effect of incorrect response, F(2, 108) = 135.28; p < .01; eta2 = .71, but 
no group differences or interaction of group and incorrect response. Participants of 
both groups thought the angry expressions at the end of the movie more frequently 
to depict contempt (21%) rather than disgust (7%). Errors in categorizing the final 
expression in disgust movies were analyzed in the same way. Here, the analysis 
revealed a highly significant main effect of incorrect response, too, F(2, 108) = 35.59; 
p < .01; eta2 = .39. For all participants the percentage of a contempt interpretation 
(10%) was significantly higher than of an angry interpretation (2%). However, no 
main effect of group or group × incorrect response interaction was evident.  
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Turning points. Analysis of the mean turning points neither revealed a main 
effect of group, F(1, 54) = 0.11; p = .74; eta2 = .00, nor was the interaction of group 
and morphed emotion statistically significant, F(2, 108) = 0.72; p = .49; eta2 = .01. 
The main effect of morphed emotion, however, was clearly significant, F(2, 108) = 
68.53; p < .01; eta2 = .56. Participants defined the turning point for smiling movies 
(37 sec) earlier than for disgust (44 sec) and for angry movies (51 sec), all p's < .01. 
In sum, error rates for angry, smiling and disgust expressions were comparable 
for SAs and NACs. With 28%, error rates were generally highest for angry, although, 
compared to disgust and smiling, the turning point decision concerning angry movies 
was made at the latest. Moreover, contempt evidenced to be the most frequent 
misinterpretation for angry (21%) as well as for disgust expressions (10%).  
 
General Discussion 
 
The present study investigated the role of social anxiety in speed and accuracy of 
facial emotion categorization in tasks where emotional intensity gradually developed 
out of a neutral expression. The findings from the RVT supported our hypotheses 
only to a limited extend. Unlike Joormann and Gotlib (2006; but also: Mohlman et al., 
2007; Simonian et al., 2001) we did not find an enhanced accuracy when SA 
categorized first signs of angry faces, neither did SA need less intensity to do so. 
There was no evidence for a speeded identification nor a delayed identification 
(Montagne et al., 2006) of angry faces. Our hypothesis concerning speed and 
accuracy of disgust categorization were not supported, either: Both groups were 
equally fast and accurate at identifying first signs of disgust. Participants generally 
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identified first signs of smiling faces more accurate than signs of angry faces. 
Especially for first signs of disgust error rates were particularly high (75%). However, 
when errors where made SA categorized first signs of disgust as contempt 
congruent to their fears (Beck, 1976), while NACs showed a clear positive 
interpretation bias and interpreted these signs as first traces of happiness (Lundh & 
Ost, 1996; Mohlman et al., 2007; Pishyar et al., 2004). These results contribute to 
scarce experimental evidence of the particular role that disgust might play in socially 
anxious individuals (Amir et al., 2005; Rossignol et al., 2007; Schofield et al., 2007). 
In addition to the emotion-specific results, social anxiety was tendentiously related to 
delayed identification of first signs of emotional facial expressions in general. 
Consistent with previous studies (Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Philippot & Douilliez, 
2005) results of the FVT indicate no accuracy differences between SAs and NACs 
when decoding full-blown emotional facial expressions (anger, disgust and smiling) 
without time constrains. In contrast to our results from the RVT, SA did not tend to 
interpret disgust expressions as contempt (for conflicting results see: Heuer, Rinck, 
and Becker, in preparation).  
In general, happy expressions yielded the most accurate interpretation, 
followed by disgust and anger (compare: Philippot & Douilliez, 2005). In this task, 
anger seemed to be the most difficult emotion to decode.  
The results from the turning point analyses support the decoding accuracy 
results. Groups did not show any differences in determining the point where first 
signs of an emotion became visible. In general, happy was recognizable relatively 
early, with only subtle differences from neutral, followed by disgust and angry facial 
expressions.  
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 This study was designed as an extension of Joormann and Gotlib’s (2006) 
experiment who used a morphed film paradigm in order to increase ecologic validity 
of expression identification tasks. Participants were asked to determine the point 
where the first signs of a gradually developing emotional expression became 
apparent and categorize the (first signs of) expression they had seen. Along with 
Joormann and Gotlib we argued that in everyday life people generally encounter 
different intensities of facial expressions. Confrontations with full-blown static 
expressions as often implemented in experimental research are rather unusual. 
Cognitive models of social phobia supposed that disruptions in the correct and 
speeded identification of facial expressions even at low emotional intensities can 
hamper social interaction and appropriate social behavior considerably and may 
consequently maintain or increase social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993). Our results indicate that socially anxious 
participants, when in doubt tend to interpret signs of disgust as contempt. This is in 
also line with the assumption that socially anxious individuals tend to interpret 
ambiguous social cues as threatening (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
 The discrepancy between our free and restricted viewing condition can 
possibly be attributed to different stages of processing. Reaction time based 
paradigms like the RVT are considered to measure more fast, automatic biases, 
whereas tasks without time constrains measure more strategic processes. Although 
we are aware, that by our RVT we did not measure automatic biases in a narrow 
sense, the present results lend partial support to the presumption of Philippot and 
Doulliez (2005). They assumed that, if at all, biased interpretation of emotional faces 
takes place at a more automatic rather than at a strategic level of processing. 
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Restricted response windows might in fact pressure the decision in a threat-
congruent fashion, while free viewing allows more conscious elaboration (Mohlman 
et al., 2007). Results are also partially in line with recent cognitive models of anxiety 
in general, assuming the existence of cognitive subsystems, which evaluate the 
threat value of stimuli already at a level of pre-consciousness to give them priority in 
further processing (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 
1993).  
In contrast to studies pressuring participants to fast responses (Mohlman et al., 
2007; Winton et al., 1995) the present RVT findings were not due to a general 
negativity bias, the inferences were rather specific. In fact it is possible that disgust is 
the most ambiguous of the employed emotions in these tasks. Philippot and Douilliez 
(2005), and also Darwin (1872) stressed the close relationship between disgust and 
contempt and their possible link with social rejection. As cognitive models of social 
phobia suggest that social anxiety is related to a tendency to interpret ambiguous 
social information as negative or even socially threatening (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) it is plausible to assume that our results hint at such a 
process. Studies not including this response category failed to find any decoding 
biases for disgust for unlimited as well as limited response windows (Philippot & 
Douilliez, 2005; Schofield et al., 2007).  
 In sum, this study did not support the notion that socially anxious individuals 
are exceedingly good/fast at identifying emotional expressions in others (for 
conflicting results see: Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). Additionally, they do not lack the 
skill to correctly recognize emotional facial expressions as might be deduced from 
the social skills deficit model (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Ashbaugh, Antony, McCabe, 
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Schmidt, & Swinson, 2005; Foa et al., 2001). It is more likely that a continuous 
valence evaluation/interpretation mechanism (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) slightly slows 
emotion categorization of SAs in a performance situation as evidenced by the 
tendentiously slowed responding in SA. Mogg and Bradley (1998) suggested that 
such a mechanism is fine-tuned by genetic setup as well as past experiences and 
cognitive set. This mechanism may be responsible for a misinterpretation of disgust 
features as contempt. However, evidence for misinterpretation or negative evaluation 
of facial expression is equivocal so far (e.g., Merckelbach, Van Hout et al., 1989). If 
reported, distortions seem to be rather elicited under conditions of restricted 
processing (e.g., short presentation times, restricted response window, etc.) but not 
under conditions of free processing (e.g., Philippot & Douilliez, 2005). There is even 
less evidence for a structural misinterpretation of disgust as contempt.  
 As mentioned above, our results contradict those of Joormann & Gotlib 
(2006). With a comparable experimental design, they found that social phobic 
individuals were considerably faster in identifying developing angry expressions than 
were depressed participants or normal controls. It is difficult to explain those 
differences in findings. Despite the similarities between the two approaches, there 
are, numerous methodological difference that could have led to the divergent results. 
Most prominently, the depicted change in our movies was much more gradual/slower 
(1 vs 2 % steps), thus more difficult to detect, and we had no emotion repeated by 
the same actor. When comparing the error rates as well as RTs of the two studies, it 
appears as if our task was much more difficult than that of Joormann & Gotlib (2006). 
In the RVT for example participants recognized angry faces in 45% of the trials, and 
happy expressions in 86%. In Joormann and Gotlib’s (2006) study the percentage 
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correct rates were much higher for these expressions (anger: 79%; happy: 98%). 
Disgust was in our study recognized correctly in only 25% of the trials. In the FVT 
participants had great difficulty in identifying angry facial expressions (72%, happy 
100% and disgust 86% correct). These figures could indicate a limitation concerning 
our stimulus material. As can be seen in Appendix 4.1, detailed analysis revealed 
that especially angry facial expressions vary largely in quality. Four of the anger 
pictures even led to more frequent false interpretations than correct ones. If 
emotions are indeed not clearly distinguishable they do definitely make the task 
more difficult. Another hint at enhanced task difficulty may be that, even when 
correcting for the uneven length of the stimulus films, participants generally reacted 
faster in the Joormann and Gotlib’s (2006) study.   
 Kamachi, Bruce, Mukaida, et al. (2001) found that identification accuracy of 
facial expressions was highly dependent on the speed of the sequence: Happiness 
and to some extend surprise were categorized most accurately with a fast changing 
sequence, while anger required medium, and sadness slow changing displays. It is 
possible that the speed of change is related to the developing speed of an 
expression in “real-life”. Consequently, it would be plausible to assume that biases 
only show if the displays progress realistically, and that speed of change has to be 
different for the different emotions. If that is true, the occurrence of a particular bias 
might be proof that the speed of a particular expression film “accidentally” coincided 
with the most ideal sequence speed for that specific emotion.   
 Additionally, we have to be aware, that using “contempt” as additional 
response option is critical. As an artificial category it facilitates response biases and 
it would have been more elegant, for example, to have as many positive as negative 
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response options. However, both groups could have chosen anger, too, but they did 
not.  
 A final point of concern is the participant selection. We are aware that results 
obtained by sampling sub-clinical socially anxious individuals do only allow limited 
generalization to a socially phobic population. However, as the transition between 
non-clinical and clinical social anxiety is thought to be of rather quantitative nature 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), we felt that an analogue sample can nevertheless help 
to shed light on the mechanisms active in a clinical population. Due to the 
constitution of the student population tested, it was only possible to test female 
participants. Of course it will be necessary to replicate our findings with a mixed-
gender group. 
 In absence of comparable experimental data in the literature, however, we 
have to conclude that under conditions of slow emotional change, participants do not 
show individual differences with regard to recognition speed or accuracy when 
identifying displays of facial expressions changing from neutral to happy, angry or 
disgust. Our results do imply that constrictions of the processing itself (time pressure 
in the Restricted Viewing Task), difficulty of the task (very slow change) resulted in 
an artificial increase of ambiguity and hence facilitated the misinterpretation of the 
already ambiguous expression of disgust in SA. 
Given the results of the current study, but also those of Joormann and Gotlib 
(2006), it seems worthwhile to develop the morphing task further, for in depth 
analysis of deficits or biases in the recognition of emotional facial expressions in 
social phobia. A whole range of emotions needs to be evaluated, to test the 
specificity of the biases. The speed of the changing sequence might need to be 
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adjusted for each emotion separately (Kamachi et al., 2001). It would also be 
worthwhile to explore the identification of the off-set of an emotion, starting with a 
full-blown expression changing into neutral (compare: Niedenthal, Halberstadt, 
Margolin, & Innes-Ker, 2000).  
In conclusion, it has been shown that socially anxious individuals, but only 
when under pressure potentially interpret disgust as contempt. As afore mentioned, 
the quick and correct identification of facial expressions is crucial for inferring the 
state of mind of others and for consequently adjusting one’s own behavior 
appropriately. The tendency to interpret an ambiguous facial expression as disgust in 
a threat confirming way is likely to enhance social anxiety, trigger inappropriate 
social and communication behavior, lead to avoidance of social situations and thus 
maintenance of the disorder.  
 
 
Morphed Emotions 
 
- 103 - 
Appendix 4.1 Percentages of emotions “seen” in the Free Viewing Task, separately for 
each picture presented. Correct interpretations are indicated in bold  
 
  
 Emotion seen 
Picture 
code 
Picture 
emotion Angry Contempt Disgust Happy 
F07 Angry 95.1% 4.9%   
F07 Disgust  50.8% 49.2%  
F07 Happy    100.0% 
F09 Angry 82.0% 18.0%   
F09 Disgust  3.3% 96.7%  
F09 Happy    100.0% 
F14 Angry 98.4% 1.6%   
F14 Disgust 1.6% 6.6% 91.8%  
F14 Happy    100.0% 
F17 Angry 60.7% 21.3% 18.0%  
F17 Disgust  6.6% 93.4%  
F17 Happy    100.0% 
F20 Angry 96.7% 3.3%   
F20 Disgust  9.8% 90.2%  
F20 Happy    100.0% 
F24 Angry 21.3% 63.9% 13.1%  
F24 Disgust 3.3% 4.9% 91.8%  
F24 Happy  3.3%  96.7% 
F26 Angry 85.2% 14.8%   
F26 Disgust 1.6% 3.3% 95.1%  
F26 Happy    100.0% 
F29 Angry 32.8% 62.3% 3.3%  
F29 Disgust  24.6% 75.4%  
F29 Happy    100.0% 
M01 Angry 41.0% 57.4% 1.6%  
M01 Disgust  3.3% 95.1%  
M01 Happy    100.0% 
M02 Angry 93.4% 6.6%   
M02 Disgust  19.7% 80.3%  
M02 Happy    100.0% 
M04 Angry 26.2% 49.2% 24.6%  
M04 Disgust  4.9% 91.8%  
M04 Happy    100.0% 
M06 Angry 86.9% 13.1%   
M06 Disgust  13.1% 86.9%  
M06 Happy    100.0% 
M10 Angry 98.4% 1.6%   
M10 Disgust 19.7% 4.9% 75.4%  
M10 Happy    100.0% 
M12 Angry 45.9% 13.1% 41.0%  
M12 Disgust  6.6% 91.8% 1.6% 
M12 Happy    100.0% 
M28 Angry 96.7%  3.3%  
M28 Disgust 3.3% 19.7% 77.0%  
M28 Happy  1.6%  98.4% 
M34 Angry 98.4% 1.6%   
M34 Disgust 3.3% 1.6% 95.1%  
M34 Happy  1.6%  98.4% 
 
Note. The picture codes correspond to those used in the KDEF database. Due to missing data some 
percentages do not sum up to 100%. 
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Chapter 5 
Here’s looking at you, folks: Eye 
Movement and the Evaluation of Facial 
Crowds in Social Anxiety 
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Abstract 
 
Scientific evidence is equivocal on whether Social Anxiety Disorder is characterized 
by a biased negative evaluation of (grouped) facial expressions. Twenty-two highly 
socially anxious (SAs) and 21 non-anxious controls (NACs) rated the degree of 
friendliness of different neutral-angry and happy-angry face combinations while eye 
movements were recorded. The resultant eye-movement patterns revealed that SAs, 
compared to NACs looked away faster when the first fixated face was angry. 
Additionally, the proportion of fixated angry faces was significantly higher than for 
other expressions in SAs. In general, these fixated angry faces were the best 
predictor of subsequent affect ratings for either group, independent of social anxiety. 
The rating task data, however, revealed no significant differences between SAs and 
NACs. 
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Introduction 
 
It has repeatedly been suggested that attentional and interpretation biases in 
patients diagnosed with social anxiety disorder (or social phobia; for diagnostic 
details see: American Psychiatric Association, 2000; APA) expedite the maintenance 
of this disorder (Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & Wells, 1995; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & 
Herbert, 1996; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993). Negative evaluation by others lies at the core 
of what socially anxious individuals (SAs) fear the most. 
While negative biases in interpretation and evaluation of social situations 
(negative interpretation biases) in SA are frequently found using text vignettes of 
ambiguous social scenarios (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; 
Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003; Stopa & Clark, 
2000; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003), evidence is less persuasive from tasks 
where participants evaluate facial expressions. The importance of facial expressions 
for social interaction and communication, and the fact that the same expressions can 
be interpreted in different ways makes it extremely surprising that SAs do not 
consistently process/evaluate facial expressions differently from non-anxious 
controls (NACs). Some support for this notion comes from Abrams (1999) and 
Surcinelli, Codispoti Montebarocci, et al. (2006). They have found that participants 
high in (social) anxiety show a recognition bias for negative facial expressions. 
Gilboa-Schechtman, Presburger, Marom & Hermesh (2005) have argued that the co-
occurrence of different facial expression in a group faces enhances ambiguity and 
makes it more succeptible for biased interpretation. Additionally, groups are 
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supposed to evoke even more social anxiety than one-by-one encounters. Utilizing 
displays of facial crowds, they could show that patients with generalized Social 
Anxiety Disorder (Social Phobia) have a tendency to evaluate moderately 
disapproving crowds more negatively compared to non-clinical controls. Individuals 
with social anxiety and comorbid depression evaluated extremely disapproving 
crowds more negatively. Results from Winton, Clark, and Edelmanns (1995), 
however, are more equivocal. They reported a tendency of SA to rate facial 
expressions as negative (Experiment 2), but did not find an enhanced ability in 
socially anxious participants for detecting negative emotions (Experiment 1). No 
support for processing biases for facial expressions in SA came from Douilliez and 
Philippot (2003; Philippot & Douilliez, 2005) when they asked socially phobic 
participants, generally (not socially) anxious participants and non-anxious controls to 
judge how strongly different intensities of facial expressions portrayed different 
emotions. Merckelbach, Van Hout, Van den Hout, and Mersch (1989) did not find 
any evidence, either, that socially phobic participants do process angry faces 
differently than non-anxious controls.  Finally, our previous work (Lange, Keijsers, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2008), did not substantiate any difference in ratings of a crowd’s 
facial expressions related to degree of social anxiety. In an Approach-Avoidance 
Task (compare: Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007; Rinck & Becker, 2007), however, SA 
displayed increased initial avoidance tendencies in response to crowds when the 
number of angry faces in a neutral crowd increased. Additionally, SAs also avoided 
smiling faces, even though these were task irrelevant.  
The inconsistencies in the reported findings can partially explained by 
neurological hardwiring that is thought to underlie and facilitate rapid face processing 
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(Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Herrmann, Ehlis, Muehlberger, & Fallgatter, 
2005; Vuilleumier, 2002, 2005). LeDoux (1996), for example, suggested that the 
processing of threat cues travels via two different neurological pathways: a 
subcortical route for rough, quick stimulus evaluation and response initiation, and a 
cortical and slow one for thorough evaluation of a stimulus. It is proposed that 
discrimination of danger-relevant stimuli, such as, e.g., angry faces, takes place pre-
attentively and is evolutionarily beneficial (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman, 1993; Öhman & 
Soares, 1993). Consequently, it is conceivable that measures of conscious 
recognition and evaluation of facial expressions, as presented above, are not 
sensitive enough to detect possible processing biases. Automatic attentional 
processes and quick evaluation, as well as appropriate responses or behavior might 
be initiated or executed very early, leaving patients and researchers unaware of fast-
acting automatic evaluation or associated responses. 
Evidence from visual search tasks has strengthened the notion that threat is 
processed pre-attentively. Although the presentation of facial crowds should be 
particularly anxiety evoking in SA, reported findings cannot be conclusively 
integrated into our understanding of social anxiety. Öhman, Lundqvist, and Esteves 
(2001) for example have shown that in general angry faces are detected faster 
(“pop-out”) in both neutral and happy crowds, while neutral and happy faces are not 
preferentially detected when embedded in angry crowds (see also: Fox et al., 2000; 
Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002; Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). 
Calvo, Avero, and Lunqvist (2006) recorded eye movements during a visual search 
task. The reported “anger superiority effect” could not be explained by a higher 
proportion of initial fixations on an angry face; instead, angry faces were detected 
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more accurately even though they were fixated upon less often and for a shorter 
time than other faces. Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, and Amir (1999) found more rapid 
detection of angry faces compared to happy faces in neutral crowds; this finding was 
even more pronounced in participants diagnosed with Social Anxiety Disorder. Juth, 
Lundqvist, Karlsson, and Öhman (2005), however, found that SAs were distracted 
not only when looking for dissimilar faces amongst angry but also in happy crowds 
(Juth et al., 2005). In sum, it remains unclear whether angry faces are preferentially 
processed by SAs and whether such a processing biases distorts the subjective 
rating of particular facial expressions in SA and not in NACs.  
 In the present study, we aimed at exploring the relationship between 
(preferential) attentional processing, subjective ratings of affect in response to faces, 
and social anxiety. Crowd displays were considered the most fitting stimuli for this 
research because we would be able to present competing emotional stimuli so that 
attentional biases (here: eye-movements) with regard to certain stimulus categories 
could be assessed. Additionally, due to the combination of different facial 
expressions, we were free in manipulating the degree of threat by varying the ratio 
between neutral, angry, and smiling faces. Besides that, crowds are more 
ambiguous than individual photos, are more susceptible to interpretations and could 
consequently be more threatening to SAs - enhancing possible evaluative 
differences.  
 First, we examined whether (different aspects of) eye movements differed 
between SA and NACs when viewing facial crowds. Second, we explored how facial 
crowds would be rated with respect to perceived friendliness as the ratio of angry 
faces in a neutral crowd or angry faces in a smiling crowd varied. We wanted to 
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know whether these ratings would differ in SAs as compared to NACs. Third, to 
control for rapid, impulsive judgments as compared to delayed, deliberate 
judgments, crowds were presented for different presentation times (compare: Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 2005; Lange et al., 2008). Fourth and most importantly, we 
investigated whether eye movement patterns would predict subsequent ratings. 
It was assumed that the number of angry faces shown in a group would 
influence gaze duration and number fixations on angry faces for SAs more than for 
NACs, and consequently subsequent ratings. This evaluation was expected to 
become increasingly negative as the number of angry faces increased in either a 
neutral or a happy crowd. In line with earlier research, we expect more negative 
ratings on moderately negative crowds in SAs than in NACs. Additionally, we 
expected these findings to be more pronounced in response to short as compared to 
long presentation times (Lange et al., 2008). 
Methods 
 
Participants, and Measures 
During prescreening, psychology students from the Dresden University of 
Technology filled in the German version of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; Stangier & Heidenreich, in press) and were selected based 
on their scores on the LSAS anxiety subscale (< 13 or > 27). The initial group of 43 
students (82.6% female) was subdivided into 22 Socially Anxious participants (SAs) 
and 21 Non-Anxious Controls (NACs). The experimental session lasted a total of 60 
minutes. All participants received € 8,- or course credit for their participation. 
 
Chapter 5 
- 112 - 
After giving informed consent, participants filled in the state-version of the 
German State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (here: STAI-State1; Laux, Glanzmann, 
Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981). Then participants completed the rating task and 
afterwards the STAI for a second time (STAI-State2), a general screening instrument 
for eyesight, handedness, education, and use of medication, a German translation of 
the “Inventory to diagnose depression” (Zimmerman, Coryell, Wilson, & Corenthal, 
1986), the “Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik nach DSM-IV” (FDD-DSM-IV; 
Kühner, 1997), and the trait-version of the German STAI (STAI-Trait; Laux et al., 
1981).  
 
Apparatus 
All stimuli were presented on a blue background on a 17-inch monitor (85 Hz) with a 
screen resolution of 1024  768. Eye movements were recorded using an “EyeLink 
V2.01” tracking system (SR Research Ltd., Toronto) at a sample rate of 250 Hz as 
participants inspected and rated the facial displays. 
 
Materials   
Color photos of 16 male1 individuals, showing three different expressions (angry, 
neutral and happy) was adapted from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces 
database (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Photos were resized to 34  
165 pixels. Subsequently, matrices of 16 (44) facial expressions were constructed, 
with each individual appearing exactly once per matrix. Two types of crowds were 
created: Neutral-angry and happy-angry combinations (compare: Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 2005). The degree of socio evaluative threat for each grouping 
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was varied by gradually increasing the ratio of angry faces in each crowd. This 
resulted in seven different ratios: 14:2 (e.g., 14 neutral and two angry pictures), 12:4, 
10:6, 8:8, 6:10, 4:11, and 2:14 (see Figure 5.1). Each individual and emotional 
expression was randomly presented at any position. The 16 pictures were evenly 
spread across a rectangle of 590  762 pixels, with margins of 122 pixels left and 
right, and 3 pixels above and below the pictures.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Example of a stimulus display. 
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Procedure 
After calibration (repeated every 10th trial) and validation of the eye tracking system, 
the computer program was started and instructions appeared on the screen. 
Participants were given 36 practice trials to become acquainted to the use of the –3, 
–2, –1, +1, +2, +3 marked keys of a standard computer keyboard. Participants 
practiced pressing the six keys with the ring, middle and index fingers of the left and 
right hand, allowing evaluation the face matrices without needing to reposition their 
fingers or looking away from the screen later in the experiment. Twenty-eight 
practice trials were then completed with different, female crowds of each crowd type. 
Participants were instructed to subjectively judge how (un-)friendly they found each 
presented crowd after seeing it for either 500 or 2500 ms using the keys described 
above. The number of experimental trials was divided into three blocks to allow for 
pauses in-between. Presentation times and other independent variables (crowd type, 
ratio) were randomized within and between blocks. The trial order within each block, 
as well as block order were pre-randomized and iterated for every 4th participant. In 
the main experiment, participants completed 3 sets of 140 trials each. Trials were 
divided equally into 15 trials per crowd type, ratio, and presentation time (i.e. 15  2 
 7  2 = 420). Each individual appeared at random in one of the 16 matrix 
positions. 
In each trial, a yellow, centered fixation cross was initially displayed in the 
center of a blue screen for 1000 ms. Then the crowd stimulus was presented for 
either 500 or 2500 ms, after which an empty blue screen appeared. The blank 
screen remained visible until the participant reacted or until 2000 ms had elapsed, 
and was followed by an intertrial interval of 500 ms. In addition to ratings and 
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reaction times, the following eye tracking variables were measured: Duration and 
location of initial fixation as well as order and gaze duration for every subsequently 
fixated picture.  
 
Design 
A 2 (crowd type: neutral-angry, happy-angry)  7 (expression ratio: 14:2, 12:4, 10:6, 
8:8, 6:10, 4:11, 2:14)2  2 (presentation time: 500, 2500)  2 (social anxiety: low, 
high) factorial design was used in analyzing the subjective ratings, decision 
latencies, and eye tracking data. While degree of anxiety was used as between-
subjects factor, crowd type, ratio (of pictures in the center), and presentation time 
were within-subjects factors. Since participants were instructed to fixate their gaze to 
the center of the screen before each trial, we expected that the central four pictures 
would appear more prominent than those in the periphery. In order to control for this 
likelihood, the central four images and related expression ratios therein were indexed 
so that separate data analyses could be calculated.  
Results 
 
Questionnaires. The participant groups scored markedly different on anxiety related 
concepts such as state- and trait anxiety. Additionally, SAs scored significantly 
higher on the depression scale than did the NACs. However, all scores fell within a 
normal, non-pathological range (for means see: Table 5.1).  
Ratings. Happy-angry crowds (M = 0.29; SD = 0.41) were rated more positively than 
neutral-angry crowds (M = -1.26; SD = 0.45), F(1, 41) = 325.03 , MSE = 2.23 , p < 
.001 across all ratios. There was a significant main effect of ratio, F(6, 246) = 389.60, 
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MSE = 0.14, p < .001 with ratings for both crowd types decreasing as additional 
angry faces are added (see Figure 5.2a, b). Ratings were generally more positive 
after seeing the crowd for 500 ms (M = -0.43; SD = 0.33) compared to ratings after 
2500 ms (M = -0.54; SD = 0.34), F(1, 41) = 15.27, MSE = 0.20, p < .001. In contrast, 
the factor group did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 41) < 1, MSE = 3.01, p = 
.58; other relevant interaction with group were also non-significant. In sum, ratings of 
both groups declined with every additional angry face in the crowd. Since no 
interaction between group and crowd type occurred, analyses of the separate crowd 
types were omitted. 
Table 5.1 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) age and questionnaire scores for socially 
anxious participants (SAs) and non-anxious controls (NACs): Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale - 
anxiety subscale (LSAS-anxiety), the state version of the Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory 
before and after the experiment (STAI-State1 & State2), the trait version of the Spielberger 
State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait), and the “Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik 
(FDD)” 
Group 
SA (n=22)  NAC (n=21) 
 
 
Variables M SD  M SD 
Age 24.2 4.1  23.6 3.9 
LSAS-anxiety** 37.6 8.9  8.9 3.6  
STAI-Trait** 46.5 8.9  33.6 7.1 
STAI-State1** 41.3 7.1  33.0 7.0 
STAI-State2* 46.8 10.0  36.1 9.0 
FDD** 11.8 6.3  4.3 4.2 
              *p < .01, two-tailed. **p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Eye Movements. In order to gain insight into the attentional mechanisms resulting in 
subjective rating of facial expression, a number of variables were computed from the 
raw eye-tracking data. These included: number of fixated (central) angry 
expressions, proportion of fixated angry faces of all fixations, proportion of angry 
 
Figure 5.2a Mean valence ratings for neutral-angry crowds per ratio and anxiety group. 
 
Figure 5.2b Mean valence ratings for happy-angry crowds per ratio and anxiety group. 
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faces on first fixation (in center), total gaze duration on angry faces, mean gaze 
duration on non-angry faces, and mean gaze duration on first fixated expression 
(compare: Table 5.2). To determine which eye-tracking variables could most reliably 
predict crowd ratings, correlations between these measures and friendliness ratings 
were calculated. 
Generally, most of the independent variables were not significantly relevant 
for interpretation. Presentation time, social anxiety, and even crowd expression 
ratios were, if at all, only moderately correlated with the ratings (Table 5.2). Herein, 
the number of angry faces in the four central images was the best predictor of 
friendliness ratings. When looking at the eye-movement data, it appeared that the 
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Table 5.2 Correlations (Person’s r) between relevant independent variables, different facets of 
eye movement behavior and social anxiety, Ratings and Presentation Time (PT; n = 43) 
 
 Anxiety Rating PT 
Rating .01   
Presentation Time -.00 -.29  
Ratio .00 -.27 .00 
No. angry faces among central four .00 -.42** .00 
No. fixated angry faces without repetition .02 -.37* .57* 
No. fixated central angry faces .02 .40** .30 
Proportion fixated angry from all fixated pictures -.10 -.51** -.10 
Proportion angry on first fixation -.01 -.32* .00 
Proportion angry on first fixation in center -.01 -.31* -.00 
Total gaze duration on angry faces -.01 -.40** .63** 
Mean gaze duration on non-angry faces .01 .36* .64** 
Mean gaze duration on the face fixated first -.01 .01 .41** 
      *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. 
Note. Due to the pre-selection based on degree of social anxiety, correlations with this factor are artificially inflated.  
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proportion of fixated angry faces among all fixated faces was the strongest predictor 
of subsequent rating. The rating of a crowd can only become negative once one has 
actually seen the negative faces composing it. Further, the absolute number of 
fixated angry faces (without repetitions), independent of the actual number of angry 
faces in the matrix, reliably influenced the way participants rated the crowds: the 
more angry faces fixated, the more negative the rating. The same finding applied to 
the number of fixated central angry faces. Similarly, the proportion of first fixations on 
an angry face, as well as the proportion of first fixations on an angry face among the 
central four pictures predicted ratings. Finally, increased total gaze duration on angry 
faces and mean gaze duration on non-angry faces influenced whether participants 
rated the crowds more negatively, or more positively, respectively (Table 5.2). 
Strikingly, SAs (M = 0.50, SD = 0.008) had a slightly, yet consistently higher 
proportion angry faces fixated than NACs (M = 0.49, SD = 0.01), F(1, 41) = 7.08, 
MSE = 0.003; p < .05, independent of crowd type or presentation time (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 Percentage angry-fixations per group per ratio in comparison to real percentage 
angry faces. 
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On further inspection, it appears that the proportion of fixated angry faces does not 
match the actual percentage of angry faces present in the matrix. It seems as if the 
focus of all participants lay generally more towards the few incongruent pictures, on 
either end of the distribution. This phenomenon was independent of the expression 
being portrayed. Interestingly, eye movements and fixations did not reveal evidence 
of increased vigilance for angry faces in SAs: their first fixation was not more likely to 
be located on an angry face than those of NACs, F(1, 41) < 1, MSE = 26, p = .33. In 
contrast, when there was enough time for avoidance of angry faces, during the 2500 
ms presentation time trials, SAs did show evidence of avoidance. When the first 
fixation fell on an angry face, rather than a non-angry one, SAs looked away from it 
more quickly than NACs, F(1, 41) = 5.15, MSE = 171980, p < .05 (Figure 5.4). This 
was true of both neutral-angry crowds, t(41) = 2.66, p < .05, and smiling-angry 
crowds, t(41) = 2.71, p = .01. 
 
Figure 5.4 Mean gaze duration in ms for angry and non-angry expressions per group. 
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Discussion 
 
In the present study, we investigated explicit evaluation of facial crowds by socially 
anxious participants (SAs) and non-anxious controls (NACs). We were particularly 
interested in how eye movement patterns predicted friendliness ratings, and whether 
the patterns differed between SAs and NACs.  
 
Crowd rating 
The results of the Crowd Rating Task revealed that SAs did not rate emotional 
crowds differently than NACs. In general, friendliness ratings decreased linearly with 
increasing number of angry faces in the facial matrix, independent of crowd type or 
presentation time.3  
The lack of group difference in the direct rating task could be explained by a 
number of mechanisms. While exploring the facial displays, all participants could 
have logically inferred that friendliness ratings should decline as the number of angry 
faces in the crowds increased. Late elaborate processing may also have offered an 
opportunity for both groups to re-appraise initial, impulsive evaluations. Initial positive 
evaluations could, for instance, arise from a ‘positivity-bias’, often observed in a non-
clinical population (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, & 
Clark, 2007). The fact that quick evaluations were more positive than elaborate ones 
provides evidence of such a mechanism, although there is no evidence that this bias 
does not exist in SAs (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). If a late re-evaluation indeed 
takes place, it appears to be a rather general process, not influenced by or sensitive 
to degree of social anxiety.  
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Social desirability effects might provide another explanation for the lack of 
divergence in the “friendliness” ratings. Socially anxious participants in experiments 
are believed to be particularly sensitive to social desirability (compare: Gilbert, 2001; 
Osman, Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros, 1998; Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 
2006). Accordingly, SA might have re-appraised the crowds in a way that they 
believed was expected from them as “reliable” research participants. Another 
possibly is that, “threat” and “friendliness” are not as clearly linked as we thought. 
Asking participants directly how threatening they found the crowds would probably 
have been more straightforward and less susceptible to social desirability effects. 
Another confound is that the terms “friendliness” or “threat” are not entirely obvious 
when linked to pictures of groups. Asking how intimidating one finds the group when 
imagining that one has to present a talk in front of this crowd might have been more 
ecologically valid, and may have elicited a dissociation between SAs and NACs.  
Finally, there is also good reason to assume that there are indeed no explicit 
rating differences between the groups. If quick, initial threat evaluations do not 
interfere with controlled cognitive processes, but instead direct eye movement 
patterns resulting in subsequent behavior tendencies, no rating differences would 
have been observed with our explicit measure. Indeed, Heuer et al. (2007), but also 
Lange et al. (2008) found that socially anxious individuals show automatic avoidance 
tendencies to emotional faces in an indirect task, while showing no differences on 
direct evaluation of the material, when compared to non-anxious controls. 
From the above it becomes evident that the friendliness ratings by themselves 
do not contribute to a clear understanding of how social anxiety is related to the 
direct evaluation of facial crowds. In the following section, we explore whether eye 
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movement patterns are more conclusive and how they correlate with the ratings of 
the crowds. 
 
Eye movement 
From the eye movement data of the present study it became clear that the number of 
angry faces in the center and the proportion of actually fixated angry pictures, rather 
than the absolute ratio of angry to other faces best predicted rating outcomes. This 
sounds logical as attention was redirected to the fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen at the beginning of each trial. Thus, a high number of angry faces in the 
central positions was likely to indicate a higher number of angry faces in the rest of 
the crowd, r(42) = .311, p = .05. Consequently, ratings became more negative when 
angry faces were fixated in central positions. Second, ratings are presumably based 
on what one really saw during each trial. Therefore correlations of ratings with ratio 
are low and insignificant with the short presentation time (r500ms(42) = .174, p = ns) 
and become more relevant with the long presentation time (r2500ms(42) = .371, p = 
.05). This means, only if one pays attention to (here: fixates) the angry pictures, can 
one come to a justified conclusion.  
Pop-out. Interestingly, participants’ proportion of fixated angry faces did not 
parallel the factual proportion of angry faces in a crowd. In fact, all participants 
tended to make more fixations on angry faces when they constituted less than 50% 
of the crowd and fixated more on non-angry faces when those formed the minority. It 
could be argued that this effect is produced by a more general “pop-out” effect 
(Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), promoting novelty in the visual field 
(compare: Lange, Heuer, Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2008; Lupianez, Klein, & 
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Bartolomeo, 2006; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). Here, a pop-out effect, be it 
for incongruent faces, or for angry faces only, is rather unlikely, though. While the 
“anger-superiority-effect” (Hansen & Hansen, 1988) has often been replicated with 
different variations of this “face-in-the-crowd” visual search paradigm (Eastwood et 
al., 2005; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Öhman et al., 2001), there is dissent 
regarding the underlying attentional mechanisms. A major point is that in the present 
study, the crowds did not require searching, but simply had to be viewed prior to 
rating. Additionally, the facial matrices consisted of 16 different individuals showing 
varying ratios of two expressions, making serial exploration of every face more 
probable; having 16 identical faces with one incongruent expression, or 15+1 
prototypic schematic faces, make pop-out more likely. If pop-out does occur in our 
task, it would make sense to assume that first fixations are more likely on angry 
faces, but in our research they were not. This finding is in agreement with research 
from Calvo, Avero, and Lundqvist (2006), who, using a classical face-in-the-crowd 
set-up with four schematic faces while registering eye movements, did not find a 
higher proportion of angry faces among first fixations. Hampton and colleagues 
(1989), but also Horstmann (2007) have already argued that observed position 
effects in a search array as well as insufficiency of the search slopes renders pop-
out effects rather unlikely.  
Additionally, Bichot and Desimone (2006) suggests that pop-out (parallel 
processing) and serial processing are difficult to discern as they neurologically seem 
to switch back and forth during visual search, depending on stimulus complexity. 
According to Hahn and Grolund (2007; but see also: Williams et al., 2005), 
preferential processing of threat is most obvious when no specific instructions are 
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given (i.e. “indicate if an incongruent face is present or not”), but can be mediated by 
a specific “top-down” instruction to, e.g., find a happy face (compare: Rinck, 
Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005). In the presented study, we gave 
participants specific instructions to rate the friendliness of each crowd from -3 to +3. 
It is possible that the specificity of this task and the associated strategies may 
circumvent disorder-relevant mediation of friendliness ratings by angry faces in SA.  
We have to be aware that our experimental set-up does not allow conclusions 
about pre-attentive processing nor covert attention (Posner, 1980). It is possible that 
anger is identified in a pre-attentive state triggering facilitated processing before 
overt attention “takes over”. This could explain how participants in Calvo and 
colleagues’ experiments showed enhanced accuracy in identifying discrepant angry 
faces in neutral crowds when presented parafoveally for 150 ms (Calvo et al., 2006). 
In fact, angry faces were detected more accurately despite being looked at for a 
shorter period than other expressions. 
Attentional avoidance. Calvo et al. (2006) suggested that pre-attentive 
processing makes longer focus times on angry faces unnecessary, because they are 
fully processed in a shorter time, while similar observations have occasionally been 
interpreted as attentional avoidance (e.g., Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; 
Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2004; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, 
Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999). Our data 
conveys a similar idea: Social anxiety was associated with a tendency to quickly 
avert the gaze only from angry initially-fixated faces. This could also explain the 
higher proportion of angry faces fixated and the slightly longer gaze durations on 
non-angry faces. Horstmann (2007) acknowledges a preferential processing of threat 
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related cues, but on the other hand, he doubts that the processing is pre-attentive. In 
our study, we unfortunately do not have any other means of investigating whether 
any pre-attentive processing has taken place, and if quick aversion of gaze is a sign 
of completed processing, rather than avoidance. Conclusively, and in contrast to 
literature (e.g., Fox, 2004; Georgiou et al., 2005; Horley et al., 2004; Mogg, Philippot, 
& Bradley, 2004) suggesting attentional vigilance to threat, first vigilance and then 
avoidance, or disrupted disengagement from threat, our findings imply a general 
novelty-bias for the smaller number of incongruent faces in a crowd, with a no-
vigilance-but-quick-avoidance pattern seen in socially anxious participants, at least 
when overt attention is concerned.  
Surprisingly, we cannot conclude that the higher proportion of angry faces 
fixated by SAs, led to observable, more negative ratings. The shorter gaze duration 
of SAs on first fixated angry pictures was not sufficient to produce rating differences 
between SAs and NACs, either.  
 
Conclusion 
These findings have a number of implications. In general, we assume that SAs, due 
to their learning history and/or genetic makeup, should be more sensitive to socio-
evaluative threat than NACs (Fox, Hane, & Pine, 2007). This hypersensitivity may 
lead to SAs being incapable of ignoring social threat (negative facial expressions) in 
their environment. However, some studies indicate that angry (threatening, negative) 
faces seem to be preferentially processed in individuals with elevated levels of social 
or trait anxiety, but not in NACs (Fox, 2004; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Kolassa 
& Miltner, 2006; Lange et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2004; Stein, Goldin, Sareen, Zorrilla, 
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& Brown, 2002), while other researchers suggest a more general anger-superiority-
effect unrelated to anxiety-proneness (Calvo et al., 2006; de Jong & Martens, 2007; 
Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; Öhman et al., 2001; Springer, Rosas, McGetrick, & 
Bowers, 2007; Williams et al., 2005). Another problem arises from the increasing 
evidence that unconscious and conscious processing of danger-related cues might 
travel via different neuronal pathways (Herba et al., 2007; Ohrmann et al., 2007; 
Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2002). For example, Etkin, Klemenhagen, 
Dudman, et al. (2004) found that conscious presentation of fearful faces consistently 
activated the dorsal amgydala in all participants. With unconscious presentation, 
however, activation of the basolateral subregion of the amgydala was correlated with 
participants’ reported trait anxiety and predicted reaction times on a face-color 
judgment task. Concurrently, Williams, Liddell, Kemp, et al. (2006) found right 
amygdala, and ventral anterior cingulate responses to subliminal presentation of 
fearful faces and left-sided amygdala, dorsal anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal 
activation followed supraliminal stimulus presentation. Öhman (2005) observed that 
the amygdala is generally activated with subliminal presentation of fear-relevant 
stimuli such as angry faces, spiders and snakes. When processed consciously, initial 
amygdala and cortical network activation to fear-relevant stimuli that are not 
individually relevant (e.g. spider pictures to a snake phobic) are inhibited. Only when 
the individual fears the particular stimulus do the relevant neural regions become 
active.  
Taken together, this could mean that a threat evaluation could take place at 
different, perhaps independent cognitive levels. Evolutionary predisposition or 
repeated threat-related learning experiences could lead to automatization of 
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subconscious (elevated) threat evaluation and processing which could initiate biased 
automatic behavior patterns such as eye movement (e.g., Calvo et al., 2006), shifting 
of covert attention (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 
2002), or avoidance tendencies (Heuer et al., 2007). If an individual is not 
consciously aware of his or her threat-appraisal of e.g., angry faces, subjective 
ratings of faces might not tap into those processes, while indirect measures would. 
On the other hand, both levels might not necessarily require a threat appraisal. 
Simple negative evaluation may be sufficient to lower the threshold for preferential 
processing (compare cognitive-motivational model of: Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 2004). 
This could partially explain the diverging evidence for preferential processing of 
angry faces, sometimes found in trait or socially anxious but not in non-anxious 
populations, sometimes found in non-anxious participants only and sometimes in 
both, but more pronounced in the more anxious populations.  
In future research, the basis of such diverging evidence has to be explored in 
greater detail. It is essential to clarify why SAs looked faster away from first fixated 
angry faces, and why their proportion of fixated angry faxes was higher than for other 
expressions without having any differentiating impact on subjective ratings of the 
very same group of faces. Results in this domain would help to revise present 
models of cognitive processes in social phobia, to gain understanding of the role of 
angry faces herein and to differentiate (the influence of) divergent cognitive 
evaluation processes and their influences on an individual’s behavior. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 Since Lange, Keijsers, Rinck, & Becker (2008) discovered speeded 
processing of especially male angry faces in a flanker paradigm, we attempted to 
enhance the possible influence negative/angry faces have on the evaluation of a 
crowd by using only male crowds.  
2 Whenever appropriate, the same analyses were applied to the central four 
pictures only. That would result in a 2 (crowd type: neutral-angry, happy-angry)  5 
(expression ratio: 4:0, 3:1, 2:2, 1:3, 0:4)  2 (presentation time: 500, 2500)  2 
(social anxiety: low, high) design. 
3 In three other experiments (two unpublished), we tested different facets of 
the direct evaluation of crowds. Manipulations of crowd size, instruction or response 
window revealed no differences in ratings between socially anxious and non-anxious 
participants (compare: Lange et al., 2008). 
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Social Anxiety and the Evaluation of 
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Abstract 
 
To investigate whether Social Anxiety Disorder is indeed characterized by a biased 
negative evaluation of facial expressions, 25 highly socially anxious (SAs) 
participants and 30 non-anxious controls (NACs) were asked to respond to different 
ratios of neutral-angry or happy-angry face combinations (crowds). In an indirect 
Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT), participants used a joystick to pull the crowds 
towards themselves (approach) or push them away (avoidance). SAs showed faster 
avoidance of neutral-angry crowds when the number of angry faces in the crowd 
increased. The happy-angry crowds were generally avoided, independent of the ratio 
of the two emotions. NACs did not show any specific response tendency. When 
directly rating the friendliness of the crowds, the two groups did not differ.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, it has repeatedly been suggested (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) that biases in information processing (e.g., 
attentional biases, interpretation biases) of patients meeting the criteria for social 
anxiety disorder (or social phobia;  American Psychiatric Association, 2000; APA) 
contribute to the maintenance of the disorder (Foa et al., 1996; Heinrichs & 
Hofmann, 2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Stopa & Clark, 1993). As negative evaluation 
by others is the greatest fear of socially anxious patients, negative biases in 
interpretations and judgments of social situations are considered the most prominent 
candidates for dysfunctional cognitive processes in social anxiety disorder (Foa et 
al., 2001; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). So far, research of interpretation biases in 
socially anxiety has been predominantly focused on text vignettes describing social 
scenarios. When participants rate, interpret or judge the likelihood of outcomes of 
written ambiguous social situations, findings have frequently shown that social 
anxiety appears to be associated with a negative interpretation style (Amir et al., 
1998b; Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Huppert et al., 2003; Stopa & 
Clark, 2000; Voncken et al., 2003).  
Contrary to the fairly straightforward findings with text materials, there is less 
persuasive evidence when participants have to process facial expressions. While 
some studies suggest attentional vigilance for (emotional) faces in general or only for 
angry faces, others suggest avoidant attention patterns for threat cues (for critical 
reviews see: Hermans & van Honk, 2006; Ledley & Heimberg, 2006). There has 
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been some evidence that participants high in (social) anxiety show a recognition bias 
for negative facial expressions (Abrams, 1999; Surcinelli et al., 2006), but the 
evidence for a biased evaluation of faces is equivocal. Merckelbach, Van Hout, Van 
den Hout, and Mersch (1989), for example, found that socially phobic participants did 
not process angry faces any differently than non-anxious controls did. In both 
groups, angry faces elicited higher skin conductance responses, inhibited eyeblink 
rates and yielded more negative explicit evaluations than either happy faces or 
neutral objects did. Philippot and Douilliez (2003; Philippot & Douilliez, 2005; Winton 
et al., 1995) asked socially phobic participants, anxious controls and non-anxious 
controls to rate different intensities (0%, 30%, 70%, 100%) of happy, angry, sad, 
disgusted, and fearful faces morphed with neutral ones. They asked how strongly the 
portrayed emotion would resemble shame, disgust, surprise, anger, happiness, 
sadness, or fear. Results lent no support for the notion that socially phobic 
participants or participants diagnosed with other anxiety disorders showed signs of 
deficits or superiority in emotion decoding. With a slightly different approach, Winton, 
Clark, and Edelmann (1995) did not find a deficit/superiority effect in socially anxious 
participants, either, when they had to identify the emotions of presented face stimuli 
(Experiment 1). However, they found a general tendency to judge emotions of others 
seen in brief video fragments as being negative (Experiment 2; Winton et al., 1995). 
In a study by Gilboa-Schechtman, Presburger, Marom and Hermesh (2005), socially 
anxious patients with and without comorbid depression and control participants rated 
how threatening were crowds with mixed emotional facial expressions. Anxious 
participants evaluated the predominantly disapproving crowds more negatively than 
controls. The inconsistency in these results is rather puzzling, assuming that 
 
Explicit and Implicit Crowd Evaluation 
 
- 135 - 
emotional facial expressions are inherently ambiguous (also in groups; Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 2005) and of high evolutionary value (Haxby et al., 2000; Juth et 
al., 2005; Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), 
especially for communication in social interaction.  
Assuming that neurological hardwiring facilitates face processing (Haxby et 
al., 2000; Herrmann et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2002, 2005), it is likely that the explicit 
ratings of facial expressions do not tap into automatic processes, and are not 
susceptible to possible processing biases. That is, automatic evaluation might have 
already taken place, and might have initiated congruent responses or behavior, while 
one is not consciously aware of or influenced by either the automatic evaluation or 
the response. Similarly, some dual processing models of social cognition (compare: 
Chaiken & Trope, 1999) assume that there is a dissociation between automatic, 
affective processes and intentional, cognitive processes. This could in fact explain 
the equivocal results in the field. In sum, it would be useful to assess automatic 
evaluations or responses indirectly without solely relying on subjective conscious 
reports. In this way, eventual dissociations between explicit and implicit evaluations 
of the same materials may be discovered and used to explain part of the 
inconsistencies. With the introduction of the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Heuer 
et al., 2007; Rinck & Becker, 2007) it is possible to supplement explicit ratings by 
indirectly investigating attitudes or evaluations via associated behavior. The 
underlying idea of this task is that human beings have a tendency to automatically 
approach pleasant stimuli while avoiding unpleasant or threatening ones (e.g., Chen 
& Bargh, 1999; Solarz, 1960). Thus, inevitable automatic evaluation of a stimulus is 
thought to influence subsequent behavior, even when stimulus valence is not task 
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relevant. In the present version of the AAT, participants have to sort face displays 
according to their color shading by pushing or pulling a joystick. Here, reaction times 
(RTs) of either movement are indicative of the valence the participant implicitly 
attributes to the presented stimulus: Speeded pushing, or slowed pulling is 
interpreted as “avoidance” of a stimulus, while speeded pulling and slowed pushing 
reflects “approach.” 
In the present study, we combined the different aforementioned notions. As 
stated above, it is supposed that emotional facial expressions are highly informative 
in a social context. It is hypothesized that crowds of faces are particularly threatening 
to people with elevated social anxiety even though related research is scarce. Our 
goal is to explore whether an indirect, behavioral measure sheds more light on threat 
evaluation of faces than explicit evaluations do. In a first task (AAT), we investigated 
how pictures of groups (“crowds”) showing task-irrelevant emotional expressions 
influence Socially Anxious participants’ (SAs) and Non-Anxious Control participants’ 
(NACs) reaction times (RTs) when sorting the pictures according to their color by 
pushing or pulling a joystick. Participants’ approach-avoidance reactions were 
recorded, and it is assumed that the number of angry faces shown in a crowd will 
influence the speed of the responses in the two groups differently. In a second task 
(Rating Task), we asked participants to explicitly evaluate the friendliness of the 
same emotional crowds used in the indirect task. 
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Approach-Avoidance Task 
 
In this task, we investigated the influence of social anxiety on automatic 
approach/avoidance responses when “crowds” composed of different emotional 
expressions where presented. The sorting of the stimuli according to the color of the 
pictures was done by “pushing” one color or “pulling” the other color with a joystick. 
Reaction times for the movements were interpreted as indices for automatic 
approach (pull) and avoidance (push) tendencies from which an effect score (AAT 
effect) is calculated by subtracting the RTs for a pull-movement from those of push-
movements. 
First, it was assumed that the RT patterns of both groups would indicate that 
the crowds consisting of neutral and angry faces were perceived as more 
threatening than crowds consisting of happy and angry faces. This would be 
reflected in more negative AAT effects for the former and more positive effects for 
the latter combination. Second, we expected an overall more negative AAT effect for 
the SA participants. That is, SAs were predicted to be generally more avoidant with 
respect to social crowds and thus faster than NACs in pushing them away than in 
pulling them closer. Third, we predicted for both groups that AAT effects would 
become increasingly negative (i.e., faster pushing than pulling) with an increasing 
number of angry faces in the crowd. Finally, and most importantly, we expected 
greater sensitivity to threatening stimuli in SA participants. That is, the differences in 
AAT effects between the two anxiety groups were predicted to increase with an 
increasing number of angry faces in the matrices. An increasingly negative response 
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in NACs to increasing numbers of angry faces, if present at all, is expected to be far 
less pronounced than that of SAs.  
Methods 
 
Prescreening, Participants, and Measures 
During class, undergraduate psychology students of Radboud University Nijmegen 
filled in the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; Oakman et al., 
2003). They were selected according to their LSAS scores (≤ 13 or ≥ 27 on the 
anxiety subscale) and invited for two days of testing, with the two sessions separated 
by 7 days1. This procedure resulted in 25 Socially Anxious participants (SAs) and 30 
Non-Anxious Controls (NACs), all female, completing both testing sessions. Each 
session lasted for 20 minutes. Participants received a payment of €3 per session or 
course credit. 
When entering the laboratory on Day 1, participants completed the LSAS for a 
second time. Those scoring above 13 and below 27 on the anxiety subscale were 
excluded from further participation. Before the computer tasks of each of the two 
sessions, participants also completed the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; 
Duke et al., 2006; Leary, 1983), a general screening instrument for eyesight, 
handedness, education, and use of medication, and the state version of the 
State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (here: STAI-State1; Spielberger et al., 1983). After the 
computer tasks, participants filled in the STAI again (here: STAI-State2), the 
Symptom Check List-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994), a self-report instrument for 
psychopathological symptoms, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 
1961), and the trait-version of the STAI (STAI-Trait). 
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Apparatus 
The task was conducted on a computer with a 451 MHz Intel Pentium III processor 
and 256MB of RAM running Windows XP Professional. The connected monitor-type 
was “Vision Master Pro 410” from Iiama Electric Cooperation. The employed joystick 
was a “Logitech Attack 3.” A DOS-based executable file presented the stimuli and 
measured response times in milliseconds.  
 
Materials 
A selection of color photos of 12 individuals (all male), each presenting one of three 
different facial expressions (angry, neutral and happy), was taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF; Lundqvist et al., 1998). The 
photos were resized to 72.0 mm by 98.8 mm, 32-bit color. Using these 36 photos, 
matrices of 12 (4 x 3) facial expressions were constructed to vary in the degree of 
social approval/disapproval. Two types of crowds were created: neutral-angry 
combinations and happy-angry combinations. The degree of threat was varied by 
gradually manipulating the ratio of angry to other expression pictures in the crowd. 
Seven different ratios were composed: 12:0 (e.g., 12 neutral and zero angry 
pictures), 11:1, 9:3, 6:6, 3:9, 1:11, and 0:12 (see Figure 6.1). Each individual and 
each emotional expression were randomly assigned to a position. Every crowd type 
x ratio combination was made in two different color shadings, reddish versus 
brownish, and in seven different sizes ranging from 200 x 202 pixels to 760 x 768 
pixels.  
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Procedure 
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from the computer monitor and 25 cm 
from a standard computer joystick, with the joystick located between them and the 
monitor. Then the computer program was started. They were told that all further 
instructions would be shown on the screen and that there was plenty of opportunity 
to practice. If they had questions, participants were asked to pose them before or 
immediately after the practice-trials. The participants’ task was to indicate the color 
shading of each multi-facial matrix (“crowd”) that appeared on the screen by pushing 
or pulling the joystick as quickly as possible until the matrix disappeared. Every other 
participant was instructed to push in response to brown matrices and pull in 
response to red matrices, while for the rest of the participants they were given the 
reverse instructions (i.e., push for red, pull for brown). Each trial had to be initiated 
by pushing the “fire”-button of the joystick. A matrix initially appeared in medium size 
(500 x 505 pixels). When the joystick was pulled, the matrix increased in size to give 
the impression of pulling the crowd closer. Pulling all the way made the matrix 
disappear. When pushing the joystick, the size of the crowd decreased in size to give 
the impression that the crowd was pushed away. Here, the display disappeared 
when the joystick was pushed all the way.  
Participants first completed 24 practice trials with all-neutral crowds to get 
acquainted with the use of the joystick. In the main experiment, participants 
completed two blocks of 168 trials each. The 336 trials were divided equally into 12 
trials per condition (2 crowd types x 7 ratios x 2 motions). The instructions 
concerning pulling and pushing the joystick in relation to the shading of the display 
(brown = push and red = pull vs. brown = pull and red = push) were counterbalanced 
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across participants.  
The sequence of a trial was as follows. First a black screen appeared until the 
“fire”-button was pushed. Then a matrix with either a reddish or a brownish shading 
appeared in its initial (medium) size. Whenever the joystick was pushed or pulled the 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Example of a sequence of the AAT. 
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picture size changed accordingly. The picture disappeared only when the joystick 
reached one of the two end positions (see Figure 6.1). RT measurement started 
upon presentation of the picture, was recorded at all intermediate positions, and 
stopped at the end position when the matrix disappeared. Once the matrix 
disappeared, the participant started the next trial by moving the joystick back to the 
central position and pushing the button. 
When the computer task ended, participants were asked to complete the 
remainder of the questionnaires. Then they were debriefed, paid, and thanked for 
their participation. 
 
Design 
A 2 (crowd type: neutral-angry, happy-angry) x 7 (expression ratio: 12:0, 11:1, 9:3, 
6:6, 3:9, 1:11, 0:12) x 2 (movement: pull, push) x 2 (group: socially anxious, non-
anxious) factorial design was used to analyze the RTs. Since previous AAT 
experiments have shown that the data for the intermediate joystick positions have 
comparable effects, only the RTs of the end positions were analyzed. While degree 
of anxiety was a between-subjects factor, crowd type, ratio, and movement 
instructions were within-subjects factors. Whenever the basic assumption of 
univariate testing (i.e., sphericity) was violated in any of the analyses, appropriate, 
more conservative tests with corrections of degrees of freedom were used (i.e., 
Huynh-Feldt). Additionally, because of the high number of levels of the “ratio” factor, 
we analyzed the contrasts/gradients of the resulting regression lines, correcting for 
the uneven spacing between ratios. 
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AAT effects were used as the dependent variable. They were calculated by 
subtracting each participant’s median RT for pulling a certain kind of crowd from 
his/her RT for pushing them. Reaction time patterns were compared between 
groups. That is, the responses to different ratios and crowd types of SA participants 
were compared to the responses to the same ratios and crowd types of NACs. An 
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.  
Results 
 
Population characteristics. SAs (M = 19.12, SD = 1.30) and NACs (M = 19.40, SD = 
1.35) did not significantly differ in age, t(53) = 0.78; p = .44, or education, χ2 (2, N = 
55) = 0.4, p = .82. SAs scored significantly higher on several scales of anxiety 
Table 6.1 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of questionnaire scores for socially anxious 
(SAs) and non-anxious controls (NACs) for all participants: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(LSAS), Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE), the trait version of the Spielberger State/Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Trait), State versions of the STAI before (State1) and after (State2) the 
computer task, Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI), and the Symptom Check List (SCL90)  
 
Group 
SA (n=32)  NAC (n=34) 
 
 
Questionnaires M SD  M SD 
LSAS-anxiety** 35.6 7.1  9.0 2.6  
FNE** 33.6 8.5  14.7 7.3 
STAI-Trait** 41.8 9.3  32.3 6.4  
STAI-State1** 38.0 8.1  29.1 6.3 
STAI-State2* 38.2 8.8  30.3 6.9 
BDI** 9.3 5.6  5.5 4.1  
SCL90** 148.4 29.6  120.2 24.4 
                *p < .01, two-tailed. **p < .001, two-tailed. 
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related concepts, as well as on questionnaires measuring co-morbidity common in 
social anxiety. Specifically, they scored higher on LSAS, FNE, STAI-state/trait, BDI, 
and the SCL90. The two groups differed in their level of state anxiety both before 
and after the tasks, t(52)= 4.15, p < .01, and t(52) = 3.64, p < .01 respectively. State 
anxiety itself, though, was not affected by the computer task, F(1, 52) = 0.47; MSE = 
14.34; p = .50, nor did it interact with group, F(1, 52) < 1 (see Table 6.1). 
AAT effects in general. In the overall analysis, there was no significant main 
effect of crowd type, F(1, 53) < 1, MSE = 3423.4, p = .75. However, the interaction of 
group and crowd type was significant, F(1, 53) = 4.29, MSE = 3423.4, p < .05. For 
NACs, the AAT effects were slightly negative (M = -3, SD = 6) for neutral-angry 
crowds and positive for happy-angry crowds (M = 7, SD = 6). In contrast, the AAT 
effects of SAs were strongly negative for both the neutral-angry crowds (M = -20, SD 
= 7) and the happy-angry crowds (M = -27, SD = 7). Additionally, there was a 
significant main effect of group, F(1, 53) = 9.42, MSE = 13125.38, p < .01 (for raw 
data see Table 6.2). The overall AAT effect was more negative for SAs (M = -24, SD 
= 6) than for NACs (M = 2, SD = 6).2 This means that SAs were generally faster to 
push crowds away than to pull them closer. There was no main effect of number of 
angry faces, F(6, 318) = 1.4, MSE = 3454.3, p = .21, nor any interaction with anxiety, 
F(6, 318) = 0.3, MSE = 3454.3, p = .94. To test whether the results could be 
explained by any of the other anxiety-related concepts, the correlations between 
questionnaires and AAT effects were analyzed. AAT responses were not correlated 
to the degree of psychopathology in general (total score of SCL-90), depressive 
symptoms (BDI), or trait anxiety (STAI-T). 
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AAT effects for neutral-angry crowds. The interaction of group and crowd type 
made it necessary to investigate the two crowd types separately. When analyzing 
the neutral-angry crowds, the main effect of group was marginally significant, F(1, 
53) = 3.09, MSE = 8594.3, p = .09. The interaction of number of angry faces and 
group was not significant, F(6, 318) < 1, MSE = 3290.86, p = .64. However, when 
looking at the overall response pattern reflected in the corrected gradients of each 
group’s regression line for the neutral-angry combinations (Figure 6.2), it appears as 
if the number of angry faces in an otherwise neutral crowd played a different role for 
Table 6.2 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of RTs for socially anxious participants (SAs) and non-
anxious controls (NACs) per movement for all seven ratios in Neutral-Angry crowds and Happy-Angry crowds  
 
SA (n=25) NAC (n=30) 
Neutral-Angry 
 
 
Ratio 12:0 11:1 9:3 6:6 3:9 1:11 0:12 12:0 11:1 9:3 6:6 3:9 1:11 0:12 
MPull 670 679 683 702 684 694 700 617 647 634 640 638 638 630 
SDPull 102 114 82 96 107 93 97 65 62 86 86 74 79 58 
MPush 669 666 668 676 656 661 658 620 647 632 631 632 634 625 
SDPush 114 102 101 117 107 100 98 57 65 70 71 70 59 62 
Happy-Angry  
Ratio 12:0 11:1 9:3 6:6 3:9 1:11 0:12 12:0 11:1 9:3 6:6 3:9 1:11 0:12 
MPull 682 694 685 692 694 707 680 612 620 614 613 633 644 637 
SDPull 107 104 95 106 122 113 113 74 76 74 67 80 80 61 
MPush 651 676 655 666 674 676 644 627 634 625 623 632 646 636 
SDPush 94 126 101 108 98 107 79 71 68 61 70 71 69 68 
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SAs than it did for NACs. The interaction between number of angry faces and group 
was marginally significant, F(1, 53) = 4.03, MSE = 2642.86, p = .05. Although, strictly 
speaking, the non-significant trend does not allow for additional analyses, further 
exploration was considered helpful for understanding the processes at hand. It 
appeared that, keeping the statistical restriction in mind, the slope of socially anxious 
participants differed significantly from zero, F(1, 24) = 7.06, MSE = 4211.8, p < .05, 
while it did not for the NACs, F(1, 29) < 1, MSE = 1516.7, p = .36. Thus, a greater 
proportion of angry faces seems to have evoked more avoidance in SAs, but not in 
NACs (Figure 6.2).  
This conclusion was also supported by analyses of the all-same expression 
crowds. AAT effects did not differ between groups when only all-neutral crowds were 
compared, t(53) = 0.24, p = .81. Additionally, they did not differ significantly from 
zero, neither in SAs, t(24) = 0.1, p = .92, nor in NACs, t(29) = 0.24, p = .81. On the 
other hand, responses to all-angry crowds were significantly different between 
Figure 6.2 Mean AAT-effects in milliseconds for neutral-angry crowds per ratio per group. 
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groups, t(53) = 2.17, p < .05. Additionally, the responses to all-angry crowds differed 
significantly from zero for SAs, t(24) = 2.70, p < .05, but not for NACs, t(29) = 0.55, p 
= .59. In sum, these results suggest that only the SAs’ AAT effects became more 
negative as the number of angry faces in a crowd increased. 
AAT effects for happy-angry crowds. In contrast to the neutral-angry crowds, 
the main effect of group was significant for happy-angry crowds, F(1, 53) = 14.05, 
MSE = 7954.48, p < .01: Socially anxious participants showed more negative AAT 
effects than non-anxious control participants did (Figure 6.3). They were consistently 
faster in pushing than in pulling the crowds, independent of the ratio between happy 
and angry pictures. The interaction between number of angry faces and group was 
not significant, F(6, 318) < 1, MSE = 3400.57, p = .83. When investigating the slopes 
of the regression lines (corrected for the uneven spacing between the ratios), the 
interaction between number of angry faces and group was again not significant, 
F(1,53) < 1, MSE = 4276,63, p = .57. Additionally, neither the SAs’ nor the NACs’ 
Figure 6.3 Mean AAT-effects in milliseconds for happy-angry crowds per ratio per group. 
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slopes differed significantly from zero, F(1, 24) < 1, MSE = 5531.0, p = .70 and F(1, 
29) = 2.5, MSE = 3264.9, p = .12, respectively. This suggests that angry and happy 
faces trigger a similar avoidance reaction and that the ratio between the two 
emotions does not make a difference. In order to substantiate this claim we 
compared the AAT effects of all-happy crowds with all-angry ones per group. They 
were not significantly different in SAs, t(24) = 0.23, p = .82, nor in NACs, t(29) = 
0.99, p = .33. Additionally, we tested whether the AAT effects differed from zero for 
SAs but not for NACs. SAs’ reactions to all-angry crowds did differ from zero, t(24) = 
2.25, p < .05, while responses to all-happy crowds were only marginally different 
from zero, t(24) = 1.96, p = .06. In NACs, neither of the two comparisons reached 
significance, t(29) = 0.21, p = .83 and t(29) = 0.96, p = .34, respectively. Thus, the 
number of angry faces in a happy crowd did not induce an additional, gradually 
increasing, negative automatic evaluation. In SAs, both emotional experessions 
seemed to elicit a comparable avoidance response not observed in NACs.  
 
Discussion 
 
Keeping the statistical restrictions in mind, it is cautiously proposed that the different 
combinations of angry, happy, and neutral expressions seem to have an impact on 
automatic or implicit evaluations and on subsequent behavior. With an increasing 
number of angry faces in a neutral crowd, the SAs became seemingly faster in 
pushing the crowds away compared to pulling them closer. This gives rise to the 
notion that with an increasing number of angry faces, SA may tend to perceive or 
interpret the crowd as increasingly aversive or unpleasant. NACs did not show this 
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pattern. Their AAT effects for neutral-angry crowds did not significantly differ from 
zero. They did not have any apparent evaluative perception or interpretation 
affecting their behavior in one way or the other.  
When combining happy and angry faces in a crowd, the picture looked 
somewhat different. Here, in general, SAs were quicker in pushing crowds away than 
in pulling them closer compared to NACs, independent of the number of angry faces 
in the crowd. This suggests that both emotional expressions provoked some kind of 
aversion-triggered avoidance response in SAs. 
So far, we can conclude that pictures of angry facial expressions in group 
displays may have a tendency to provoke different behavioral response patterns in 
SA and in NAC participants, when the angry faces were in a crowd with either 
neutral or happy faces. From the observed patterns, it is hypothesized that both 
angry and happy faces in a group likewise initiate an immediate automatic negative 
evaluation indicated by a seemingly impulsive avoidance response in socially 
anxious participants. In order to investigate whether this implicit negative evaluation 
is also present after more elaborate processing, the following Crowd Rating Task 
explored explicit, subjective evaluations of the displays by SAs and NACs.  
Crowd Rating Task  
 
In this Crowd Rating Task, we investigated whether the negative evaluative 
behavioral tendencies observed in SAs with the AAT could also be shown in a more 
direct way. For example, the first impulse of avoidance might lead to a negatively 
biased “post-hoc” interpretation of the friendliness of the crowd in question. With the 
initial avoidance response being more accessible, an immediate conscious 
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evaluation might be more biased than a more delayed reaction. In fact, later on, 
more strategic processes might take over and reappraisal might play a role, 
correcting and even erasing possible initial differences between the groups. 
Therefore, we asked the participants to subjectively rate the presented crowds in 
terms of friendliness, either immediately after seeing the display, or after a 2.5 
second delay (compare: Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2005).  
Our first prediction was that in general, neutral-angry crowds should be rated 
more negatively than happy-angry crowds. Second, friendliness ratings for all 
participants should gradually decline with an increasing number of negative faces in 
the matrix. Third, in line with prior findings, we assumed that for the neutral-angry 
crowds, SAs would show a more pronounced decrease in ratings than NACs do. 
Fourth, we also assumed that SAs’ subjective ratings of happy-angry crowds should 
generally be more negative than NACs’ ratings of the same crowds, if SAs 
experience happy and angry faces as equally threatening. Finally, we expected that 
the findings should be more pronounced in the immediate ratings than in the delayed 
ones. 
Methods 
 
Participants 
As stated in footnote 1, this sample contained additional participants, for a total of 32 
socially anxious participants and 34 non-anxious controls. Again, the experimental 
session lasted for 20 minutes, and participants received payment of €2 or course 
credit.  
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Apparatus 
This task was conducted on an Apple eMac with integrated 17” monitor, operating at 
700 MHz on Mac OS X 10.2.8.. Stimulus presentation and reaction time recording 
were controlled by the software RSVP 4.0.5 for Macintosh ( Williams & Tarr, 1998).   
 
Materials 
The crowd types and the ratios were constructed and randomized as in the former 
task, except that the crowds did not have a colored shading and were not 
constructed in varying sizes. They were 760 x 768 pixels in size and were presented 
in 32-bit color (see Figure 6.1). 
 
Procedure 
The pre-selection and the general procedure were the same as for the AAT session, 
except that no joystick was involved. Participants were given 36 practice trials to get 
acquainted with the use of the –3, –2, –1, +1, +2, +3 marked keys of the otherwise 
covered standard computer keyboard. They practiced pressing the six keys with the 
ring fingers, middle fingers and index fingers of their left and right hand. This way, 
participants learned to evaluate the crowds without taking their fingers off the six 
response keys and without looking away from the screen. In the main task, the 
participants had to subjectively judge how (un-)friendly they thought a presented 
crowd was after seeing it for 500 ms. The experiment consisted of two blocks. In one 
block, participants had to respond immediately after the crowd had disappeared 
(“response-window: immediate”). In a second block, participants had to delay their 
response for 2500 ms (“response-window: delayed”). The order of the blocks was 
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counterbalanced across participants. Before each block, there were 24 practice trials 
with different, gender-mixed crowds of each crowd type. In the main experiment, 
each block consisted of 2 sets of 84 trials each. The total of 336 trials was divided 
into 168 trials per crowd type. For each crowd type, each ratio was presented 12 
times for each response window, with individuals and photo positions randomized 
(12 individuals, 12 positions). 
The sequence of a trial was as follows. First a yellow fixation cross was 
displayed in the center of a blue screen for 1000 ms. The matrix of 12 faces 
(“crowd”) was presented for 500 ms, after which the blue screen reappeared. Either 
immediately or after a delay of 2500 ms, depending on the response window 
condition, the word “now” (Dutch: “nu”) reminded participants to react. The blank 
screen remained visible until the participant reacted or until 1000 ms had elapsed. If 
the latter was the case, the message “too late” (Dutch: “te laat”) appeared and a 
buzzer sounded. After a subsequent 500 ms, the next trial began. Ratings as well as 
reaction times were recorded. 
 
Design 
A 2 (crowd type: neutral-angry, happy-angry) x 7 (expression ratio: 12:0, 11:1, 9:3, 
6:6, 3:9, 1:11, 0:12) x 2 (response window: immediate, delayed) x 2 (group: socially 
anxious, non-anxious) factorial design was used for the analysis of the subjective 
ratings as well as the decision latencies. While group was a between-subjects factor, 
crowd type, ratio, and response window were within-subjects factors. As before, we 
analyzed the gradients of the regression lines, corrected for the uneven spacing 
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between the expression ratios. If not stated otherwise, statistical assumptions were 
identical to those stated in the AAT section.  
Results 
 
Population characteristics. Including the additional participants, SAs (M = 19.41, SD 
= 1.5) and NACs (M = 19.35, SD = 1.48) did not significantly differ in age, t(64) = 
0.15, p = .89, or education, χ2 (2, N = 66) = 0.29, p = .87. The previously reported 
 
 
Figure 6.4a Mean valence ratings for neutral-angry crowds per ratio per group.  
 
 
Figure 6.4b Mean valence ratings for happy-angry crowds per ratio per group. 
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significant effects on anxiety-related concepts and co-morbidity did not change with 
the additional participants (see Table 6.1).  
Ratings. As expected, happy-angry crowds (M = 0.22, SD = 0.02) were rated 
more positively than neutral-angry crowds (M = -0.99, SD = 0.04), F(1, 64) = 842.78, 
MSE = 0.79, p < .01. There was a significant main effect for ratio as well, F(2.2, 
140.92) = 1481.55, MSE = 0.91, p < .01: The ratings of both crowd types decreased 
with every angry face added to the matrix (Figures 6.4a & b). In contrast, neither the 
effect of group, F(1, 64) < 1, MSE = 1.31, p = .83, nor any of its relevant interactions 
reached statistical significance.3 The analyses of the slopes (corrected for the 
uneven spacing between the ratios) did not reveal any additional information, 
besides that the slopes of both NACs and SA differed significantly from zero, F(1, 
33) = 1152.27, MSE = 1.40, p < .01, and F(1, 31) = 1162.22, MSE = 1.16, p < .01, 
respectively. Finally, immediate reactions (M = -0.41, SD = 0.03) were generally 
more negative than delayed responses (M = -0.37, SD = 0.03), F(1, 64) = 5.27, MSE 
= 0.17, p < .05, but this effect of response window was not moderated by any other 
relevant factor. In sum, the friendliness ratings of both groups declined similarly with 
every additional threatening face in the crowd. Since no interaction between group 
and crowd type occurred, further analyses of the separate crowd types were omitted.  
 
Discussion 
The results of the Crowd Rating Task demonstrate that during explicit evaluations, 
socially anxious participants did not rate emotional crowds differently from non-
anxious control participants. The number of angry faces in the crowds influenced 
both groups similarly; that is, the friendliness ratings decreased linearly with an 
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increasing number of angry faces in the crowds.4 Further, the ratings made 
immediately after the presentation of the crowds were more negative than the ratings 
after a delay of 2.5 seconds. This, again, was independent of participant group.  
 
General Discussion 
 
In the present study, we investigated implicit evaluations of emotional crowds, as 
reflected in approach-avoidance tendencies, and contrasted them with explicit 
valence ratings of the same material. We were particularly interested in finding out if 
negative behavioral responses towards facial crowds would differ between socially 
anxious participants (SAs) and non-anxious control participants (NACs), and in 
exploring to what degree implicit and explicit evaluations would diverge.  
With an indirect Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT), we found a marginal 
increase in automatic avoidance responses for SAs when they were presented with 
an increasing number of angry faces in neutral-angry crowds. However, the effect 
did not reach standard levels of significance to unequivocally support this claim. 
Happy-angry crowds, on the other hand, clearly evoked a general avoidance 
response in SAs, independent of the different emotion-combining ratios. Thus, SAs 
seemed to be increasingly avoidant of neutral-angry crowds and generally avoidant 
of happy-angry crowds. In both cases, NACs did not show any behavioral 
preferences and instead were equally fast to approach as to avoid the different 
crowd types. In the direct Crowd Rating Task, participants were asked to explicitly 
rate the crowds that were used in the AAT. Surprisingly, here we found no 
differences between SAs and NACs at all, and no evidence for a negative evaluation 
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of happy faces by SAs, either. In fact, implicit evaluations were dissociated from the 
explicit ratings, for each crowd type: For neutral-angry crowds the correlation 
between ratings and AAT effects was low and not significant, r(54) = .14; p = .31. For 
happy-angry crowds the two tasks were not correlated either, r(54) = .18, p = .18. 
The following discussion of theoretical implications must clearly be seen in the 
light of the statistical restrictions. The presence of angry faces in a neutral crowd 
appears to trigger an increase in threat evaluation in SAs. It seems plausible to 
assume that socially anxious people, due to their learning history and/or genetic 
setup, are much more sensitive to socio-evaluative threat than non-anxious people 
(Fox et al., 2007). The general tendency of SAs to push away social crowds more 
quickly than pulling them closer seems to support that view. Consequently, this 
hypersensitivity might render them incapable of ignoring social threat in their 
environment. Despite following the instructions of the AAT (namely pushing pictures 
of one color and pulling pictures of the other color), which did not require them to 
notice the content of the crowds, their responses may inevitably have been affected 
by the automatically perceived threat depicted by the crowds. Additionally, their 
degree of avoidance may be of a dynamic nature rather than an on/off-mechanism – 
the more threatening faces that are present in a crowd, the faster the avoidance 
tendency becomes. In contrast, people without social anxiety were able to readily 
focus on the task at hand without being distracted by the valence of the faces. We 
must keep in mind, however, that in fact, the observed effects were not significant in 
the overall analysis and may therefore be non-existent. Therefore, replication is 
certainly necessary. 
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What remains remarkable with regard to happy faces, is the complete 
dissociation between explicit ratings and AAT effects. We suppose that in order to 
initiate such a drastic reversal of “naturally” positive valence at an automatic level, 
one must have had an extensive history of negative experiences, or at least many 
unchallenged negative interpretations in situations involving these facial 
expressions. Frequent negative interpretations of ambiguous social interactions 
probably precede the manifestation of automatic negative evaluations (compare: 
Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). This could mean that, once automaticity is established, 
direct cognitive accessibility might not be necessary anymore, might have become 
difficult, or might even be impossible. The lack of group differences in the direct 
rating task as well as the low correlation between the tasks seem to support that 
notion, though other explanations are possible. We have argued earlier (Lange et al., 
2008) that while exploring the facial displays, all participants could have “logically 
reasoned” that friendliness ratings should decline when the number of angry faces in 
the crowds increases.  
It is also possible that the concordance of the two groups in explicit ratings 
stems from social desirability effects. Socially anxious participants could have re-
appraised the crowds in a way that they believed was expected from them as “good” 
participants (Gilbert, 2001; Osman et al., 1998; Schnabel et al., 2006). Another 
explanation might be that the initial, automatic threat evaluation measured with the 
AAT may initiate associated simple behavioral tendencies but may not be strong 
enough to affect controlled cognitive processes.  
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Limitations 
It appears that the AAT approach might be a promising path when investigating 
evaluation biases in social anxiety. In fact, similar AAT effects have been observed 
with single emotional face stimuli (angry, neutral, happy; Heuer et al., 2007), and 
comparably straightforward data for social anxiety have not yet been found with non-
verbal materials. Several critical issues have to be raised, however. First and 
foremost, the lack of statistical significance of the group-by-ratio interaction in the 
neutral-angry crowds limits the results considerably. Although the results make 
sense in the light of the reviewed literature and comparable results in a similar study 
(Heuer et al., 2007), we are fully aware that the conclusiveness of our findings is 
limited, at least for the neutral-angry crowds. Therefore, replication is certainly 
necessary. 
The generalization of our results is also hampered by the fact that the sample 
consisted only of socially anxious women. In the future, it will be necessary to extend 
this research to a male population. Additionally, it could be that the two crowd types 
used here do not only differ in the number of angry faces, but also in the intensity of 
emotionality. In the neutral-angry crowds, additional angry faces make the crowd 
more negative, but also increasingly emotional. In the happy-angry crowds, the 
valence becomes more negative, too, but the intensity of the depicted emotions 
probably stays the same. In future research, it will be necessary to add different 
ratios of other emotional expressions to neutral crowds to disentangle these 
influences and to make the crowds more comparable.  
Finally, the direct rating task might need some revision. Possibly, 
“friendliness” and “threat” are not clearly opposite enough. It might be more 
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straightforward to ask participants directly how threatening they find the crowds to 
be. Another possibility is that “friendliness” or “threat” ratings are too abstract when 
referring to pictures of groups. To circumvent this problem, the question could be 
worded in a way such that it relates more to “real threat” or anxiety. For instance, 
asking how intimidating one finds the group when imagining having to give a 
presentation in front of them, might be more ecologically valid, and may elicit 
diverging responses of SAs and NACs.  
 
Future directions 
If the AAT proves to be a reliable task for assessing biased implicit evaluations in 
socially anxious patients, and helpful in addition to explicit evaluation tasks, it might 
open up a range of future applications. It has to be investigated if the task is helpful 
to measure treatment effects in addition to traditional instruments for treatment 
outcome evaluation (compare: e.g., Teachman & Wood, 2003; for conflicting results 
see also: Huijding & de Jong, 2007). Another application might be to use the AAT as 
a therapeutic instrument making use of the bidirectional link between behavior and 
evaluation as suggested by Neumann, Förster and Strack (2003). 
In sum, if the main theoretical and technical issues of this paradigm have 
been tackled, it has the capacity to shed more light on the cognitive and behavioral 
processes underlying social anxiety and social anxiety disorder, and it may 
complement the diagnostic and therapeutic instruments available in the clinical field. 
However, in the light of the statistical limitations, above all, replication of our results 
is necessary. 
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 Footnotes 
 
 1 Participants were invited for the Rating Task on Day 1 and the AAT on Day 
2. Not all students completing the Rating Task participated on Day 2 (AAT), which 
explains the different sample sizes for the two tasks. 
 2 We presume that pulling and pushing responses can be carried out equally 
quickly. Consequently, a negative AAT effect might be interpreted as a tendency to 
prefer pushing the stimulus away over pulling it closer. An effect score around zero 
would indicate that there is no particular preference.  
3 Additional analyses of the data from only those participants who had 
completed both the AAT and the rating task yielded comparable results.  
 4 In two other experiments, we also tested different facets of the direct 
evaluation of crowds. Manipulations of presentation time and response window 
never revealed any differences in ratings between socially anxious and non-anxious 
participants (e.g., Lange, Heuer, Langner et al., 2008).  
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Chapter 7 
Induced Interpretation Bias Influences 
Automatic Avoidance Behavior 
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Abstract 
 
Cognitive bias modification studies suggest a causal role of interpretation biases in 
the etiology and maintenance of Social Anxiety Disorder. It is unknown, however, if 
the effects of induced biases transfer to behavior. In an analogue study, behavioral 
changes in response to aversive and positive stimuli were measured after the 
induction of positive and negative interpretation biases in “averagely anxious” 
participants. Responses to emotional multi-facial displays (“crowds”) were measured 
using an indirect Approach-Avoidance Task. The crowds comprised different ratios 
of either neutral and angry faces or happy and angry faces. Negatively trained 
participants showed a faster avoidance response for the neutral-angry crowds when 
the number of angry pictures in the crowd increased. This response pattern 
resembles the one previously found in socially anxious individuals. 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decennia, a large body of evidence has supported the theoretical 
framework (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995) that biased information processing might be 
crucial in the understanding of etiology and maintenance of psychiatric disorders. In 
fact, many recent studies have provided evidence that information-processing biases 
may play a causal role in anxiety disorders, but also in sub-clinical anxiety. Patients 
diagnosed with social phobia (for details see: American Psychiatric Association, 
2000; APA), for example, are thought to hold a strong negative interpretation bias 
(e.g., Hirsch & Clark, 2004). Their worst fear is negative evaluation by others. 
Negative biases in interpretations is one of the most prominent dysfunctional 
information processes in social phobia (e.g., Foa et al., 2001). When participants 
are, for instance, asked to interpret outcomes of ambiguous social situations, 
findings have repeatedly shown that social anxiety seems to be associated with a 
more negative interpretation (e.g., Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007). 
Moreover, Voncken, Bögels, and de Vries (2003) found that socially phobic 
participants tended to interpret all kinds of social scenarios negatively, not just 
ambiguous ones.  
Contrary to the straightforward findings with text materials, there is less 
persuasive evidence when participants have to evaluate (ambiguous) facial 
expressions instead of social scenarios (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2005; 
Merckelbach, Van Hout et al., 1989; but also: Philippot & Douilliez, 2005; Yoon & 
Zinbarg, 2007). This is rather surprising when considering that facial expressions are 
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often ambiguous, thought to be evolutionarily routed, and seem to have 
communicative (thus social interactive) value (Vuilleumier, 2002). Just recently, 
though, it has been shown that negative evaluations or interpretations of facial 
expressions are reflected in automatic1 approach and avoidance behavior, but not 
necessarily in controlled direct evaluations (individual pictures: Heuer et al., 2007; 
multifacial displays: Lange, Heuer, Langner et al., 2008). In both studies, participants 
had to pull emotional faces towards themselves (approach) or push them away 
(avoid) by means of a joystick. Even though the emotions were task-irrelevant in 
both studies, socially anxious participants generally showed speeded avoidance 
reactions to (an increasing number of) emotional faces (angry, happy). When asked 
to rate the same faces directly in terms of friendliness, the groups did not differ. 
Just recently, researchers have started to investigate the cause-effect-chain of 
biases and symptoms. It is still unclear whether people are anxious and, as a 
symptom, develop a cognitive bias, or whether people have developed a cognitive 
style that might eventually, along with behavioral changes, evolve into a psychiatric 
disorder. As an analogy, techniques have been developed that allow for the 
induction of interpretation biases or attentional biases in non-anxious participants 
(Cognitive Bias Modulations [CBM]). An important issue regarding CBMs is whether 
an induced bias not only transfers to conceptually similar new materials, but whether 
the bias also generalizes to other domains and whether it is reflected in measures 
estimating anxiety or anxiety-related behavior. Recent evidence indeed suggests 
that induced interpretation biases (CBM-I) influence subsequently reported anxiety in 
response to stress, as predicted by the valence of the training (e.g., Mackintosh et 
al., 2006). Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend, (2007) showed that, in highly trait 
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anxious participants, a four-session benign interpretation training increased the 
amount of positive interpretations of novel ambiguous events. Additionally, the 
degree of subjectively reported trait anxiety decreased after the training. Yet, to our 
knowledge, to date no study has reported changes in anxiety-related behavior 
following such a training.  
The present article reports selected data from a broader series of experiments 
at the University of Utrecht. While the main study investigated the effects of CBM-I 
on new more generalized social scenarios, and will be published elsewhere 
(Salemink & van den Hout, 2007), the current article focuses on the transfer of such 
an interpretation bias to anxiety-related behavior. Consequently, our research 
question was very specific. Since it has been shown by Lange, Keijsers, Becker et 
al. (2008) that facial crowds trigger automatic avoidance responses in people with 
elevated social anxiety, it was hypothesized that the same should be true for people 
who were trained to interpret social situations negatively. Specifically, in socially 
anxious individuals these response tendencies are known to become increasingly 
avoidant, when the number of angry faces increases in a neutral crowd. Moreover, 
socially anxious individuals also react avoidant to happy faces (e.g., Heuer, Rinck, & 
Becker, 2007). We therefore examined if CBM-I influences behavioral responses to 
emotional crowds, using the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) developed by Rinck 
and Becker (2007). 
From results of earlier research, we predicted that in negatively trained 
participants, AAT effects would become increasingly negative (faster pushing than 
pulling) with an increasing number of angry faces in a neutral-angry crowd. For 
happy-angry crowds, we hypothesized that emotional faces as a whole are seen as 
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threatening by NETs and are reacted to with an avoidance response. If positive 
training is a good model of how healthy individuals with average anxiety levels 
perceive the world, they should not be influenced by the valence of the crowds 
because valence is irrelevant to the task. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
After exclusion of two participants due to technical problems, 68 second-year 
psychology students (88.2 % female) of the University of Utrecht participated in this 
study. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 31 years (M = 20.71; SD = 
2.27). An experimental session lasted for about 1.5 hours for which students 
received course credit. 
 
Material & Measures 
General. Participants were preselected according to their trait-anxiety scores on the 
Dutch version of the State-Trait Anxiety inventory (Van der Ploeg, Defares, & 
Spielberger, 1980) that 270 students had filled in at the beginning of their study year. 
In order to be able to induce and detect changes in anxiety, only students with 
scores around the mean (between 32 and 39) were invited for the study. On the day 
of the experiment, before the training, participants completed a general screening 
instrument (handedness, education, etc.), the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; 
Liebowitz, 1987), the state-version of the State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (here: STAI-
State1), and the trait-version of the STAI (STAI-Trait). After the training, a 
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manipulation check followed, as well as additional measures of interpretation bias 
that are irrelevant for this paper. Finally, participants filled in the STAI (here: STAI-
State2) and the LSAS again. Then they completed the AAT.  
Interpretation Training. The interpretation procedure made use of text materials 
that have successfully been employed earlier (compare: e.g., Yiend, Mackintosh, & 
Mathews, 2005), in a Dutch translation utilized by Salemink, van den Hout, and Kindt 
(2007b). In each of eight training blocks, participants read 13 text vignettes with 
descriptions of ambiguous social scenes. Each scene consisted of three sentences, 
which could be “disambiguated” by filling in the missing letter of the last word(-
fragment). After this “disambiguation”, the scenes turned out to be either positive or 
negative, depending on the training condition. Eight of the 13 vignettes were for 
training purposes, but each block also contained three filler items and two probe 
items to monitor training effect across blocks. While the filler items were to obscure 
the direction of the training, the probe items were predefined (one positive, one 
negative) in both conditions alike, and served as manipulation check. Here, response 
latencies for word completion were recorded. 
Participants read the vignettes sentence by sentence (self paced) on a 
computer monitor. When they reached the last word(-fragment) they had to fill in the 
missing letter. Afterwards, a comprehension question was asked to enhance the 
interpretation given to the meaning of the scene: e.g., “After painting the walls of 
your living room, you invite friends for dinner. You can see their surprise as they 
enter the room. They react with d _ _ _ ust/ ap _ _ _ val. “ The question followed 
immediately after word completion: “Did your friends like your work ? (Yes/No)”. 
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After the training phase a so called “recognition task” was introduced that 
served as another manipulation check, and additional social vignettes and 
questionnaires were used to measure transfer of the training. The details of these 
tasks are irrelevant here and will be described elsewhere (Salemink & van den Hout, 
2007). 
Approach-Avoidance Task. The AAT was identical to the one used by Lange, 
Keijsers, Becker et al. (2008). A selection of 36 color photos of 12 individuals (all 
male), each one presenting three different expressions: angry, neutral and happy, 
was taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist et al., 
1998). Matrices of 12 (4 3) facial expressions were constructed to vary in the 
degree of social approval/disapproval. Two types of crowds were created: Neutral-
angry combinations and happy-angry combinations. The degree of threat was varied 
by gradually manipulating the ratio between pictures of the two target expressions of 
each crowd. Seven different ratios were composed: 12:0 (e.g., 12 neutral and zero 
angry pictures), 11:1, 9:3, 6:6, 3:9, 1:11, and 0:12. Each individual and emotional 
expression was randomly presented at any position. Every matrix was constructed in 
two different color shadings (here: reddish, brownish) and in seven different sizes 
ranging from 200  202 pixels to 760  768 pixels. 
 
Procedure 
When entering the laboratory, participants vested informed consent before being 
seated approximately 50 cm from a computer monitor in a soundproof cubicle 
completing a first set of questionnaires. They started with the general screening 
questions, the LSAS, the STAI-State1, and the STAI-Trait. Then they were randomly 
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assigned to the positive interpretation training (POT) or the negative interpretation 
training (NET) and started the retraining program by pressing the keyboard’s space 
bar. A first sentence appeared on the screen and participants could advance to the 
next sentence until the word fragment was presented. As soon as they recognized 
the word, they were asked to press the space bar, and then type the first missing 
letter. If the answer was correct, the full word appeared for one second in blue 
letters. Otherwise the word appeared in red letters. In any case the next trial started 
afterwards. Then, the comprehension question was presented, which could be 
answered with “yes” or “no”. Again color feedback was given and the next trial 
started. After the training, participants filled in the STAI-State2 and the LSAS again, 
completed the recognition task and the social vignette questionnaires. Then, for the 
AAT, a standard computer joystick was located 25 cm between them and the 
monitor. The participants were asked to either push or pull the joystick depending on 
the color shading of the appearing multi-facial display (called “crowds”) as quickly as 
possible, until the display disappeared. On each self-paced trial, a display appeared 
in medium size. When the joystick was pulled, the display increased in size to give 
the impression of pulling the crowd closer. Pulling all the way would make the display 
disappear. When pushing the joystick, the size of the display decreased in size to 
give the impression that the crowd was pushed away. Here, the display disappeared 
when the joystick was pushed all the way.  
Participants were given 24 practice trials, before completing two blocks of 168 
experimental trials each. The instructions concerning pulling and pushing the joystick 
in relation to the shading of the display (brown = push and red = pull vs. brown = pull 
and red = push) were counterbalanced across participants.  
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The sequence of a trial was as follows: the black screen was blank until the 
“fire”-button of the joystick was pushed. Then the crowd appeared in its initial 
medium size, having either a reddish or a brownish shading. Whenever the joystick 
was moved the display size changed accordingly. The display disappeared when the 
joystick reached one of the end positions. RT measurement started upon 
presentation of the crowd, was recorded at all intermediate positions and stopped at 
the end position when the crowd disappeared. Then the participant started the next 
trial by moving the joystick back to the central position and pushing the button. At the 
end, participants were debriefed, compensated for their effort, and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Results 
 
Training effects & manipulation checks. The main measure to control whether the 
manipulation worked was the reaction time (RT) in response to the probes. A 2 
(direction of training: negative, positive)  2 (probe valence: negative, positive) 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the RTs. This ANOVA revealed 
that the expected training  probe valence interaction was significant, F(1, 66) = 
14.11, p < .001. As expected, POTs tended to be faster than NETs when responding 
to positive probes (MPOT = 1139 ms, SDPOT = 53 ms vs. MNET = 1267 ms, SDNET = 53 
ms), while both groups reacted about equally fast to negative probes (MPOT = 1316 
ms, SDPOT = 53 ms vs. MNET = 1273 ms, SDNET = 53 ms).  
From the above, it can be concluded that the manipulation basically worked, 
and that participant reacted to valenced materials as would be expected from the 
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training. Similar conclusions can be drawn from additional manipulation checks 
reported by Salemink, et al. (2007).  
AAT effects in general. AAT effects were calculated by subtracting each 
individual’s median RT for pulling a certain kind of crowd from the median RT for 
pushing it. The resulting difference scores were entered into an ANOVA. A main 
effect for crowd type, F(1, 66) = 20.46, MSE = 6944.29, p < .001, and a significant 
training  crowd type  expression ratio interaction, F(6, 396) = 2.19, MSE = 
7095.62, p = .04, indicated that the two crowd types were substantially different. 
Additionally, we were more interested in the degree of response change with an 
increasing number of angry faces than in the individual contribution of single ratios. 
Therefore, responses to both crowd types were analyzed separately by means of a 
linear regression analysis.  
AAT effects for neutral-angry crowds. The linear regression analysis revealed 
a trend for the training  ratio interaction, β = 3.21, SD = 1.80, t(66) = 1.78, p = .08. 
When regression lines were analyzed separately, the slope of NETs differed 
Figure 7.1 Mean AAT-Effects in milliseconds for neutral-angry crowds per ratio per group. 
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significantly from zero, F(1, 33) = 10.55, MSE = 8267.51, p < .01, while the same 
assumption for the POTs was rejected, F(1, 33) < 1, MSE = 3929.42, p = .31. This 
suggests that only the NETs became more avoidant as the number of angry faces in 
a neutral-angry crowd increased (Figure 7.1). 
AAT effects for happy-angry crowds. In contrast to the angry-neutral crowds, 
analyses of the slopes revealed no differences between NETs and POTs. The linear 
regression confirmed that the interaction between training and ratio, β = -2.14, SD = 
1.62, t(64) = -1.38, p = .19, was not significant. Additionally, NETs’ slope did not 
differ significantly from zero, F(1, 33) < 1, MSE = 5066.19, p = .51, nor did the slope 
for the POTs, F(1, 33) = 2.76, MSE = 7315.69, p = .11. It seems that the training did 
not change participants’ behavior towards happy-angry crowds (Figure 7.2).  
Figure 7.2 Mean AAT-effects in milliseconds for happy-angry crowds per ratio per group. 
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Discussion 
 
In the present study, we investigated if an induced interpretation bias/cognitive bias 
modulation evokes changes in approach-avoidance tendencies towards emotional 
crowds. The results show that an induced negative interpretation bias influenced 
subsequent automatic behavior impulses, depending on the types of emotional 
expressions combined in multi-facial displays. Importantly, the influence of the bias 
on behavior was highly dependent on the types of emotions combined (crowd types). 
The combination of neutral and angry emotional expressions in a crowd revealed the 
most striking results. With an increasing number of angry faces in a crowd, the group 
trained to endorse negative interpretations of social situations, became faster in 
pushing the crowds away (avoidance) than in pulling them closer (approach). This 
supports the notion that with an increasing number of angry faces, NETs tend to 
perceive or interpret the crowd as increasingly aversive, similar to socially anxious 
participants (compare: Lange, Keijsers, Becker et al., 2008). In contrast, POTs did 
not show such a pattern. The slope of their AAT effects did not significantly differ 
from zero. In all stimulus configurations, their pushing was as fast as their pulling. 
Apparently, the POTs did not have any distracting evaluative perception or 
interpretation affecting their behavior. In other words, they followed the instructions 
to respond to the pictures’ color shading, and they were unaffected by the irrelevant 
emotional dimension. In the happy and angry face combination, no differences 
between the two training groups could be observed. 
So far, we can conclude that the induction of a negative interpretation bias that 
is related to social scenarios, influences initial automatic behavior tendencies in 
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response to pictures of angry facial expressions in group displays. From the 
observed patterns, it is concluded that an increasing number of angry faces in a 
neutral group initiates an immediate automatic avoidance response comparable to 
that observed in socially anxious participants (Heuer et al., 2007; Lange, Keijsers, 
Becker et al., 2008). The responses to positive faces remain unchanged, as the 
behavior in reaction to both crowd types by positively trained participants. 
It seems that the induction of cognitive biases might be a promising path 
when investigating the cause-effect chain in psychiatric disorders in general, and 
interpretation biases in social anxiety in particular. In fact, comparably 
straightforward data indicating changes in anxiety-related behavior due to a 
generalization of cognitive retraining have not been found in a non-clinical sample 
before and need further exploration. Nevertheless, several critical remarks and 
questions have to be raised. Due to the lengthy set-up of the experimental series 
(not all parts and results reported here), interpretation biases and AAT scores were 
not measured before the training. Thus, unfortunately no base line could be 
established. Seemingly, the results of manipulation check imply that participants who 
received a positive interpretation training behaved according to the valence of the 
training. Without a baseline, though, this is not a valid conclusion. As a matter of fact, 
the AAT results suggest the contrary. Here, it seems that mainly the negatively 
trained participants were influenced in their behavior. Additionally, all participants 
had an “average” degree of anxiety proneness before training. The literature 
suggests that non-anxious participants may as well have a positive interpretation 
bias “protecting” them from psychopathology (e.g., Matthew Garner, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2006). Taking this into account, it is plausible to assume that the negatively 
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trained participants in the recent study were deprived of their formerly positive bias. 
This could explain why they did not show significant reaction time differences for 
positive compared to negative probes or why they did not show significant 
“recognition differences” (reported in: Salemink & van den Hout, 2007) for negative 
as compared to positive interpretation options. Positively trained participants did 
show these differences and it appeared as if they were the ones profiting from the 
training, even though they might simply have been doing what they always do: prefer 
positive interpretations. For the AAT, even if evaluation of the pictures becomes 
more positive, it would remain task-irrelevant. Threat detection might after all be 
evolutionarily more significant than the detection of friendly faces.  
Another point of interest must be the absence of any response tendency 
differences in the happy-angry crowds. If the induction of a negative interpretation 
bias mimics the interpretations in social anxiety, and if happy faces are implicitly 
negative, one would expect that response patterns for happy-angry crowds would 
resemble those by socially anxious, too (compare: Heuer et al., 2007; Lange, 
Keijsers, Becker et al., 2008). However, they do not. A possible explanation could be 
that the generalization of an induced cognitive bias towards automatic behavior 
works better towards “logically” congruent material. It is likely that angry faces are 
naturally more threatening than happy faces and that only the long learning history of 
socially anxious individuals has made them perceive the valence of ("naturally" 
positive; Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997) happy faces as threatening. In contrast, a 
negative interpretation training might be capable of pushing the implicit threat 
evaluation above a certain “relevance” threshold. The training might be too weak, 
though, to reverse the inert “positiveness” of a happy face within an hour. 
 
Chapter 7 
- 176 - 
Additionally, the working mechanism of a positive training is unclear. The 
observation of a positive bias in non-anxious controls is normally less specific and 
not restricted to social scenarios. This makes the selection of training items more 
difficult, and if kept purely social, too specific to generalize to other domains. 
Besides, we do not know what happens when someone with a positive bias is 
trained to think even more positively, and if we are encountering a ceiling effect. 
Ideally, interpretation training would have to work both ways, and transfer to related 
behavior should be bidirectional. Besides that, we have to be aware that the sample 
in this analogue study was non-clinical, and that we attempted to induce a bias in 
order to simulate the consequences for novel interpretations, anxiety, and 
associated behavior, as a model of social anxiety. Whether benign interpretation 
training has the potential to reduce negative biases in clinically anxious patients, and 
whether such a training reduces automatic avoidance tendencies towards emotional 
faces, has to be determined by future research. 
In sum, the results show that CBM transfers to (automatic) anxiety-related 
behavior. Nevertheless, more questions are raised than answered. On the one hand, 
they show that training an interpretation bias can influence automatic avoidance 
tendencies. By doing so, the negative training serves as an analogue model for 
understanding social anxiety disorder and shed more light on the cognitive and 
behavioral processes underlying social anxiety and social phobia. Considering this, it 
is likely that, rather than merely being a symptom, cognitive biases might be initiating 
factors in bringing about psychiatric disorders. On the other hand, it remains unclear 
what effects positive interpretation training brings about, and whether it could serve 
as therapeutic means for the treatment of social anxiety disorder. This would have to 
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be evaluated by testing participants who already show a negative bias, and by 
comparing bias and behavior measures before and after a positive training.  
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Footnotes 
 
 1 For a critical discussion of the term “automatic”, see Moors and De Houwer 
(2006). 
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About thirty years ago, distortions in information processing have been identified to 
be a key component of emotional disorders (Beck, 1976), and as such integrated in 
a first model for treatment. Since then it has been claimed that individuals suffering 
from anxiety disorders, for example, share a misconception about how threatening 
an object, situation, or sensation really is and that they process threat-relevant 
information preferentially (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Huppert & Foa, 2004). These so 
called cognitive biases are subdivided into a number of different phenomena: e.g., 
negative (mis-)interpretation of ambiguous situations or sensations (interpretation 
bias), the tendency to evaluate situations and their outcomes as 
negative/threatening and the likelihood of their occurrence as highly probable 
(evaluation or judgmental bias), and the rapid detection of seemingly threatening 
stimuli (attention bias: hyper-vigilance). In recent years, the cognitive processes 
underlying anxiety have come more into focus. Cognitive theories for social anxiety 
disorder (SAD) such as the one of Beck and Clark (1997; but also: Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have stressed that biases in the information 
processing of social cues in patients diagnosed with SAD might contribute to the 
maintenance and maybe even etiology of the disorder (e.g., Heinrichs & Hofmann, 
2001; Hirsch & Clark, 2004). Presently there is cumulative experimental evidence to 
strengthen that claim (Foa et al., 1996; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hofmann, 2007; 
MacLeod, Campbell, Rutherford, & Wilson, 2004; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Stopa 
& Clark, 1993; Yiend & Mackintosh, 2004). Even though facial expressions are 
undoubted strong, readily misinterpreted social signals, it is insufficiently clear if, in 
social phobia, they are target of negative interpretations, are preferentially 
processed, and evoke social evaluative stress.  
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This thesis investigated in how far (particular) facial expressions are subject to 
preferential attentional processing, misinterpretations or -evaluations, such as being 
threatening and anxiety confirming for individuals with elevated degrees of social 
anxiety. Six different approaches have been selected to gain insight in biased 
processing of facial expressions and the correlation with high levels of social anxiety.  
 
Biased attention to attentional bias 
First, we aimed in a more general setup to explore if threatening stimuli such as 
spiders and angry faces affected an attentional phenomenon called Inhibition of 
Return (IOR; Berlucchi, 2006; Posner & Cohen, 1984). IOR prioritizes visual 
attention to stimuli in a new spatial location over stimuli in previously scanned spatial 
locations. This phenomenon is supposed to promote novelty in the visual field and 
make attentional processes more efficacious (compare: Lupianez et al., 2006). If, on 
the other hand, detection of threat is prioritized in order to prepare an organism for 
quick appropriate responses (Öhman, 1993; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001), threatening 
stimuli in the previously scanned location might nevertheless catch attention, and 
IOR might be undermined (Fox et al., 2002). In Chapter 2, we explored that notion. 
Contrary to findings from e.g., Fox et al. (2002), none of our experiments confirmed 
the hypothesis that IOR is reduced or absent when threatening stimuli are presented 
prior to the target stimuli, neither in unselected participants, spider fearfuls, nor in 
socially anxious individuals (SAs) or non-anxious controls (NACs). In fact literature 
does provide only limited examples of altered IOR for fear related stimuli. Instead it is 
believed that “… IOR is a ‘blind’ mechanism that is unaffected by the mere 
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occurrence of biologically relevant cue and target stimuli” (Taylor & Therrien, 2005; 
p. 1414). As our implementation of a variety of threat stimuli could not evoke any 
disruptions of IOR throughout a series of experiments we believe that IOR is 
insensitive to the valence of the utilized cues. Our results imply that IOR is largely 
determined by “bottom-up” perceptual information (compare: Berlucchi, 2006; 
Possamai, 1986; Tassinari et al., 1989). Specific perceptual features/energy 
changes in the visuospatial field appear to lead to the inhibition of attention of a 
specific locus during a short period of time. Since stimulus valence is controlled “top-
down”, however, it might not have had the time to interfere with the bottom-up 
process. The presented experimental set-up does not allow a conclusion about 
preferential attentional processing of threat stimuli in general. We can only conclude 
that a basic attentional process, such as IOR, does not seem to be affected by 
stimulus valence. 
 In Chapter 3 and in a series of unpublished studies, we explored the 
attentional processing of facial expressions more directly. From our results (Chapter 
2) we concluded that angry faces may not be threatening enough to catch attention 
in a way that undermines robust attentional processes such as IOR. The assumption 
that, once threat is detected in the visual field, it may be difficult to disengage 
attention from (Fox et al., 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, 
Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Salemink et al., 2007a), led to a more straightforward 
exploration of the attentional properties of facial expressions. We conducted three 
experiments, varying a promising disengagement paradigm developed by Fox and 
colleagues (2001; Experiment 5). SAs and NACs were asked to identify/categorize 
letters flashed in the periphery of a centrally presented facial expression. Thus, first a 
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facial expression was centrally presented. While the face was still visible, a letter, 
either an “R” or a “B”, was presented on the screen on one of 8 different randomized 
positions with a radius of 5 or 13 cm. Participants had to decide as quickly as 
possible which letter they had seen. According to theory, angry faces should hold 
attention (of socially anxious individuals) longer than other faces, and thereby disrupt 
reaction times and/or percentage correct responses. Alternatively, Christianson 
(1992; Wessel et al., 2000) introduced the term “attentional narrowing” to discribe 
disengagement-related phenomena. If the diameter of the attentional focus 
constricts in response to a threat cue, naturally, other stimuli in proximate spatial 
locations fall beyond the focus and are difficult to detect - response latencies 
increase. Though disrupted disengagement is frequently reported with trait- and 
state anxious individuals (Fox et al., 2001 for word stimuli; Georgiou et al., 2005 for 
fearful face stimuli), we were unable to find increased “dwell-times” for centrally 
presented angry faces, neither in NACs nor in SAs (unpublished: Lange, Keijsers, 
Rinck, & Becker, 2007). In fact to our knowledge, we are the first using this paradigm 
in a socially anxious population, disconfirming that angry facial expressions hold 
attention longer than neutral or happy expressions. From the above we conclude 
that not only automated processes such as IOR but also probe detection in general, 
might be based on bottom-up processing and remain relatively unaffected by top-
down influences such as threat evaluation (e.g., Berlucchi, 2006). Thus, it is possible 
that alterations of stimulus processing by means of its changing valence are 
dependent on their relevance for fulfilling the task. For example, in order to improve 
task performance in Chapter 2, thorough processing of the (valenced) cue was 
unnecessary. In our disengagement-study described above we may have failed to 
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find disrupted disengagement because the centrally presented stimulus was again 
irrelevant for task completion.  
 To test the notion of attentional capture and attentional narrowing in a 
paradigm with more task-relevant valenced material, a flanker task was employed in 
Chapter 3. The emotion of a target picture had to be categorized into angry, happy, 
or neutral, while the flanking faces had to be ignored. If threatening faces would 
indeed capture attention than the participants’ responses should be delayed for 
angry flankers when the target face was happy or neutral. Theory (e.g., Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) suggests that flankers that are similar or equal to the target, are less 
distracting than flankers that differ from the target. But, if a target is identified as 
threatening it should initiate attentional narrowing. Consequently, the influence of 
differing as opposed to equal flankers should be diminished (Fenske & Eastwood, 
2003). Since angry faces are supposed to be highly threatening to SAs, SAs were 
expected to show clear effects of attentional narrowing. However, our findings did 
not show any effect of angry faces, neither as flankers nor as targets. Social anxiety 
was not relevant for any of the effects, either. Thus, even if task-relevant, responses 
to threatening flankers or targets did not elicit preferential processing, neither 
through distraction nor through narrowed focusing. Unexpectedly, however, we 
found an interaction of target gender and target emotion. Pictures of smiling females 
and angry males were faster categorized than angry females and smiling males. 
Though irrelevant for a better understanding of face processing in social anxiety, 
these findings do have important methodological implications for research utilizing 
facial expressions of different genders. The implications are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. In general, our results could convey that threatening facial expressions 
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are probably not perceived threatening enough to distract attention from a task such 
as emotion categorization. Similarly, the impact of flanker-target similarity did not 
decrease when an angry target had to be processed. Thus, no (detectable) 
attentional narrowing took place. In sum, our findings from Chapter 2 and 3 as well 
as from our unpublished study, do not evidence any attention-capturing capacity of 
angry facial expression that brought forth either distraction or speeding of responses, 
nor did angry faces evoke any attentional narrowing. Thus, even if the processing of 
the stimulus is task-relevant and top-down control enabled (Chapter 3), angry faces 
are not apt to attract attentional resources quicker or longer than neutral or happy 
faces. With these results we are in line with findings from Bradley et al. (2000; but 
also: Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Pineles & Mineka, 2005). On the other 
hand our data contradict evidence of a bias towards (negative) faces of e.g., 
Maieritsch & Walter (2003; but also: Mogg & Bradley, 2002a; Mogg et al., 2004; 
Sposari & Rapee, 2007), but contradict also evidence for a bias away from 
(negative/emotional) faces  (Chen et al., 2002; Mansell et al., 1999; Stirling et al., 
2006). 
 Both, the lack of vigilance to as well as the lack of distraction by angry facial 
expressions contradicts not only results from visual probe literature but also findings 
with visual search tasks such as e.g., the “face-in-the-crowd” paradigm (e.g., Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 1999; Hansen & Hansen, 1988). The employment of this 
procedure has repeatedly evidenced an “anger superiority effect” in normal controls 
but also in trait anxious participants: detection times of, e.g., angry faces in a group 
of happy faces (crowd) appear much shorter than the other way around. However, 
even within the visual search literature, findings are quite equivocal especially when 
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participants are selected on degree of social anxiety. Eastwood et al. (2005) used 
schematic faces (“smileys”) and found an attentional bias towards negative faces for 
social phobic participants. Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, and Amir (1999) utilized crowds 
composed of the same individual depicting one deviant expression. She did find the 
anger-superiority effect in socially phobic individuals, too, but also found distraction 
by happy expressions. Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman (2005) found an anger-
superiority effect with schematic faces, and only in the accuracy not in the reaction 
time data. Besides that, anger was only detected more accurately by socially anxious 
participants, when embedded in emotional distractors and when under conditions of 
socio-evaluative stress. For real faces (all different individuals) she found a happy-
superiority effect independent of anxiety levels. These inconsistencies can have 
many reasons. Hahn and Gronlund (2007) argued that task difficulty and instructions 
influence presence or absence of a processing advantage for threat. Taken together 
in seems though that in visual search, individuals with a high degree of social anxiety 
may exceed the superior accuracy for searching angry faces in a crowd that normal 
controls show. Interestingly, Horstmann (2007) remarked that a systematic anger-
superiority effect is no proof of an enhanced preconscious processing of angry faces. 
In fact, mere negative evaluation of angry faces (in social anxious individuals) would 
make a fast detection of angry faces in a crowd as plausible. Thus, if no threat-
evaluation takes place, covert attentional processes calibrated to detect danger may 
not be activated as our results so far have demonstrated. The negative evaluation of 
a particular category of facial expressions can nevertheless lead to speeded 
detection as the visual search literature proves.  
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 In sum, our results so far suggest that emotional faces are not evaluated as 
threatening by SA and as such do not interfere with threat-related attentional 
processes. We believe, though, that they might be special for some individuals (with 
elevated degrees of social anxiety) but not for others. Even though certain emotional 
faces are not necessarily evaluated as threatening they are nevertheless evaluated 
as strikingly negative. Consequently, cognitive distortions may manifest themselves 
on another domain of processing then studied thus far in the present thesis: not 
during quick feature or (threat-)valence detection, but on the contrary, during slower 
more evaluation-related responding to (negative) emotional faces.  
 
Response Bias or Interpretation Bias ? 
In the previous paragraph it has been concluded that mere negative evaluation of 
facial expressions might stem from different cognitive processes than threat 
evaluations do. For the occurrence of a negative evaluation, for example, it is 
necessary that an expression is factually recognized or at least conjecturally 
recognized, and quickly (negatively) interpreted. In Chapter 4 our attention shifted to 
the question whether social anxiety is perhaps associated with an altered detection 
of facial affect change in others. While the social skills deficit model suggests that 
socially anxious individuals may lack a variety of skills needed in social interactions 
they may be poor at recognizing emotional change in others, too (e.g., Stopa & 
Clark, 1993). Others propose, however, that SA might be superior in recognizing 
negative affect as it is relevant to their fear and thus threatening to them (compare: 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & Workman, 2006). 
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In addition, it is suggested that these described processes might be joined by 
(speeded) jumping to negative conclusions (e.g., Winton et al., 1995).  
 We constructed the following experiment to explore whether SAs’ and NACs’ 
recognition of gradually changing facial expressions differ. Short film clips made of 
two photos morphed (compare: Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Niedenthal et al., 2002) 
from neutral to emotional (angry, happy, or disgust), had to be stopped when the 
participant thought to have detected emotional change. Then, without getting the 
opportunity to see the full emotional expression, participants were asked to decide 
which emotion they thought would develop from the features they had seen (Chapter 
4, Restricted Viewing Task [RVT]). In the second part of the study participant were 
allowed to freely move forward and backward through the whole film clip. They were 
asked to determine the point at which the emotion became visible and to guess the 
depicted expression shown in the end (Free viewing Task [FVT]). There was only 
tendentious evidence for a generally slowed detection of emotional change in SA 
under the restricted conditions of the RVT. Instead, we found that, under restricted 
viewing conditions, socially anxious participants when in error, mistake first signs of 
disgust expressions for depicting contempt. NACs, when mistaken, rather interpreted 
the first signs of disgust as those of a happy expression. Thus, not the number of 
errors (per emotion) differed between the groups, but the kind of error. The FVT did 
not reveal any differences attributable to any emotion in particular or to social 
anxiety. Our results contradict those of Joormann & Gotlib (2006). With a 
comparable experimental design, they found that social phobic individuals were 
considerably faster in identifying developing angry expressions than were depressed 
participants or normal controls. It is difficult to explain those differences in findings. 
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Despite the similarities between the two approaches, there are, numerous 
methodological difference that could have led to the results, as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. Most prominently, the depicted change in our movies was much 
more gradual (1 vs 2 % steps), thus more difficult to detect, and we had no emotion 
repeated by the same actor. From the longer RTs as well as the higher error rates in 
our RVT, it appears as if our task was much more difficult than that of Joormann & 
Gotlib (2006). In absence of comparable experimental data in the literature, we have 
to conclude that under conditions of slow emotional change, participants did not 
show individual differences with regard to recognition speed or accuracy. 
 In sum, this study did not support the notion that socially anxious individuals 
are exceedingly good/fast at identifying emotional expressions in others (for 
conflicting results see: Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). Additionally, they do not lack the 
skill to correctly recognize emotional facial expressions as might be deduced from 
the social skills deficit model (Alden & Wallace, 1995; Ashbaugh et al., 2005; Foa et 
al., 2001). It is more likely that a continuous valence evaluation/interpretation 
mechanism as suggested by Mogg & Bradley (1998) hampers a quick decision of 
SAs in a performance situation. As this very same mechanism is believed to be fine-
tuned by genetic setup as well as past experiences and cognitive set (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), it might be responsible for a misinterpretation of disgust features as 
contempt. In fact, it is possible that disgust is the most ambiguous of the employed 
emotions during the task. Philippot and Douilliez (2005), and also Darwin (1872) 
stressed the close relationship between disgust and contempt and their possible link 
with social rejection. As cognitive models of social phobia suggest that social anxiety 
is related to a tendency to interpret ambiguous social information as negative or 
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even threatening (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) it is possible that 
our results hint on such a process. However, evidence for misinterpretation or 
negative evaluation of facial expression is equivocal so far (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 
1989). If reported, distortions seem to be rather elicited under conditions of restricted 
processing (e.g., short presentation times, short response frame, etc.) but not under 
conditions of free processing (e.g., Philippot & Douilliez, 2005). From our results we 
conclude that constrictions of the processing itself (time pressure), difficulty of the 
task (very slow change) resulted in an artificial increase of ambiguity and hence 
facilitated the misinterpretation of the already ambiguous expression of disgust in 
SA. To explore how negative interpretation bridges the gap between our previous 
findings, it is necessary to investigate how automatic processing (e.g., eye 
movement) relates to evaluative processing, and how both relate to social anxiety.  
 
Following the eye of the beholder 
In none of the preceding studies we were able to show that socially anxious 
individuals process emotional faces as if they were highly threatening or at least 
“special”. Compared to NACs, angry faces did not undermine the IOR effect 
(Chapter 2), disrupt disengagement (formerly unpublished), distract when in the 
periphery of visual focus, or facilitate when in focus (Chapter 3), and were not 
detected more easily when gradually developing (Chapter 4) in SAs. What has been 
shown, though, was that especially angry male faces are processed more quickly, 
and that, faces showing disgust are misinterpreted by socially anxious individuals, as 
depicting contempt.  
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 After refining the essence of the previous study we focused on the link 
between increased ambiguity and direct evaluations/interpretations. In order to 
investigate how (socially anxious) individuals visually explore a mixed (read: 
ambiguous) emotional crowd, we recorded eye movements while participants saw a 
crowd for either 500 or 2500 milliseconds. In addition, they had to rate the presented 
crowd in terms of friendliness when the display had disappeared (compare: Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 2005). Generally, the best predictor for the ratings was the 
percentage fixated angry faces of all fixations: As the proportion angry faces of all 
seen faces increased, the crowds were rated as less friendly. It seemed though that 
the proportion fixated angry faces was slightly higher in SA, but this did not lead to 
more negative ratings. Social anxiety did also influence the duration of the first 
fixation when it was on an angry face. NACs looked longer at first fixated angry faces 
than did SAs. This circumstance could be interpreted as attentional avoidance, 
though Calvo, Avero, and Lundqvist (2006) construed comparable results differently. 
They recorded eye movement data while participants completed a “classical” face in 
the crowd task (e.g., Hansen & Hansen, 1988). Even though participants looked 
shorter at angry faces, they were more accurate and faster at identifying a neutral 
crowd as “deviant” when it comprised an angry face as compared to a happy or a 
sad target face. Calvo and colleagues (2006) concluded that angry faces may be 
preprocessed preattentively which may have facilitated task performance and 
decreased fixation times. From our data we cannot rule out that any differential 
preattentional processing took place in SAs or NACs. Yet, if it did, crowd ratings 
neither in SAs nor in NACs, were object to its diverging influence.  
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 In line with findings from Douilliez & Philippot (2003; and: Heuer et al., 2007; 
Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial, & Miltner, 2007; Lissek et al., 2008; Merckelbach, van 
Hout, van den Hout, & Mersch, 1989; Van Hout, Merckelbach, & Mersch, 1991) but 
in contrast to Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (2005; but also: Amir et al., 2005, Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 2007, MacKinnon & MacIntyre, 2007), we demonstrated in Chapter 5 that 
ratings of emotional facial crowds did not differ between SAs and NACs. In addition, 
threat-related processes, such as vigilance for angry faces, were only tendentiously 
evident. The only evidence for differential processing was based on shorter gaze 
durations of SAs on first fixations when they were on angry faces. When considering 
overt attention, it appears as if angry faces do initiate some form of differential 
attentional processing in SAs. These differences however did under no circumstance 
correlate with the direct ratings. It remains unclear whether this biased processing is 
based on threat-evaluations and becomes relevant for anxiety prone behavior such 
as negative self-evaluation, negative evaluation of social scenes, or avoidance of 
social situations. Our results reflect the inconsistencies in the literature and suggest 
that assessing biased evaluation of facial expressions by direct ratings might not be 
the most promising path to go. They indicate, however, that evaluative mechanisms 
not detectible with explicit ratings could initiate an automatic behavior reflected in 
avoidance tendencies in response to facial crowds. 
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A Tendency to Avoid 
In anxiety disorders avoidance of the feared object, or situation is quite common. In 
fact, learning theories (e.g., Seligman, 1971), but also cognitive theories (e.g., Beck 
& Clark, 1997; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), assume that avoidance is 
a maintaining factor in the etiology of anxiety disorders. In general, anxious people 
know what they fear when approaching a feared stimulus and they are aware that 
they deliberately avoid it whenever possible. It is suggested, however, that 
avoidance may extend beyond conscious processing (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Foa et 
al., 2001; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2007). Spider phobic 
individuals, for example, show an attentional vigilance-avoidance pattern: They 
quickly detect a spider in a display of mixed stimuli, but avoid looking at it afterwards 
(Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2004). Similarly, Amir, Foa, and Coles 
(1998a) found that social phobic individuals have a tendency to preferentially 
process potentially threatening social sentences fast, but strategically avoid the 
threat later on. To test the notion that negative evaluation of facial expressions in 
socially anxious might rather be reflected in automatic action tendencies than in 
direct evaluation, the following twofold experiment was set up: We confronted SAs 
and NACs with a matrix of face stimuli (crowds; compare: Chapter 5) with changing 
ratios of neutral-angry, or happy-angry combinations. The participants were asked 
not to respond to the emotional valence but to the background color of the crowds. 
Nevertheless, our results showed that approach-avoidance tendencies, as measured 
by the speed of joystick movements (pulling closer vs. pushing away; see also:  
Rinck & Becker, 2007), were influenced by the crowd composition. SAs as compared 
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to NACs became more avoidant as more angry faces composed the crowd. 
Interestingly, happy-angry combinations were avoided as a whole, independent of 
ratio. This holds true even for purely happy crowds. It seems that happy faces where 
perceived as similarly negative/threatening than angry faces (see also: Heuer et al., 
2007). These results differed from those of the explicit crowd ratings in a surprising 
way. When rated explicitly, in both groups, all-smiling crowds were considered 
positive, and the crowd ratings decreased with an increasing number of angry faces 
in the crowds.  
 In contrast to the findings from Chapter 2-5, we now have results allowing 
much clearer inferences about the way socially anxious individuals react to 
emotional faces. First, there was no proof that angry facial expressions elicited any 
kind of attentional vigilance or disrupted disengagement, neither in non-anxious 
controls nor in socially anxious participants. Second, when rated directly, angry faces 
are evaluated as negative, neutral faces as neutral and smiling faces as positive 
(compare Chapter 5). Here, the degree of social anxiety did not play any relevant 
role (for conflicting results see: Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2005). Third, unlike 
proposed by interpretation bias literature, ambiguous neutral expressions are not 
interpreted as more unfriendly nor reacted to in a more avoidant way. Instead disgust 
is interpreted as contempt, but only under conditions of highly increased ambiguity. 
Fourth, when indirectly measuring approach-avoidance tendencies, it appeared that 
it was not possible for SAs to ignore the emotional content of the crowds whereas 
NACs were able to do so. Only SAs became more avoidant as more angry faces 
were in a neutral crowd. Fifth, social anxiety was also associated with avoidance of 
happy faces, which contradicted the results of the positive direct ratings. From these 
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results it can be concluded that social anxiety is associated with an initial avoidance 
response concerning emotional faces. Even generally positive faces such as a 
smiling one, are avoided (see also: Heuer et al., 2007). It appears rather unlikely that 
a happy face is evolutionarily preprogrammed to be experienced as threatening 
(Becker et al., 2007). Continuous negative experiences or the relentless negative 
interpretation of a smile (e.g., laughing about me), on the other hand, could result in 
a steadily increasing aversion in SA. On a conscious level, though, he or she 
acknowledges that a smile is positive. Cognitive theories are vague about whether 
an aversion, build up by repeated negative experiences, eventually develops into a 
threat inference. From our studies we conclude that it may not be necessary that a 
threat evaluation has to take place in order to initiate avoidance; a negative 
evaluation might be sufficient. To investigate the implications of our results we 
decided to teach non-anxious or “averagely” anxious individuals to interpret 
(ambiguous) social scenes as negative (or positive) and examine whether avoidance 
tendencies regarding emotional facial crowds change.  
 
The causal role of misinterpretation 
It has been stressed in recent years that cognitive biases might be causally related 
to the development of emotional disorders (Mackintosh et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 
2004). Thus, having a tendency to evaluate one’s environment as threatening and to 
selectively adopt threat-confirming information, might eventually contribute to the 
development of an anxiety disorder. Cognitive bias manipulations (CBMs) as for 
example the induction of an interpretation bias (CBM-I) in “averagely anxious” 
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individuals have shed light on the cause-effect chain in question. Many researchers 
have attempted to induce a negative CBM-I in participants and have indeed found an 
increase in subjectively reported anxiety (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Yiend et al., 2005). With a 
more therapeutic application in mind, others have experimented with the induction of 
a benign CBM-I in participants reporting high (but sub-clinical) degrees of trait- and 
social anxiety (Mathews et al., 2007; Murphy et al., 2007). Indeed, after four 
sessions of training, the subjectively reported trait anxiety scores decreased. It is 
unknown, however, in how far such training effects transfer to observable and 
measurable behavior. This is important, though, when one attempts to create a 
meaningful analogue for anxiety proneness or for specific therapeutic interventions. 
After all, high degrees of (trait) anxiety are usually reflected in some kind of behavior 
beyond eye movement, covert attentional vigilance/avoidance, or tendencies to 
negatively interpret vignettes of social scenes. In fact, patients suffering from social 
anxiety disorder tend to avoid feared social situations, or show behaviors mistakenly 
presumed to down-regulate or conceal their anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 
2007; Voncken, Alden, & Bögels, 2006). In Chapter 7, we reported how a common 
CBM-I influenced a measure of automatic behavior (Approach-Avoidance Task) as 
outlined in Chapter 6. Thus, the induction and consecutive employment of a negative 
interpretation style seemed to have led to a negative evaluation of the task-irrelevant 
facial crowd combinations, and had triggered an aversion/threat based avoidance 
response. In contrast to our findings in socially anxious individuals (Chapter 5), here 
the happy-angry crowds were not avoided. It was concluded that in social anxiety 
automatized negative evaluation of happy faces must be the result of an extensive 
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learning history of negative(ly interpreted) experiences with smiling people. 
Consequently, it might not be possible to reverse the naturally positive valence of a 
happy face with a negative interpretation training of an hour. Our study revealed the 
first evidence that an induced negative interpretation bias for ambiguous social 
scenarios could bring forth an avoidant behavior pattern similar to that observed in 
socially anxious individuals. These avoidance tendencies however, could only be 
reported in response to neutral-angry crowd combinations. In short, our results 
suggest that it is not necessary to have an inert threat evaluation of angry faces, a 
negative interpretation (training) seemed sufficient enough to let the angry faces 
appear even more negative and thus subjectively more relevant to surpass the 
threshold for an avoidance reaction. 
 
Integration 
As cognitive models (Beck & Clark, 1997; Clark & Wells, 1995; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) suggest that people suffering from 
social anxiety disorder have a tendency to interpret (ambiguous) social cues as 
being negative or threatening, it has been considered very likely that facial 
expressions being prominent communicative signals (Haxby et al., 2000; Öhman, 
2002; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), must be relevant cues for 
threat inferences, too. Yet, research results as well as results from our own research 
that tested predictions based on the theoretical models have been 
indecisive/inconclusive.   
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 Based on findings from Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (1999; but also: Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist et al., 2001) it has been suggested that angry 
faces are always preferentially processed, but that people high in social anxiety 
show a more accentuated attentional bias towards angry (read: threatening) faces or 
tend to evaluate such faces as more threatening/negative. Eye movement studies 
(Calvo et al., 2006; Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; 
Rohner, 2002), studies employing exogenous cueing paradigms (Mansell et al., 
1999; Mogg et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005), EEG-studies (Cooney, Atlas, 
Joormann, Eugene, & Gotlib, 2006; Kolassa et al., 2007; Rossignol et al., 2007) as 
well as expression categorization studies (Coles, 2004; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2007; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Meyer, 2005) and emotion rating 
studies (Amir et al., 2005; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2007; Douilliez & Philippot, 2003; 
Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2005; Merckelbach et al., 1989; Yoon & Zinbarg, 2007) 
could only partially confirm this claim (for literature overview see Table 1.1.; for 
review see: Fox, 2004b). Our own results could also confirm these claims only to a 
limited extend: we did not find disruption of threat-related covert attentional 
processes (vigilance, delayed disengagement, distraction, attentional narrowing) in 
response to particular facial expressions, neither in SAs nor in NACs. Further, SAs 
were not particularly good or bad in recognizing certain emotional expressions that 
were developing. Instead, they tended to misinterpret “disgust” as “contempt”, under 
conditions of enhanced ambiguity. In addition they tended, in contrast to NACs, to 
avoid angry as well as smiling faces in a crowd, while the direct evaluations of the 
displays did not reveal any group differences. Finally, negative interpretation training 
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led normal control participants to behave similar to SAs in response to angry faces: 
avoidant. Smiling faces, however, were not avoided.  
 Matters are complicated by reports of comparable findings in trait anxious but 
not in non-anxious participants in the literature. At the same time, unselected (non-
anxious) individuals have shown processing differences for angry/negative faces, too 
(for critical discussion see: Fox, 2004b). Another unsettled issue results from to the 
employment of different not necessarily threat-related (usually: anger) but definitely 
negative facial expressions (fear, sadness, disgust). Fox (2004b) attempted to 
explain variations in research findings by the fact that scientists “… are not sampling 
stimuli that are of prime concern to high trait anxious people” (p.102). Additionally, 
even naturally positive emotions (happy, surprise) might undergo preferential 
processing, first, because they might be an invitation for desired social interaction, or 
a signal of sympathy and acceptance, etc. Herein, especially female smiles might be 
preferentially processed because females seem to play an evolutionary role in 
ensuring social coherence and warmth (Becker et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2000; see 
also Chapter 3). At the same time smiles might have acquired a negative 
connotation over time by a sequence of negative experiences of an individual: Being 
often laughed at or having been ridiculed after misinterpreting a flirtatious smile could 
eventually, after numerous repetitions lead to a negative evaluation of a formerly 
positive expression (e.g., Chapter 6). In sum, there are numerous reasons why 
positive as well as negative emotional expressions might acquire a valence that 
leads to preferential processing. Therefore a negative evaluation of a stimulus can 
result in several somewhat contradictory behavioral consequences such as for 
example an attentional vigilance towards a stimulus as well as avoidance away from 
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it. Herein, may lay the core of inconsistencies throughout the literature. In social 
anxiety, the list of threat-evoking cues can be quite long and may vary greatly 
between individuals. Threatening stimuli are supposed to influence cognitive 
processes such as covert attention (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). While current cognitive 
models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) begin at a 
point where a threatening cue or situation is present in one’s environment, where the 
threat inference is about to be made or is already made, they do not take into 
consideration to what degree different levels of threat evaluation do or do not tamper 
threat-related processes. 
  In 1998 Mogg & Bradley introduced a cognitive-motivational model, which 
seems to resolve some of the aforementioned theoretical difficulties and describes 
processes that might precede those predicted by disorder specific theories. Mogg & 
Bradley suggested that all stimuli entering any of the sensory modalities are 
evaluated by a valence evaluation system integrating both, quick superficial feature 
analysis and slower detailed exploration of context, knowledge from experiences, 
etc. (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). Any given input receives a valence “tag”, ranging from “no 
threat” to “high threat”. According to this tag a “goal engagement system” motivates 
the subsequent course of action: Interrupt current goal and look for escape from 
danger, or pursue current goals because the stimuli do not warrant immediate action. 
The goal engagement system is thought to be responsible for the steering of 
subsequent cognitive processing such as i.e., attentional avoidance (with mild 
negative/threat valence) and attentional vigilance and dwelling (with high threat 
valence). Mogg and Bradley further assume that the sensitivity of the valence 
evaluation system can be altered by biological predisposition, the situational context, 
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experience, and character traits (see Figure 8.1). Mogg and Bradley’s motivational 
model summarized here does not elaborate in detail how positive stimuli are 
processed by the valence evaluation system. Apparently, positive evaluations must 
feed into the goal engagement system, too, in order to prioritize positive stimuli or to 
interrupt striving for current goals and replace it by a better one. Just recently, Mogg 
and Bradley have endeavored to extrapolate their model (Mogg & Bradley, 2007a, 
2007b). They hypothesize that the valence evaluation system must be imagined as 
an entity predicting degrees of reward and punishment on a continuous scale. 
Consequently, an organism that is motivated to pursue goals that either keep it away 
from punishment/negative experiences, or strive for reward/positive experiences, 
engages in avoidance (compare: Chapter 5-7) or approach behaviors. Those 
behaviors can manifest in covert, not observable actions such as for example 
relocation of covert attention, physiological arousal (e.g., preparation to fight, flight, 
Valence Evaluation 
System 
 
High threat 
 
 
 
No threat 
Trait anxiety reflects reactivity 
of valence evaluation system to 
aversive stimuli 
Goal Engagement System 
 
Interrupt current goals (‘danger’ mode) 
 
 
Pursue current goals (default ‘safety’ mode)  
Prioritize positive stimuli  
Ignore minor negative stimuli 
Stimulus input 
Situational context 
State anxiety 
Prior learning 
Biol. preparedness 
Figure 8.1 Reprinted from Mogg & Bradley (1998). 
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or freeze), cognitive processes (e.g., reappraisal; Chapter 4), but also observable 
behaviors such as (speeded) eye movements towards or away from stimuli as 
presented in Chapter 5, observable signs of physiological arousal (e.g., trembling), 
or approach and avoidance behaviors as presented in Chapter 6 and 7.  
 Mogg and Bradeley (2007b) contrasted anxiety and drug dependency to 
illustrate the model. While in anxiety prone individuals the detection of threat leads to 
interruption of the current goal pursuit in order to avoid expected harm, drug use in 
addicted individuals is associated with reward. Goal pursuits are also interrupted but 
are substituted by approach behavior. Both opposing evaluations can lead to 
cognitive distortions such as e.g., attentional biases towards the stimulus, but can 
lead to different observable behaviors: either approach or avoidance. It remains 
open to debate, which and how strong factors calibrate the valence evaluation 
system. As Mogg and Bradley (1998) asserted in the original paper, stimulus 
properties as well as the situational context and state anxiety might play an important 
role. Before those factors come into play, though, biological preparedness (Öhman 
et al., 1985; Seligman, 1971), but even more genetic predisposition (Lieb et al., 
2000; Stein, Jang, & Livesley, 2002) and prior learning experiences (Neal & 
Edelmann, 2003) may have shaped someone’s personality and sensitized the 
valence evaluation system in a way that makes an individual more or less anxious in 
a specific context with specific stimuli. Suitably, Derryberry and Reed (1994a; 
Derryberry & Reed, 1994b) have found correlations between temperament 
(extraversion and introversion) and attentional biases (disrupted disengagement) 
from positive and negatively tagged visual locations. Additionally, they suggested 
that temperamental differences in childhood are associated with the development of 
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motivational systems steering reward/approach and punishment/avoidance related 
behaviors but also corresponding attentional preferences. The fact that processing of 
facial expressions is sited in distinctive neurological structures, is highly automated 
(e.g., Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007) and that 
threat is rudimentarily processed via quick sub-cortical routes first (LeDoux, 1996), 
fits nicely with Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) proposition that their motivational model 
primarily refers to preattentive and attentional processes. Nevertheless, the model 
appears tenable to explain other automatized cognitive behaviors as well and is 
nicely complemented by the ideas of Derryberry and Reed (1994a, 1994b).  
 On a more methodological level Fox (2004b) implied that stimulus material 
used in experimental psychopathological research, such as e.g., emotional faces, 
might not be relevant enough for a particular individual or for the tested population. It 
is possible that increased levels of e.g., trait anxiety do not necessarily bias attention 
towards (or away from) angry faces. In fact, this is only plausible if an unambiguous 
threat evaluation takes place and as a result a certain threat-threshold is surpassed. 
Even though angry faces might be evolutionarily determined threat signals, they do 
not inevitably trigger attentional vigilance or other threat-related phenomena as has 
been shown in Chapter 2-4. They only do so, if the individual (‘s valence evaluation 
system) “considers” the stimulus and the context salient enough to be threatening. 
These “considerations” may be colored by former experiences, parenting style, 
cognitive style, but also genetic and evolutionary predisposition. They feed into, and 
fine-tune the valence evaluation system. Thus, angry faces may have some 
disruptive capacities in a search paradigm (e.g., Öhman, Lundqvist et al., 2001) or 
may be processed quicker than other emotions (Becker et al., 2007; our findings 
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Chapter 3), but they may not be equally threatening (read: “attention capturing”) to 
high trait anxious or socially anxious individuals (Chapter 2-4). Even though it is 
supposed that an increased degree of trait anxiety predisposes to a greater 
alertness for threat signals in general it remains unclear if that applies to angry faces. 
In the same line socially anxious individuals might be over alert for signals of social 
disapproval, but an angry face might after all be not as likely to occur or as 
threatening as long pauses in a conversation, someone turning away, one’s own 
signals of anxiety, not knowing what to say, being in the focus of others’ attention, 
etc.  
 Taken together, if an automatized, preattentive stimulus or input valence 
evaluation system as supposed by Mogg & Bradley (1998) really exists, it can readily 
explain the divergent findings summarized in this dissertation. When angry facial 
expressions are not necessarily evaluated as threatening by socially anxious 
participants, they may not impede threat-related attentional processing (Chapter 2 & 
3) nor facilitate supposedly threat-relevant emotion recognition (Chapter 4). As these 
processes are assumed to take place on a preattentive, sub-cortical level, explicit 
evaluations will not show traces of implicit evaluation differences (Chapter 5 & 6). If a 
preattentive valence evaluation system appraises angry faces as unmistakably 
negative, they may still be processed faster in general (Chapter 3), or especially by 
socially anxious individuals (Chapter 5). A distinctly inflated negative evaluation does 
also make an avoidance impulse more plausible when the number of task-irrelevant 
emotional (angry) faces in a crowd increases (Chapter 6). Evidence is 
complemented by the fact that negative interpretation training not threat-
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interpretation training in non-anxious individuals can result in avoidance impulses 
similar to those observed in socially anxious participants (Chapter 7).  
 
Limitations 
So far, we have mainly considered the theoretical implications our findings could 
have. We are aware that some methodological constraints have to be considered as 
well. As more specific restrictions are discussed in each individual study, we will 
therefore reflect upon more general issues that are relevant for explanatory power 
and generalization.  
 First, all utilized pictures derived from the same KDEF (Lundqvist et al., 1998) 
picture set (except those in Chapter 2). It is imaginable that, if some of the pictures 
were flawed, in fact all studies would be unsound. It is possible that the presented 
pictures of Swedish actors might not be a good representation of facial 
characteristics or ethnicities in the Dutch population. Additionally, the depicted 
emotions could have been experienced as too intense, exaggerated, not 
recognizable, etc. Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, and Verschuere (2006), however, 
have recently investigated the validity of this particular picture set and concluded that 
“… despite the restriction in use with regard to cross-cultural studies and gender 
specificity, the good percentage idiosyncratic hit rate leads us to conclude that the 
KDEF pictorial databank is an extensive and easily applicable valid stimuli set of 
human affective facial pictures” (p. 15). Of course, it would be necessary to replicate 
our findings with a collection of different actors in order to verify the generalizations. 
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 Second, we have to be aware that in most of our studies, the participant 
gender was female. This is a result of our participant recruitment mainly among 
psychology students, which are predominantly female. This hampers the 
generalization of our results considerably, and especially in the light of the gender-
emotion interaction reported in Chapter 3, we feel that replication with a more 
balanced population is necessary.  
 Third, the selected pictures were predominantly male beginning with the third 
study. This choice was made after discovering that especially male angry faces were 
preferentially processed. It is plausible to assume that angry males are probably 
more threatening, especially to females. However, following our theoretical line of 
reasoning above, attentional biases or disruption of other attentional processes (e.g., 
IOR) should be more easily detectable with threatening male angry stimuli, while 
aversion related processes (e.g., approach-avoidance) should also be identified with 
angry female stimuli. For future research it will be a challenge to disentangle the 
effects of stimuli gender, anxiety proneness, and related cognitive biases. 
 Finally, it is important to know that in all reported experiments, only analogue 
participant samples were assessed. Here, we considered a high vs. low degree of 
social anxiety (usually, highest and lowest quartile of the distribution of Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale [LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987] scores) sufficient to investigate the 
envisaged processes. Rapee and Spence (2004) suggested that social anxiety 
disorder must be seen as “relatively arbitrary cut” along a broader dimension or 
continuum (see also: Mattick & Clarke, 1998; Stein, Torgrud, & Walker, 2000; 
Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). Following this line of reasoning, detection 
of cognitive biases in an analogue sample, might form an adequate precursor for 
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patient studies. Here, effects should be even stronger but not fundamentally 
different. As stated earlier, socially anxious students are much easier to recruit in a 
university environment, while recruitment of the patients demands considerably more 
time and resources. Besides that, the inclusion of social phobic patients brings about 
a large variety of comorbidity that has to be dealt with (Brunello et al., 2000; Chartier, 
Walker, & Stein, 2003; Stein & Chavira, 1998).  
 In sum, we felt that results from socially anxious but not diagnosed students 
can contribute sufficiently to the understanding of social phobia. Nevertheless, 
replication of our results with a clinical sample without comorbidity would be 
worthwhile to determine if the reported effects are indeed more pronounced. 
 
So far, the discussion about limitations with regard to stimulus material, participant 
gender, and tested population is not resolved satisfactorily, and replication of our 
results with the aforementioned changes would be helpful to answer these open 
questions. However, the work at hand was not designed to clarify all possible 
methodological questions in investigating cognitive biases. Instead, our main 
interests were focused around evaluation differences between socially anxious and 
non-anxious individuals, and were tested in order to shed light on the question 
whether social anxiety is associated with distorted perception and evaluation of 
emotional faces. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate in how far differential processing of 
emotional faces is mediated by the degree of social anxiety. Specifically, we 
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addressed different facets of potentially biased cognitive processes such as covert 
and overt visual attention, attentional disengagement, attentional narrowing, emotion 
recognition, approach-avoidance behavior and evaluation biases. Extensive 
experimental psychopathological research testing predictions of current cognitive 
theories could not convincingly evidence the extraordinary role of emotional (angry) 
facial expressions in the maintenance and maybe even etiology of social anxiety 
disorder. In fact, it appears that current theories need to incorporate a (preceding) 
step in which a social cue obtains its threatening value. Once such a cue is labeled 
as threatening, the whole cascade of negative assumption activation, awareness of 
anxiety, attention relocation, etc. can take place. In the light of the motivational 
model of anxiety discussed earlier (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) the results presented 
throughout this work give rise to the notion that emotional facial expressions, and 
especially angry faces might play a prominent though not necessarily threat-related 
role when processed by socially anxious individuals. It is suggested that they are 
solely labeled as entirely negative, and as such do not compellingly interfere with 
threat-related (covert) attentional processes. Although anxiety research still lacks a 
clear distinction between determinants of “threat-“ and “non-threat but negative” 
evaluations, it seems as if even angry faces are not intrinsically threatening to (all) 
socially anxious participants. If our assumptions about how threat evaluations 
influence cognitive processes and related behavior are correct, we have to assume 
that in our social anxious participants, angry faces are ”only” evaluated as 
disproportionally negative. In doing so, socially anxious individuals consistently show 
automatic negative evaluation or aversion as reflected in avoidance tendencies, but 
not necessarily attentional processes related to the presence of threat such as 
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diminished IOR or constriction of the attentional focus. Additionally, it has become 
evident that angry, but also happy facial expressions are evaluated differently from 
non-anxious controls, but only when responded to implicitly. Taken together we 
conclude that in social anxiety, facial expressions such as anger and happiness may 
acquire, due to a general genetic predisposition and learning history, a prominent 
negative evaluation which eventually becomes automated and ignites aversion-
related, reflex-like behavioral tendencies such as avoidance, but which does not tab 
into conscious face evaluation processes. Thus, a negative interpretation style, as 
often observed in socially anxious individuals can lead to these reflexive behaviors in 
response to facial expression, but it is not mandatory. If so, however, it is likely, that 
such behavior is sensed by an interlocutor and interpreted on his part as rejection. 
Consequently, the interlocutor might behave more unfriendly or unsocial, which the 
socially anxious individual sees as fulfilling the prophecy of social rejection.  
 This research has helped to resolve a number of theoretical and 
methodological problems. The presented experimental investigation contributes to 
the refinement of cognitive models of social anxiety disorder and invites 
reconsideration of the current theoretical approaches. For future research, it will be 
essential to justify selections and determine clear benchmarks of experimental 
paradigms utilizing facial expressions. Additionally, the mechanisms that underlie 
and distinguish negative from threat evaluation have to be explored and refined. It 
has also become necessary to determine beforehand whether we intend to use 
threatening or “just” negative stimuli and which kind of outcome either one predicts. 
Especially for the research of social anxiety it remains open to debate whether facial 
expressions are the most suitable stimuli when investigating threat and its impact on 
 
Chapter 8 
- 210 - 
cognitive processes. Results might be confounded by “simple” negative evaluation of 
the faces. More clarity herein will promote more consistent results in research, 
broaden the understanding of the disorder and eventually lead to improved 
therapeutic interventions.  
 
General Discussion 
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Summary 
 
People suffering from social anxiety disorder (social phobia) are constantly worried 
about how they come across to other people. Their foremost fear is to be rejected 
and eventually abandoned. They are markedly afraid to behave embarrassingly in 
social or social performance situations, presume to be evaluated negatively, and 
tend to avoid social situations if possible. Social anxiety disorder is the fourth most 
prevalent mental disorder and quite debilitating for the individual suffering from it. 
Cognitive theories indicate that social anxiety disorder is particularly characterized by 
a manifest tendency to interpret (ambiguous) social events or cues as negative or 
even threatening. Even though facial (emotional) expressions are believed to be 
evolutionarily valuable for communication and social (evaluative) feedback, evidence 
for biased processing of facial expressions in individuals with elevated degrees of 
social anxiety is far from coherent.  
 Goal of the present thesis was to shed light on these inconsistencies. Through 
the employment of different experimental paradigms we strove to explore 
implications of paradigm selection for theory forming and understanding of this 
debilitating disorder. In detail, we investigated distraction by, biased (automatic) 
responses to, and deviations in the recognition and direct evaluations of emotional 
and neutral faces. All findings were interpreted in the light of social anxiety levels. To 
achieve our goal, the following line of research was put forward:  
 First (Chapter 2), we started with a more general investigation, attempting to 
replicate findings showing that supposedly evolutionarily relevant threat cues, 
namely pictures of spiders and of angry faces, have the potential to draw and 
especially hold attention. We were specifically interested, whether other basic 
attentional processes (such as Inhibition of Return; IOR) were undermined. IOR 
refers to a hampering of initial visual attention to a previously scanned spatial 
location. IOR is believed to promote novelty in the visual field and make attentional 
processes more efficacious. If, on the other hand, detection of threat is prioritized in 
order to prepare an organism for quick appropriate responses, threatening stimuli in 
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a previously scanned location might still catch attention (vigilance) and hold attention 
(disrupted disengagement). Additionally, we investigated, whether alterations in IOR 
might be more pronounced in a population with fear for such stimuli (spider fearfulls 
and high socially but not clinically anxious). In none of the three experiments we 
found any evidence that IOR, is reduced by or absent due to threatening stimuli 
appearing in an earlier scanned visual location.  
 We concluded that IOR might be a process largely determined by “bottom-
up”, perceptual information. However, stimulus valence is controlled “top-down” and 
might not have the time to interfere with bottom-up processes. The presented 
experimental set-up does not allow a conclusion about preferential attentional 
processing of threat stimuli in general. We can only conclude that a basic attentional 
process, such as IOR, does not seem to be affected by stimulus valence. 
 Second (Chapter 3), it has been argued that patients suffering from anxiety 
disorders might show disrupted attentional disengagement rather than enhanced 
attentional vigilance: Patients display a disability in turning away their attention from 
a threatening cue. However, many employed experimental paradigms, such as for 
example the dot-probe task, neglect the possibility that full processing or 
identification of an emotion might be necessary before disengagement effects can 
occur. That is, only if the task demands full identification of the facial expression, 
e.g., by asking participants to name the depicted expression, it may become difficult 
to disengage one’s attention from a threatening face. Additionally, the reported 
findings of previous disengagement studies in the literature can also be attributed to 
a narrowing of attention once an individual is confronted with threatening material. 
By means of a flanker paradigm we, therefore, explored if threatening target stimuli, 
when fully processed, do indeed narrow the attentional field, and thus restrict the 
distractive influence of task irrelevant flanking stimuli. Additionally, we were 
interested if such an effect might be more pronounced in socially anxious individuals. 
We argued that if the diameter of the attentional focus constricts in response to a 
threat target, other stimuli in proximate spatial locations fall beyond the focus and are 
less apt to distract. Consequently, response latencies would decrease. If threatening 
faces would indeed capture attention than responses should be delayed for angry 
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flankers, when the target face was happy or neutral. Since angry faces are 
supposedly most threatening to socially anxious subjects, the effects of attentional 
narrowing should be most prominent in this population. To assure top-down stimulus 
recognition and threat evaluation, participants had to categorize the emotion of a 
target picture into angry, happy, or neutral, while the flanking faces had to be 
ignored.  
 Our results could not substantiate any attentional narrowing for angry face 
targets nor any increased distraction by angry face flankers.* Social anxiety was not 
relevant for any of the found effects, either. Thus, even if full processing of the cues 
is necessary to fulfill the task, responses to threatening target or flankers did not 
undergo preferential processing. It appears that emotional facial expressions are not 
perceived threatening to such a degree that they prompt attentional narrowing. Nor 
do they distract attention from a task such as emotion categorization. From the 
results up to this point we concluded that emotional faces might not necessarily be 
evaluated as threatening but that they nevertheless may be seen as more negative.  
 Third (Chapter 4), we argued that inconsistencies in reports of vigilance for 
threatening faces in social anxiety might stem from paradigm selection. Quick 
attention to angry faces might not necessarily manifest itself in quick detection of a 
“full-blown” facial expression. In fact, we thought it likely that socially anxious 
individuals might be particularly apt in detecting first signs of a (threatening) emotion 
very rapidly and (falsely) identify the gradually developing expression, even before it 
is completely visible. In two tasks participants watched movies of facial expressions 
gradually change from neutral to emotional (happy, angry, disgust). In the first task 
participants had to stop the movie as soon as they felt that the first signs of the 
emotion became visible. Then, without seeing the end of the film, they also had to 
guess, which emotion they thought would develop. In the second task, they were 
able to fast-forward or rewind through the whole movie and were asked to identify 
the point at which the facial expression changed from neutral to emotional. Here, 
 
* Instead, we found an interaction of target gender and target emotion. Pictures of 
smiling females and angry males were faster categorized than angry females and 
smiling males. Though irrelevant for a better understanding of face processing in 
social anxiety, these findings do have important methodological implications for 
research utilizing facial expressions 
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they could see the full-blown emotion and were asked to identify it, too. The results 
of both tasks did not support the idea of either facilitated or impaired recognition of 
gradual facial affect change in socially anxious participants. However, we found that 
in the first task, socially anxious individuals when in error, mistake developing signs 
of disgust for contempt. Non-anxious controls, when wrong, rather interpreted the 
first signs of a disgust expression as happy. Thus, not the number of errors (per 
emotion) differed between the groups, but the kind of error.   
 In line with cognitive models of social phobia we found a relationship of social 
anxiety and a tendency to interpret ambiguous social information as negative. Facial 
expressions of disgust and contempt have previously been found to be quite similar. 
Therefore, it is possible that socially anxious tend to interpret the expressions 
congruent to their fears, when in doubt. In fact the task specific viewing restrictions 
artificially increased ambiguity and gave more room for these interpretations.  
 Fourth (Chapter 5), we aimed to answer the question which role overt 
attention may play in the evaluation of certain types of facial expressions. 
Consequently, we recorded the eye movements of participants while they observed 
a matrix of faces with different ratios of two intermixed expressions. We explored if 
the eye movements could predict participants’ subjective evaluations and if those 
ratings were correlated with social anxiety. We found that social anxious participants 
fixated angry faces shorter than non-anxious controls. The subjective ratings, 
however, did not differ between the two groups. It remains unclear whether the 
observed biased processing is relevant for anxiety related behavior such as negative 
self-evaluation, negative evaluation of social scenes, or avoidance of social 
situations. 
 Fifth (Chapter 6), we sought to gain insight in evaluative processes not 
detectible with explicit ratings or attentional tasks. Instead, we investigated whether 
automatic behavior patterns such as approach and avoidance differ between socially 
anxious individuals and non-anxious individuals when responding to emotional facial 
crowds. We confronted socially anxious and non-anxious participants with a matrix of 
face stimuli (crowd) with changing ratios of neutral-angry, or happy-angry 
combinations. Participants were asked to sort the crowds according to their 
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background color by means of pulling (approach movement) or pushing (avoidance 
movement) a joystick, ignoring the depicted faces. As in our previous study, we 
contrasted those implicit responses with explicit subjective ratings of the same 
material. Socially anxious participants showed a tendency to react avoidant towards 
increasingly angry crowds. Additionally, they reacted avoidant when confronted with 
happy faces. Thus, it appeared that it was not possible for socially anxious 
individuals to ignore the emotional content of the crowds (though task irrelevant), 
whereas non-anxious controls were able to do so. They did not show any particular 
behavioral pattern in response to the task-irrelevant emotional faces. The explicit 
subjective ratings did not reveal any differences between groups. In sum, social 
anxiety seems to be associated with an initial avoidance response concerning 
emotional faces. Even generally positive faces such as smiling ones, are avoided.  
 Finally (Chapter 7), we addressed the sequence of cause and effect with 
regard to cognitive bias and anxious behavior: Is a cognitive bias a symptom of 
social anxiety such as e.g., avoidance behavior, or is it crucial in its etiology and 
cause of subsequent anxious behavior. We investigated whether an induced 
cognitive bias in a normal population, brings about implicit approach-avoidance 
tendencies that are similar to those of socially anxious individuals. We found that 
participants trained to hold a negative interpretation bias reacted similarly to angry 
faces than socially anxious participants did in the former study. Unlike observed in 
socially anxious individuals (Chapter 5), here the happy-angry crowds were not 
avoided as a whole. It was concluded that in social anxiety automatized negative 
evaluation of happy faces must be the result of an extensive learning history of 
negative(ly interpreted) experiences with smiling people. Such a drastic reversal of 
valence, we believe, is not accomplished within one hour of bias training. The study 
revealed the first evidence that an induced negative interpretation bias for 
ambiguous social scenarios could bring forth an avoidant behavior pattern similar to 
that observed in socially anxious individuals. These avoidance tendencies, however, 
could only be induced with respect to neutral-angry crowd combinations. Thus, it was 
not necessarily a “threat” evaluation that initiated avoidance; a negative evaluation 
seemed to be sufficient to surpass the threshold for an avoidance reaction. 
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 Taken together, if an automated stimulus or input valence evaluation system 
really exists, and if it distinguishes between “threatening” and solely “negative” input, 
it can readily explain the divergent findings summarized in this dissertation. As covert 
visual attentional processes are thought to be sensitive to threat in the visual field, 
they may not be impeded when a stimulus is not evaluated as threatening (by 
socially anxious participants; Chapter 2 & 3). Accordingly, there is no harm to be 
protected from, and facilitated (early) emotion recognition is not necessary, either 
(Chapter 4). As human beings are apt to (quickly) avoid negative events and stimuli, 
the appraisal of angry faces as unmistakably negative, does not contradict faster 
recognition in the general population (Chapter 3), or avoidant overt eye movements 
in socially anxious individuals (Chapter 5). A distinctly inflated negative evaluation 
does also make an avoidance impulse more plausible when the number of 
(irrelevant) faces in a crowd increases (Chapter 6). Evidence is complemented by 
the fact that negative interpretation training in non-anxious individuals can result in 
avoidance impulses similar to those observed in socially anxious participants 
(Chapter 7).  
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate in how far differential processing of 
emotional faces is mediated by the degree of social anxiety. Specifically, we 
addressed different facets of potentially biased cognitive processes such as visual 
attention, attentional disengagement, attentional narrowing, emotion recognition, eye 
movements, approach-avoidance behavior and explicit ratings. Cognitive theories 
and extensive experimental psychopathological research so far could only 
unequivocally evidence the extraordinary role of emotional (angry) facial expressions 
in the maintenance and maybe even etiology of social anxiety disorder. The results 
presented throughout this work give rise to the notion that emotional facial 
expressions, and especially angry faces, might play a prominent though not 
necessarily threat-related role in the face processing of socially anxious individuals. 
Based on our findings we suggested that angry faces are solely seen as 
 
Summary 
 
- 217 - 
unreasonably negative, and as such do not compellingly interfere with threat-related 
(covert) attentional processes. Although anxiety research still lacks a clear distinction 
between determinants of “threat-“ and “non-threat but negative” evaluations, it seems 
as if even angry faces are not intrinsically threatening to all socially anxious 
participants. If our assumptions about how threat evaluations influence cognitive 
processes and related behavior are correct, we have to assume that in our social 
anxious participants, angry faces are “only” evaluated as disproportionally negative. 
As a result, socially anxious individuals consistently show behaviors related to 
automatic negative evaluation or aversion such as avoidance tendencies. This does 
not necessarily imply that they display responses related to the presence of threat in 
the visual field such as diminished IOR or constriction of the attentional focus. 
Additionally, it has become evident that angry, but also happy facial expressions are 
evaluated differently from non-anxious controls, but only when responded to 
indirectly. Taken together, we conclude that in social anxiety, facial expressions such 
as anger and happiness may acquire, due to a general anxiety-prone genetic 
predisposition and learning history, a prominent negative evaluation. Such an 
evaluation eventually becomes automated and ignites aversion-related, reflex-like 
behavioral tendencies such as avoidance. These evaluative processes, however, do 
not tab into conscious face evaluation processes. It is very likely, though yet to be 
investigated, that such behavior is sensed by an interlocutor and interpreted on his 
part as rejection. Consequently, the interlocutor might behave more unfriendly or 
unsocially, which the socially anxious individual sees as fulfilling his or her own 
prophecy of social rejection. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research has helped to resolve a number of theoretical and methodological 
problems. The presented experimental investigation contributes to the refinement of 
cognitive models of social anxiety disorder and invites reconsideration of the current 
theoretical approaches. For future research, it will be essential to justify selections 
and determine clear benchmarks of experimental paradigms utilizing facial 
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expressions. Additionally, the mechanisms that underlie and distinguish negative 
from threat evaluation have to be explored and refined. It has also become 
necessary to determine beforehand whether we intend to use threatening or “just” 
negative stimuli and which kind of outcome either one predicts. Especially for the 
research of social anxiety it remains open to debate whether facial expressions are 
the most suitable stimuli when investigating threat and its impact on cognitive 
processes. Results might be confounded by “simple” negative evaluation of the 
faces. More clarity herein will promote more consistent results in research, broaden 
the understanding of the disorder, and eventually lead to improved therapeutic 
interventions. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Mensen met een sociale angststoornis (sociale fobie) maken zich voortdurend 
zorgen over hoe zij bij anderen overkomen. Het is hun grootste angst om afgewezen 
en uiteindelijk in de steek gelaten te worden. Ze zijn vooral bang om zich belachelijk 
te maken in sociale- of prestatiesituaties, verwachten negatief beoordeeld te worden 
en hebben daarom de neiging om sociale situaties te vermijden. De sociale 
angststoornis is een zeer belemmerende en de op vier na meest voorkomende 
psychische stoornis. Cognitieve theorieën veronderstellen dat de sociale 
angststoornis onder andere gekenmerkt is door een manifeste neiging om (ambigue) 
sociale gebeurtenissen of cues als negatief of zelfs bedreigend te interpreteren en 
deze cues vervolgens op een vertekende (“ge-biasde”) manier te verwerken. Hoewel 
aangenomen wordt dat (emotionele) gezichtsuitdrukkingen een evolutionair 
waardevolle rol spelen in communicatie en bij sociale (evaluatieve) feedback, is het 
bewijs voor een vertekende/ge-biasde verwerking van gezichtsuitdrukkingen bij 
mensen met een verhoogd niveau van sociale angst niet eenduidig. 
 Het doel van de onderzoeken die in dit proefschrift beschreven worden was 
helderheid te scheppen over de in de literatuur gerapporteerde discrepanties. Door 
het gebruik van verschillende experimentele paradigma’s onderzochten we de 
implicaties van paradigmakeuze voor theorievorming en begrip van deze 
invaliderende stoornis. De volgende vragen werden onderzocht: in hoeverre gaan 
emotionele en neutrale gezichtsuitdrukkingen de visuele aandacht afleiden van een 
uit te voeren taak; kunnen taakirrelevante afbeeldingen van gezichten automatische 
gedragstendensen beïnvloeden, zijn er vertekeningen te observeren in het 
herkennen van bepaalde gezichtsuitdrukkingen en hoe worden deze gezichten 
beoordeeld als men de deelnemers direct om hun mening vraagt. Alle resultaten 
werden geïnterpreteerd in het licht van het al dan niet aanwezig zijn van sociale 
angst. De onderzoekslijn wordt hieronder besproken. 
 Allereerst (Hoofdstuk 2) begonnen we ons onderzoek met een meer 
algemene aanpak. We probeerden eerdere bevindingen te repliceren die lieten zien 
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dat vermoedelijk evolutionair belangrijke bedreigende stimuli, namelijk plaatjes van 
spinnen en boze gezichten, de “normale” verwerking van deze stimuli vertekenen 
(genoemd: “aandachtsbias”). Specifiek werd verondersteld dat bedreigende stimuli 
visuele aandacht snel naar zich toe trekken (“vigilantie”) en deze buiten 
proportioneel lang vast houden (verstoorde “disengagement”) met als doel een 
organisme op een snelle en gepaste reactie voor te bereiden. We waren in het 
bijzonder geïnteresseerd of de verwerking van bedreigende stimuli andere basale 
aandachtsprocessen zoals “Inhibition of Return (IOR)” verstoort/reduceert. IOR 
verwijst naar een proces dat het opnieuw richten van de aandacht op een locatie die 
al is gezien bemoeilijkt. IOR faciliteert het schenken van aandacht aan nieuwe 
stimuli in het visuele veld waardoor aandachtsprocessen doelmatiger verlopen. In de 
literatuur word verondersteld dat IOR en vigilantie-effecten voor bedreigende stimuli 
niet samen kunnen optreden. Als een bedreigende stimulus prioriteit krijgt bij het 
naar zich toe trekken van aandacht, zal een dergelijke stimulus, ook in een eerder 
gescande locatie van het gezichtsveld, alsnog alle aandacht opeisen. IOR treedt dan 
niet of slechts in verminderde mate op. Bovendien waren we geïnteresseerd of 
mogelijke veranderingen in IOR sterker zijn als mensen specifiek bang zijn voor 
deze stimuli (spinnen voor mensen met spinnenangst en gezichten voor hoog 
sociaal angstigen). In geen van de drie experimenten hebben we bewijs gevonden 
dat IOR gereduceerd is wanneer bedreigende stimuli op al eerder gescande locaties 
van het gezichtsveld worden aangeboden.  
 We concludeerden dat IOR een proces is dat vooral “bottom-up” 
gecontroleerd wordt door perceptuele informatie van de stimulus zelf. De waardering 
van een stimulus wordt echter “top-down” (door cognitieve evaluatie in het brein) 
gecontroleerd en heeft vermoedelijk niet de tijd om te interfereren met bottom-up 
processen. De gekozen onderzoeksopzet maakt algehele conclusies met betrekking 
tot een aandachtsbias echter niet mogelijk. We kunnen slechts concluderen dat een 
basaal proces als IOR niet door bedreigende stimuli verstoord lijkt te worden. 
 Ten tweede (Hoofdstuk 3), stelt men dat patiënten met een sociale 
angststoornis ten opzichte van een bedreigende stimulus vooral moeite hebben met 
verstoorde disengagement in plaats van verhoogde vigilantie voor deze stimuli. In de 
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literatuur onderschat men de mogelijkheid dat disengagement wellicht een grondige 
verwerking of identificatie van de emotie vereist: om de beoogde taak uit te kunnen 
voeren is het van belang dat de gebruikte emotionele gezichtsuitdrukking relevant is. 
Bij de, in dit soort onderzoek vaak gebruikte dot-probe taak, is dit niet nodig, 
waardoor de bevindingen wellicht niet eenduidig zijn. Bovendien zijn de wél 
gerapporteerde bevindingen rondom verstoorde disengagement ook te verklaren 
door een versmalling van de visuele focus wanneer een individu geconfronteerd 
wordt met een bedreigende stimulus. Door middel van een flanker paradigma 
hebben we onderzocht of bedreigende emotionele gezichtsstimuli, die 
gecategoriseerd moesten worden in blij, boos en neutraal en dus taakrelevant 
waren, leiden tot een versmalling van de visuele focus. Met dezelfde taak konden we 
ook onderzoeken of taakirrelevante, bedreigende perifere stimuli het uitoefenen van 
de taak bemoeilijken. We redeneerden dat als de visuele focus in reactie op 
bedreiging vernauwt, afleidende stimuli in de nabijee omgeving minder invloed 
hebben dan wanneer er geen vernauwing van focus optreedt. Reactietijden zouden 
dan kleiner moeten worden. Als de afleidende stimuli echter bedreigend zijn en de 
oorspronkelijke stimulus niet, zouden de reactietijden juist langer moeten worden. 
Wederom waren we geïnteresseerd of de verwachte effecten sterker zouden zijn bij 
mensen met sociale angst. 
 Er was geen bewijs voor een vernauwing van de visuele focus in reactie op 
boze gezichten noch dat boze gezichten meer afleidden van de taak dan andere 
expressies*. Kortom, ook al is de verwerking van de stimulus taak relevant, er is 
geen evidentie voor verstoringen in de aandacht en verwerking gevonden. Op basis 
van onze resultaten tot hiertoe vermoedden we dat emotionele gezichten niet zo 
zeer onderwerp zijn van bedreiginginterpretaties maar dat ze desondanks als zeer 
negatief worden ervaren.   
 
* Wel vonden we een interactie van geslacht van een persoon op een stimulusfoto met 
de door hem of haar getoonde expressie van het afgebeelde gezicht. Foto’s van lachende 
vrouwen en boze mannen werden sneller gecategoriseerd dan boze vrouwen en blije 
mannen. Ondanks dat deze resultaten irrelevant zijn voor het begrijpen van 
gezichtsverwerking bij sociaal angstigen, hebben deze bevindingen verstrekkende 
methodologische implicaties voor onderzoek dat gebruik maakt van 
gezichtsuitdrukkingen. 
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 Ten derde (Hoofdstuk 4), veronderstelden we dat de inconsistenties in de 
bevindingen omtrent vigilantie en boze gezichten bij sociaal angstigen met de keuze 
van het experimentele paradigma te maken zou kunnen hebben. Versnelde 
aandacht voor boze gezichten manifesteert zich niet noodzakelijk in een versnelde 
detectie van “full-blown” gezichtsuitdrukkingen, maar mogelijk juist in het herkennen 
van de eerste tekenen van een (boze) emotie bij een zich geleidelijk ontwikkelende 
expressie. Mogelijk ook dat sociaal angstigen deze eerste tekenen van een (boze) 
emotie vaker verkeerd identificeren. In twee taken bekeken deelnemers films waarin 
een neutrale gezichtsuitdrukking geleidelijk veranderde in een blije, boze of 
walgende expressie. In de eerste taak stopten de deelnemers de film zodra ze 
meenden de eerste tekenen van een emotie te herkennen. Zonder het einde van de 
film te hebben gezien moesten ze gokken welke emotie zich volgens hen ging 
ontwikkelen. In de tweede taak zagen ze dezelfde film, maar hadden ze de vrijheid 
om de hele film heen en terug te “spoelen”, het einde te zien en dan alsnog het punt 
op te zoeken waarop zij meenden dat de gezichtsuitdrukking van neutraal naar 
emotioneel geladen omsloeg. Hierna konden ze weer teruggaan naar het einde van 
de film om te bepalen welk emotie zij dachten dat er getoond werd. Beide taken 
leverden geen bewijs voor een beterde of slechtere herkenning van gradueel 
veranderende gezichtsuitdrukkingen bij sociaal angstige mensen in vergelijking met 
niet angstige controle personen. Wel vonden we dat de eerste tekenen van walging 
(taak 1) door sociaal angstigen vaker geïnterpreteerd werden als afwijzing, terwijl 
niet-angstigen deze tekenen van walging interpreteerden als tekenen van blijdschap. 
Het is dus niet het aantal fouten dat het verschil tussen groepen bepaalde, maar het 
soort fouten.  
 In overeenstemming met cognitieve modellen van sociale fobie hebben we 
een samenhang gevonden tussen sociale angst en de neiging om ambigue sociale 
informatie negatief te interpreteren. Het is al eerder geconstateerd dat 
gezichtsuitdrukkingen zoals walging en afwijzing sterk op elkaar lijken. Het is dus 
denkbaar dat sociaal angstige, in geval van twijfel, expressies in overeenstemming 
met hun angsten interpreteren. De taakspecifieke beperkingen in beschikbare 
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informatie voor de proefpersoon zou de ambiguïteit kunstmatig verhoogd kunnen 
hebben, waardoor er meer ruimte was voor interpretatie. 
 Ten vierde (Hoofdstuk 5), wilden we de vraag beantwoorden welke rol 
“overte” (door oogbewegingen traceerbare) aandacht speelt bij de evaluatie van 
bepaalde soorten expressies. Daartoe hebben we oogbewegingen bij deelnemers 
gemeten terwijl zij naar matrices van gezichten (“crowds” genoemd) keken die 
verschillende verhoudingen van twee expressies bevatten (bijvoorbeeld een 
combinatie van 9 blije en 3 neutrale gezichten). De deelnemers moesten de crowds 
beoordelen op vriendelijkheid. We onderzochten in hoeverre de oogbewegingen de 
beoordelingen konden voorspellen en of dit samen hing met sociale angst. We 
vonden dat sociaal angstige deelnemers korter naar boze gezichten keken dan niet-
angstigen. De subjectieve beoordelingen verschilden echter niet tussen de groepen. 
Het blijft verder onduidelijk of de geobserveerde verkorte aandacht voor boze 
gezichten in sociaal angstigen relevant is voor angst gerelateerde gedragingen zoals 
bijvoorbeeld zelfevaluatie, negatieve interpretatie, of vermijding van sociale situaties.  
 Ten vijfde (Hoofdstuk 6), trachtten we inzicht te krijgen in evaluatieve 
processen die niet door middel van expliciete beoordeling of aandachtstaken op te 
sporen zijn. Feitelijk onderzochten we of automatische gedragspatronen zoals 
toenaderings- en vermijdingstendensen verschillen tussen sociaal angstige en niet-
angstige individuen wanneer zij reageren op groepen van emotionele gezichten. We 
presenteerden de proefpersonen wederom matrices van gezichten met 
veranderende verhoudingen tussen neutraal-boze of blij-boze gezichten. De stimuli 
waren voorzien van een rode of bruine achtergrondkleur en aan de deelnemers werd 
gevraagd om de plaatjes op basis van die kleur met een joystick te sorteren 
ongeacht de emotionele uitdrukking van de gezichten: bij de ene kleur naar je toe 
trekken (toenadering), bij de andere van je weg duwen (vermijding). Zoals in de 
vorige studie moesten de deelnemers de crowds na de joysticktaak op 
vriendelijkheid beoordelen. Sociaal angstigen reageerden meer vermijdend 
naarmate in een neutrale groep het aantal boze gezichten toenam ondanks de 
opdracht de emoties van gezichten te negeren. Bij de blij-boze combinaties 
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reageerden ze overal vermijdend. Het blijkt dat sociaal angstige individuen emoties 
in het algemeen, zelfs als ze positief zijn, vermijden.  
 Tot slotte (Hoofdstuk 7), hebben we gepoogd de oorzaak-gevolg relatie van 
vertekeningen (biases) in de cognitieve verwerking en angstgerelateerd gedrag te 
onderzoeken: is een dergelijke vertekening bij de informatieverwerking nou een 
symptoom van sociale angst zoals bijvoorbeeld vermijdingsgedrag, of speelt een 
cognitieve bias een cruciale rol bij de etiologie die uiteindelijk leidt tot de sociale 
angst stoornis. Door middel van een bias-inductie in een normale populatie wilden 
we onderzoeken of toenaderings- of vermijdingstendensen uitgelokt konden worden. 
We vonden dat deelnemers die getraind werden om sociale informatie negatief te 
interpreteren (“negatieve interpretatiebias”), op een vergelijkbare manier neutraal-
boze groepen gingen vermijden als sociaal angstigen in het vorige onderzoek 
(Hoofdstuk 6). In vergelijking met de bevindingen voor de blij-boze combinaties uit 
het vorige onderzoek, werden hier geen reactieverschillen gevonden tussen de 
groepen (hier: positief en negatief getrainde). We concludeerden dat bij sociale 
angst de geautomatiseerde vermijding van blije gezicht het resultaat moet zijn van 
een uitgebreide leergeschiedenis met negatieve, of wellicht negatief 
geïnterpreteerde, ervaringen met lachende mensen. Met één uur trainen zoals we in 
het onderzoek hebben gedaan, hebben wij vermoedelijk van de van oorsprong 
positieve valentie van blije gezichten niet om kunnen keren. Deze studie leverde wel 
de eerste bewijzen op dat een geïnduceerde negatieve interpretatiebias voor ambigu 
sociaal materiaal kan resulteren in vermijdende gedragspatronen vergelijkbaar met 
die van sociaal angstigen. Dit effect was echter beperkt tot de responsen op 
neutraal-boze stimuli. Hieruit concludeerden we dat het niet noodzakelijk om een 
evaluatie van bedreiging gaat die vermijding initieert, maar dat een negatieve 
evaluatie voldoende is om de drempel voor een vermijdingsreactie te passeren. 
 Concluderend, als er inderdaad een geautomatiseerd cognitief systeem 
bestaat dat elke stimulus of input evalueert en als het systeem kan differentiëren 
tussen “bedreigende” en “negatieve” elementen, dan kan dit onze uiteenlopende 
bevindingen verklaren. Omdat visuele aandachtsprocessen verondersteld worden 
vooral sensitief te zijn voor bedreiging, is het aannemelijk dat ze niet beïnvloed 
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worden door stimuli die door sociaal angstigen slechts als negatief beoordeeld 
worden (Hoofdstuk 2 & 3). Er is geen dreigend gevaar waartegen het organisme 
onmiddellijk beschermt dient te worden. Vroegtijdige herkenning van (eerste tekenen 
van) emotionele gezichtsuitdrukkingen is dan ook niet nodig (Hoofdstuk 4). Omdat 
de mens wél geneigd is om negatieve situaties en stimuli (zo snel mogelijk) te 
vermijden, en boze gezichten duidelijk negatief zijn, spreekt het de gevonden 
snellere categorisatie in de normale populatie (Hoofdstuk 3), of specifiek bij sociaal 
angstigen, niet tegen (Hoofdstuk 5). In feite maakt een sterke negatieve evaluatie 
een vermijdingsimpuls meer plausibel wanneer het aantal (irrelevante) negatieve 
gezichten in een groep toeneemt (Hoofdstuk 6). Aanvullend bewijs wordt geleverd 
door het feit dat een inductie van een negatieve interpretatiebias in een normale 
populatie resulteerde in vermijdingstendensen vergelijkbaar met die van sociaal 
angstige individuen.   
 
Discussie 
 
Het doel van de in dit proefschrift beschreven studies was om te onderzoeken in 
hoeverre de verwerking van emotionele gezichten beïnvloed werd door de mate van 
sociale angst. We hebben verschillende facetten van mogelijk vertekende cognitieve 
processen aan de orde gesteld: namelijk visuele aandacht, disengagement van 
aandacht, aandachtsvernauwing, emotie herkenning, oogbeweging, toenaderings- 
en vermijdingstendensen en expliciete/subjectieve beoordelingen. Cognitieve 
theorieën en uitgebreid experimenteel psychopathologisch onderzoek konden tot op 
heden maar beperkte aanwijzingen  vinden dat de verwerking van emotionele (boze) 
gezichtsuitdrukkingen een belangrijke rol spelen bij het in stand houden, maar 
misschien ook het ontstaan, van de sociale angststoornis. De resultaten die in dit 
proefschrift gepresenteerd worden laten zien dat emotionele gezichtsuitdrukkingen, 
en specifiek boze gezichten, een prominente, maar niet noodzakelijk op bedreiging 
gerichte, rol kunnen spelen bij de verwerking van gezichten bij sociaal angstige 
individuen. Gebaseerd op onze bevindingen, denken wij dat boze gezichten alleen 
als “overdreven” negatief gezien worden en daardoor niet interfereren met een 
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bedreiginggerelateerd proces zoals (verdekte [“covert”]) aandacht. Ondanks het feit 
dat binnen angstonderzoek criteria ontbreken om “bedreigend“ en “niet-bedreigend 
maar negatief” duidelijk van elkaar te scheiden, duiden onze bevindingen erop dat 
boze gezichten niet intrinsiek bedreigend zijn voor alle sociaal angstigen. Als onze 
assumpties kloppen met betrekking tot hoe bedreigingbeoordelingen cognitieve 
processen en gerelateerd gedrag beïnvloedden, moeten we aannemen dat sociaal 
angstige proefpersonen boze gezichten “slechts” als disproportioneel negatief 
evalueerden. Daarom laten sociaal angstige individuen consistent gedrag zien dat 
gerelateerd is aan automatische negatieve beoordeling of aversie zoals 
vermijdingstendensen. Dat betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat ze responsen laten 
zien die blijk geven van bedreiging in het visuele veld zoals een vermindering in IOR 
of aandachtsvernauwing. Bovendien kon aangetoond worden dat naast boze ook 
blije gezichtsuitdrukkingen negatiever beoordeeld worden door sociaal angstigen 
dan door niet-angstigen. Samengenomen, concluderen we dat bij sociale angst 
gezichtsuitdrukkingen zoals boosheid of blijdschap, door een leergeschiedenis en 
een algemene angstneiging die genetisch gepredisponeerd is, een prominente 
negatieve evaluatie ondergaan. Een dergelijk proces raakt geautomatiseerd en 
initieert aversiegerelateerde, reflexmatige gedragstendensen zoals vermijding, maar 
leidt niet tot veranderingen van bewuste gezichtsbeoordelingsprocessen. Het is 
mogelijk, ook al moet dit nog onderzocht worden, dat een gesprekspartner dit soort 
subtiel gedrag bij een sociaal angstig persoon waarneemt en als afkeur interpreteert. 
Vervolgens zou de gesprekspartner zich dan onvriendelijk en afwijzend kunnen 
gedragen wat de sociaal angstige als een bevestiging van zijn verwachting te 
worden afgewezen kan zien, wat zijn of haar angst weer versterkt.  
 
Conclusie 
 
Dit onderzoek heeft licht geworpen op een aantal theoretische en 
methodologische problemen. De resultaten helpen om de cognitieve modellen 
over de sociale angststoornis aan te scherpen en nodigt uit de theoretische 
kaders te overdenken. Voor de toekomst is het cruciaal om de keuzes en 
 
Samenvatting 
 
- 227 - 
randvoorwaarden bij de inzet van experimentele paradigma’s die van gezichten 
gebruik maken duidelijk te omschrijven. Ook moeten de mechanismen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan een negatieve of een bedreigingbeoordeling uitgezocht en 
(opnieuw) gedefinieerd worden. Het is belangrijk om van tevoren te bepalen of 
men bedreigende of “slechts” negatieve stimuli wil gaan gebruiken en welke 
uitkomst men van elk verwacht. Voor het onderzoek naar sociale angst, resteert 
de vraag of gezichtsuitdrukkingen de meest geschikte stimuli vormen als men 
bedreiging en zijn invloed op cognitieve processen wil onderzoeken. De 
resultaten zouden verstoord kunnen zijn bij een prominente negatieve 
beoordeling. Meer duidelijkheid zal uiteindelijk leiden tot meer consistente 
onderzoeksresultaten, een beter begrip van de sociale angststoornis, en ten 
slotte verbeterde therapeutische interventies.  
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